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The global labor force continues to undergo complex processes of informalization and
urbanization, especially, in African economies. So far, however, studies of these pro-
cesses have been mostly preoccupied with monitoring the size, growth, working con-
ditions, economic returns, and types of informal work. This dissertation complements
and expands the existing literature by exploring the historical, political, and sociological
processes that have contributed to global and national understandings of informal work
In Kenya, informal employment comprised more than 75 percent of total employ-
ment in 2004 (Republic of Kenya 2005b). Despite the potential for a large unified
constituency, informal workers remain politically marginalized and divided, unable to
mobilize for collective rights. This research seeks to understand this marginalization
by exploring the effects of international and national relations of power in the field of
informal work. Through both primary and secondary data collection, this project uncov-
ered relations of power between multilateral organizations (particularly the ILO, World
Bank, and IMF), Northern academic institutions, powerful Northern States (particularly
the U.S. and the U.K.) and the Kenyan State, which have influenced the construction of
global and local informal identity.
This work also exposes mechanisms of power operating in the field of informal work,
including normalization, consent, and coercion, and economic control that have limited
the degree to which informal workers see themselves as a collective force or find social
or political solidarity with other informals. Without this collective identity, informals
have been unable to form a strong front to lobby for political representation despite their
legal claims to it.
Evidence presented in this study reveals that informal workers face a number of bar-
riers to collective mobilization including government repression, co-optation of lead-
ership, political patronage, fomenting of ethnic divisions, and policies that privilege
elites. Informals have formed both large and small organizations to combat these el-
ements with limited success. Recently, however, an umbrella organization of hawkers
and traders has been formed, uniting over 5,000 workers to lobby for representation on
the current draft of the Micro and Small Enterprise Bill. This study finds that informal
workers are not passive recipients of structural forces but actors who negotiate power
and contest marginalization. These are positive signs that informal workers are begin-
ning to mobilize for lasting political and social change that will help them support their
livelihoods and improve their lives.
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CHAPTER 1
POWER AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE FIELD OF INFORMAL WORK
The global labor force continues to undergo complex processes of informalization and
urbanization especially, in African economies. Informal employment in Kenya com-
poses more than 75 percent of total employment in 2004 (Republic of Kenya 2005b).
Despite the potential for a large unified constituency, informal workers remain politi-
cally marginalized and divided, unable to mobilize for collective rights. This research
seeks to understand this marginalization by exploring the effects of international and
national relations of power in the field of informal work. To ascertain these effects,
mechanisms of power including normalization, coercion, consent, and economic con-
trol are investigated.
The analysis of the relations of power among informal workers explores informal
workers’ perceptions of identity compared to external notions of informality. This study
finds that informal workers are not passive recipients of structural forces but actors
who negotiate power and contest marginalization. By exploring the power relations
and mechanisms of power that influence global understandings of informality and how
informal workers negotiate these influences in their daily lives, this research offers an
exciting new multi-level perspective on informal work.
1.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses
In order to analyze the effects of international and national relations of power in the field
of informal work, this work proposes the following questions:
• What forms and agents of power are involved in constructing marketplaces and
the identity of those who work within?
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• How do these forms and agents of power influence development strategies and
policies targeting informal workers?
• How do retailers perceive their identity and place in society in relation to their
understanding of state and international policy?
According to the theoretical premises on which this paper rests, the following hy-
potheses are examined:
• Academic institutions, international organizations, state and local government,
and local social movements influence the construction of informal identity, albeit
with differing levels of influence.
• Groups in power privilege elite interests and their control of knowledge and ma-
terial production. As a result, policies meant to benefit informal workers also
minimize class-consciousness and social mobility. As long as informal workers
lack the solidarity needed to form a social movement, they can be controlled and
manipulated to maintain the status quo.
• Informal workers can exert influence over their own identity, spatial distribution,
and understanding of valuable social processes and forms of organization through
contestation and resistance. However, this influence is limited by powerful forces.
The power structure in Kenya has encouraged divisions based on the occupation,
ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status, and gender of workers, affecting the
ability of informals to develop a broad-based social movement to fight for liveli-
hood rights, legality, and democratic processes.
These hypotheses were evaluated using primary and secondary data collected in the
field and through a historical analysis of development discourses and national policy.
Yet, these hypotheses lack clarity without an understanding of the terminology used in
this study. The following section seeks to clarify what we mean by informal work.
1.2 What is Informal Work?
External categories of knowledge have been applied broadly to synthesize many dif-
ferent types of labor-market activities resulting in a bifurcation of labor-market termi-
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nology according to modernist conceptualizations of “productive” and “unproductive”
work (ILO 1972; Fields 1990).1 With rising rural-urban migration and low urban job
creation, the notion “the informal sector” emerged as a key conceptual framework for
understanding the survival mechanism of the masses of people not accounted for in of-
ficial employment statistics. However, over time, these terms fell out of favor as the
development discourse surrounding social problems of the global South evolved. Con-
temporary scholars of informal work face a large challenge in untangling the plethora of
overlapping definitions applied to this segment of the labor force. This section illumi-
nates key debates over terminology in the study of informal work (as listed below) and
clarifies the definition of informal work as used in this thesis.
• Traders and Hawkers
• Informal Sector (Urban and Rural)
• Petty Commodity Production (PCP)
• Medium and Small Enterprises (MSEs)
– Small Scale Enterprises (SSEs)
– Micro Enterprises
1.2.1 Traders and Hawkers
The earliest institutional recognition of informal work in Kenya occurred in the colonial
period. Traders and hawkers were depicted in colonial documents as a necessary scourge
— needed for food provision to keep urban labor costs low but a general nuisance and
danger to European sensibilities. Under the colonial regime, unlicensed traders and
hawkers were considered vagrants and referred to derogatively as spivs.
1See Appendix B for a timeline of important dates in the history of informal work in Kenya and
internationally.
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More recently, term “trader” has been used as a blanket term to describe people
engaged in economic exchange, though it conjures up antiquated images of barter and
non-cash reciprocity that are rare in Nairobi’s modern marketplaces. In this dissertation,
it is employed when discussing economic activity involving the sale of goods (whether
self-produced or resale) from a stationary location, whether at the wholesale or retail
level. On the other hand, the term “hawker” describes sellers who are ambulatory or
work at individual stands on roadsides. Hawking is one of the most visible and marginal
forms of informal work and has been studied in detail in Kenya (Mitullah 1991; Chep-
kurui 1981). Municipal bylaws are particularly harsh towards hawkers, with numerous
references to restricting their operations (Gichira 1991). Although there is a tendency
to want to group hawking and trading into one category, historically (with a few excep-
tions) the two groups have had opposing interests and do not see themselves as a united
front.
1.2.2 The Informal Sector Debate
Coined in 1971 by Keith Hart, the term “informal sector” was developed under Inter-
national Labour Organization’s (ILO) World Employment Program to help develop a
body of literature around the “working poor.” Rooted in modernization theory, the in-
formal sector was seen as a secondary, unproductive traditional sector in opposition to
the primary, productive, modern industrial sector. Cemented in the ILO’s 1972 Kenya
Report, the informal sector was defined by seven key characteristics, including ease of
entry, reliance on local resources, family ownership and operation, small-scale (hav-
ing no or few employees), labor intensive and using basic technology, workers without
formal training, and high levels of competition due to lack of market regulation (ILO
1972:6). The confusion between necessary and sufficient characteristics resulted in a
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lack of consensus on whether a business must have one of these characteristics, all of
them, a critical mass, or key ones to be considered part of the informal sector.
Used to discuss a range of phenomena, including employment, housing, and trans-
port, the term “informal” became overextended. The World Bank’s flagship report on
informality states:
The mere fact that we need to employ multiple measures of informality
capturing distinct approaches to the sector suggests that we are not clear on
exactly what it is and what we should be studying. In all likelihood, we are
dealing with several distinct phenomena under this convenient, but arguably
unhelpful, umbrella term (2007:1).
In addition, this definition ignored the question of legality that was central to some
scholars’ conceptualization of informality (Portes et al. 1989; de Soto 1989; Mead and
Morrisson 1996).
The informal sector is often divided into two subsectors: the urban informal sector
and the rural informal sector. As discussed in Chapter 3, modernization theory encour-
aged an urban bias that ignored the rural informal sector. Various labor market models
sought to remedy this problem by including at various times a rural or urban informal
sector in addition to agricultural and industrial work. Structural adjustment policies near
the end of the century sought to reverse this urban bias by creating programs to bolster
the rural informal sector and stem the tide of rural-urban migration.
During the1993 International Conference of Labour Statisticians, the ILO issued
a new document clarifying and redefining employment in the informal sector (UN-
HABITAT 2006; ILO 2002; ILO 2007; SNA 2004). The theoretical conceptualization
of the term remained similar to the older version with a primary emphasis on general-
ized characteristics such as a low level of organization, small-scale, non-contract based
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Table 1.1: Key Changes in Defining the Informal Sector
1993 ILO Definition 1972 ILO Definition
The assets of an informal business belong to the
owner and not to the firm or production unit so
goods that are used in the business may be used
at home also.
Not part of the original definition.
Informal business owners do not keep accounts
that allow for a distinction between “the produc-
tion activities of the enterprises from other activ-
ities of their owners and the identification of any
flows of income and capital between the enter-
prises and the owners” (ILO 2007:3).
Considered one characteristic of the informal
economy to be a lack of record-keeping; how-
ever, many businesses that fit the criteria for in-
formal economy in other ways, kept a basic bal-
ance sheet.
Informal businesses include both self and paid
employment regardless of seasonality, amount of
fixed assets, characteristics of the work site, and
whether the labor in this business was primary or
secondary for income receipt.
Did not recognize the overlap between sectors.
Informal businesses are not registered meaning
“registration under factories or commercial acts,
tax or social security laws, professional groups’
regulatory acts, or similar acts, laws or regula-
tions established by national legislative bodies”
(ILO 2007:6).
“Registration” was unclear in previous defini-
tions, so that businesses that had obtained a busi-
ness license but fit the list of characteristics oth-
erwise were not considered informal.
Non-remunerated household labor, subcontracted
labor, self-employed professionals, agricultural
activities, and most domestic workers should not
be considered part of the informal economy.
Did not specify how these forms of labor should
be classified.
work, few social protections or worker benefits, and family ownership and employment.
At the same time, the ILO attempted to rectify some of the limitations of the previous
definition by creating operational definitions that nuanced several key characteristics,
including the use of assets, cross-sector work, lack of record keeping, and registration
(see Table 1.1). Despite these improvements, the connection between the theoretical and
operational definitions remained unclear and was based on characteristics that likely did
not apply to every informal business.
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1.2.3 Petty-Commodity-Production (PCP)
Deeply concerned with the dualism evident in the ILO’s approach, scholars from the
dependency theory tradition formulated a contrasting understanding of labor markets
in developing countries. Rooted in neo-Marxist understandings of work, the Petty-
Commodity-Production (PCP) school of thought focused on relations of workers to the
means of production (Kitching 1980b). Instead of two distinct sectors, PCP theorists
saw a continuum of economic activity that was intricately interconnected (Moser 1978).
They began to explore connections between productive activities, rather than taking
the ILO approach of working to define the characteristics of sub-sectors of production
(Moser 1994). Relations between forms of production were seen as the driving force for
economic growth. Ultimately, PCP theorists concluded that despite its marginal appear-
ance, petty-commodity-production was intimately tied to capitalist forms of production
(Gerry 1978). The question remains as to the mutual benefit of such relationship. Some,
like Marx himself, argued that this relationship was exploitative and privileged one form
at the expense of the other.
Wherever it takes root, capitalist production destroys all forms of commod-
ity production which are based either on the self-employment of producers,
or merely on the sale of the excess product as commodities . . . Capitalist
production first makes the production of commodities general and then,
by degrees, transforms all commodity production into capitalist production
(Marx 1972:36).
Theorists in this vein of thought contend that the petty producer will always be sub-
ordinate to capitalism due to the inherent exploitation in the linkages between these
forms of production (Swainson 1978). To them, the ILO’s contention that changes in
political policy, within the system of capitalism, can successfully bring about economic
and social development was naı¨ve (Gerry and Birkbeck 1981).
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Yet, others see a more dialectical relation between different forms. The globalizing
forces that have spread capitalism around the world have certainly not destroyed PCP as
predicted by Marx. In fact, PCP is less marginalized than expected since capitalist suc-
cess depends on petty-commodity-producers in a myriad of ways, from sub-contracting,
commission selling, and outsourcing (Tokman 1978a; Perlman 1976; Bromley 1978b).
Less directly but no less importantly, PCP keeps the cost of urban life and therefore
urban labor artificially low by providing a cheap form of import substitution. Yet, capi-
talism provides the basic equipment, raw materials, access to capital, and access to mar-
kets on which PCPs depend (Gerry 1978). By selling inputs at a high price and buying
outputs at a low price, capitalist industry is able to profit off of PCP relations. Through
such means, capitalists dominate the ownership and control of the means of production;
however, petty-commodity producers do have potential leverage in the supply of urban
goods and services as well as the ability to exit unproductive forms of production, as
we will see later in a discussion of colonial policies and backward linkages in Kenya
(Moser 1978; Pen˜a 1997). PCP terminology was popular with dependency theorists in
the 1970s but never gained mainstream attention, in part due to its Marxist connotations
(McNeill 2004).
1.2.4 Medium and Small Enterprises (MSE)
Under the policies of privatization and liberalization enacted from the 1980s onwards
the term “informal sector” fell out of popularity with the multilaterals. While discussed
in detail in Chapter 4, in summary, multilaterals and ultimately the state employed the
rhetoric of entrepreneurship to recast what was considered formally marginal economic
activity as what would bring Kenya into a laissez-faire economy (Cross 2000). Medium
and Small Enterprises (MSEs) (and its sub-sectors of microentrepreneurs and small-
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scale enterprises) were considered approximations of the nascent state of larger indus-
tries and could be studied as “firms,” which, with proper business management and
capital investment, could become organized and productive like the larger industries
(Elyachar 2005).
The MSE sector was further divided into productive (upper-tier) and non-productive
(subsistence) sub-sectors (House 1984; Fields 2004a; UN-HABITAT 2006). Small-
Scale Enterprises (SSE) and microenterprises in the manufacturing and productive ser-
vices were widely heralded as having the potential for productivity, growth, and the
ultimate goal of graduation of skilled workers into the formal sector. Non-productive
sub-sectors included the majority (55–65 percent) of activities categorized as informal
by the ILO, such as trading, hawking, and transport (Riley and Steel 2000). Indeed,
much of the empirical and policy literature discussing the “informal sector” after 1972
has focused on small-scale manufacturing or small enterprises (see Akoten et al. 2006,
2007, 2007; McCormick et al. 1997, 1998; King 1996; Moyi 2003). Chapter 6 discusses
retailers’ contestation or concession to this externally imposed framing discourse.
1.2.5 Perspectives of Informal Work In This Dissertation
The history of the development of the terminology “informal sector” and its subsequent
forms, as discussed above, point to the sociology of the sector. Namely, despite the
actual characteristics of informal enterprises, its perceived characteristics of marginal-
ity, low productivity, and a temporary holding ground for migrant labor, are what de-
fine it both in development literature and in society (Sethuraman 1981:63; Mazumdar
1976:55). To some, the dividing line between informal and formal sectors is so visually
apparent that a concrete definition is superfluous. This analysis recognizes the popular
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perception of informality as important, especially when discussing how the constructed
identity of informals influences their own understanding of their work. Thus, this study
uses the term “informal sector” to recognize this popular perception of a group of casual,
subsistence, and transient workers.
However, this work views the casual empiricism of the popular understanding of in-
formality as insufficient for a detailed look at the nuances in and development of labor
market bifurcation, preferring instead to employ the term “informal work” to describe
all labor activities (full-time or part-time, waged or self-employed, primary or secondary
income), where the employer is not registered with the government in a way that he or
she is obligated to pay worker benefits such as social security (however the employer
still may decide to do so — see Daily Nation 2009b, 2007d) or pay Value Added Tax
(VAT). The business still may have a license to operate legally or be taxed daily. Other
characteristics used to define informality, such as small-scale, survival level, unregu-
lated, unorganized, operating out of temporary structures, low level of capital, and fam-
ily owned and operated are neither necessary nor sufficient to be considered part of the
definition of informal work.
“Informal workers” or “informals” are individuals employed or self-employed in
“informal” activities. Workers are not considered statically formal or informal, they can
transcend categories as they switch occupations during the same day. In many cases,
workers are engaged in multiple sectors at the same time, for example by importing
cars or working for Kenya Airways and employing a worker to run their used clothing
business (Daily Nation 2007c:4, 2009; research interview).
This dissertation sees informal and formal work as separated by a registration bar-
rier that requires formal enterprises to follow strict tax and labor guidelines while de-
manding compliance with less strict measures for informal workers. The most formal
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export-oriented enterprises have the strictest regulatory environment forcing them not
only to comply with domestic laws but also international regulations. Smaller formal
enterprises must comply with strict domestic labor and tax laws while the strongest in-
formal enterprises must comply with a less strict but still present regulatory environment
of health guidelines and licensing requirements. Extremely informal enterprises such as
hawking have the least regulatory oversight and are often considered illegal forms of
employment since workers in these forms often cannot or do not purchase licenses. The
labor market of formal and informal work is not regarded as a trajectory since there is
little empirical evidence that informal workers “naturally progress” into formal employ-
ment (Haan 2001; King 1996).
Because of the broad understanding of “informal work” employed in this disserta-
tion, I advocate for the separation of work into sub-sectors whenever possible. Akoten
(2007) lists five sub-sectors of informal work including manufacturing, services, restau-
rants/hotels/bars, construction, and trade, to which I add transportation, subcontracting,
home-based work, and casual labor. Different sub-sectors have different characteristics
and needs that need to be understood within their specific contexts and often members of
one sector see themselves as having separate interests from members in another sector.
1.3 Contributions
The global labor force continues to undergo complex processes of informalization and
urbanization especially, in African economies. So far, however, studies of these pro-
cesses have been mostly preoccupied with monitoring the size, growth, working con-
ditions, economic returns, and types of informal work. This work complements and
expands the existing literature by exploring power relations that influence global under-
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standings of informality and how informal workers negotiate these influences in their
daily lives. Thus, this research offers an exciting new multi-level perspective on infor-
mal work.
Historically, analyses of power in informal work have stemmed from the depen-
dency school, but these have centered around critiques of exploitative capitalist modes
of production and hegemonic power (see Swainson 1978; Leys 1994; Kitching 1980a;
Birkbeck 1978; Gerry 1978; Gerry and Birkbeck 1981). In this view, informals are
marginalized by virtue of being separated from their own means of production, but this
marginality is irreversible due to the very structure of the capitalist machinery (Ramos
et al. 1977; Moser 1978; Tokman 1978a, 1978b). This work appreciates this attention to
exploitation and marginality, but departs from Marxist interpretations of power. Instead
Foucault’s notion of a web of power relations is employed to highlight how even the
marginalized exert power in their daily lives. This focus on informal contestations and
negotiations of power pushes the envelope of the sociological study of informal work.
The majority of research on informal work in Kenya has had a narrow scope, focus-
ing on definitions of informal work, the livelihoods of informals, or the macro-regulatory
climate. King (1996) and Robertson (1997b) have synthesized these broad topics relat-
ing to informality in Kenya into one body of work, but King’s work focuses exclusively
on small-scale manufacturers and Robertson delves into the colonial history of women’s
trade. While these books are excellent resources, neither has provided the full history
of retail/trade in Kenya from the 1900s to the present alongside the larger context of the
development of global understandings of informality. Thus, this research seeks to build
on King (1996) and Robertson’s (1997b) oeuvres to provide a much more expansive
understanding of informal work.
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In part, this research is unique because it chooses to study retailers as its primary
unit of analysis. Despite the fact that retailers compose the largest sub-sector of informal
labor in Nairobi, few studies have focused solely them (Riley and Steel 2000; Brown
and Lyons 2010). Rather, much of the empirical and policy literature on informal work
has examined small-scale manufacturing (see Ikiara 1990; Republic of Kenya 1992;
Macharia 1993, 1994; Portes 1994; King 1996; McCormick et al. 1997, McCormick
1998; Riley and Steel 2000; Moyi 2003; Blattman et al. 2004; Bigsten et al. 2004,
2006; Akoten et al. 2006, 2007, 2007). Other research has primarily concentrated on
hawkers and street traders instead of market traders (see Mitullah 1991, 2003a, 2004;
Bromley 1978b, 2000; Cross 2000, 2007; Popke and Ballard 2004; Brown and Lyons
2010). There is also a large base of literature on slums and the employment opportunities
within but many marketplaces and retailers are not located in slums (Alder 1995; Ferrara
2002; Mitullah 2003b; Government of Kenya 2004; Mugisha 2005; Gulyani 2006).
Surprisingly few authors have rooted their work in the urban marketplace (see Lyons
and Snoxell 2005; Muraya 2006). This study identifies this gap and seeks to fill it by
providing an in-depth analysis of retailers in Kenya from the colonial era to the present.
To the best of my knowledge, this study is also one of the first broad analyses of
both historical and contemporary informal worker social mobilization in Kenya. Previ-
ous studies have investigated the self-help associations that help to organize and provide
resources for informals (see Godfrey and Mutiso 1974; Ferrara 2002; Chen 1996; Ud-
vardy 1998; Mitlin 2001). McCormick et al. (2003) discussed the current status of small
and large associations in Kenya and Brown and Lyons (2010) explored characteristics
of traders’ organizations in several other African countries. Yet, few have analyzed the
evidence for a broad-scale informal workers’ social movement in Kenya.
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Finally, the question of defining informal work has been a thorn in the side of re-
searchers since the 1970s. This work heeds Mead and Morrisson’s warning that “it is
incumbent on analysts to specify what they mean by [the informal sector] in their own
country” (1996:1617). A new legal definition for informal work in Kenya has been pro-
vided that moves beyond Portes et al. (1989) and de Soto’s (1989) legalist perspectives.
Previous studies have been preoccupied with defining the characteristics of enter-
prises in the informal sector (ILO 1972; Mead and Morrisson 1996; House 1984; Moser
1978; Livingstone 1991; Daniels 1999; ILO 2007). On one hand, structuralists had a
dualistic understanding of labor markets and thus defined the informal sector accord-
ing to what characteristics it lacked in relation to the formal (ILO 1972). Early studies
viewed informal work as a holding ground for rural migrants until they could find suit-
able jobs in other sectors (Sethuraman 1981:63; Mazumdar 1976:55). But, far from
being marginal workers, this perspective emphasized informal enterprises as a potential
source of economic development (Hart 1973; ILO 1972). The original definition of the
“informal sector” that appeared in the 1972 Kenya Report has remained one of the most
influential and well-recognized explanation of informality despite being clarified and
redefined several times by the ILO (1985, 2002, 2007).
While dependency theorists also held a structuralist and modernist perspective of a
“second economy” that would eventually fade out as capitalist growth occurred, they
viewed informal enterprises as trapped in a state of perpetual marginalization (Tokman
1978a). According to this view informal work was a mode of production inherent to the
functioning of a capitalist system that sought increasingly lower wages and higher profit
(Moser 1980; Bromley 1978a; Gerry 1978).
On the other hand, legalists saw the informal sector as created by the state through
regulatory mechanisms. Portes et al. (1989:12, 31) extended a legal definition that has
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become well-known in sociological literature. They write, “the informal economy is
. . . a process of income-generation characterized by one central feature: it is unregulated
by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activi-
ties are regulated . . . [and] is comprised of economic activity that uses illegal means to
produce legal products.” Thus, Portes et al. (1989) view informal work as both illegal
and unregulated.
De Soto (1989) also employs a legalist definition but argues that informal enter-
prises are over-regulated and that if the government would reduce its meddling in eco-
nomic affairs “a burst of competitive energy would be released, living standards would
start rising, international trade would increase, developing countries could service their
huge and debilitating external debts more easily” (de Soto 1989:15). This definition has
achieved remarkable attention because it, like neo-liberal theory, views the government
as a barrier to economic growth.
This work employs a legal definition but claims that both Portes et al. (1989) and de
Soto (1989) are misguided in their assertions. Contrary to Portes et al.’s notion that in-
formals are illegal and unregulated, this research finds that while informals in Kenya are
unregistered, they are not necessarily unregulated or illegal. In fact, there is significant
heterogeneity among unregistered workers, some of whom have licenses and are both
regulated and legal, some that work in periphery marketplaces and are unregistered, reg-
ulated, and illegal, and some hawkers on the streets that are unregistered, unregulated,
and illegal.
Moreover, contrary to de Soto’s prediction of the power of deregulation, this work
finds a correlation between unregulated enterprises and unproductivity. That is, the
most unregulated segment of informal work — hawkers — are the least economically
productive and stable. It is questionable then that with reduced regulations informals
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will transform into engines of national development. Instead, I argue that increased po-
litical representation will improve the policy climate in ways that truly benefit informal
workers. This study expands previous legal definitions by proposing that registration
is the defining break between formal and informal while the degree of regulation is a
continuum. This conceptualization of informal work offers an exciting new direction
forward.
1.4 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation develops a multifaceted analysis of power and identity construction in
the field of informal work. Chapter 1 lays out the direction of the thesis by providing the
three research questions and hypotheses that have guided this work. The methods used
to explore each hypothesis are then discussed. The first chapter also provides a detailed
explanation of the history of terms surrounding informality and why this study has cho-
sen to employ the term “informal work.” The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the unique contributions of this work to the field of sociology and the study of informal
work.
Chapter 2 roots this study in contemporary sociological theory, particularly the the-
ories of Foucault and Gramsci. A discussion of Foucault’s methodology frames the
introduction of the methodological choices of this work. This chapter also explains the
rationale for conducting field research in Kenya before providing a justification for the
importance of studying informal work more generally.
Chapter 3 addresses the first hypothesis by exploring how informal work has been
modeled and theorized by key international actors including members of the Chicago
School of Economics, World Bank, IMF, U.K. and U.S. It reviews influential labor mar-
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ket theories that came to form global understandings of labor market characteristics and
roots them in one of two orthodox macroeconomic schools of thought.
Chapter 4 explores how these international discourses of development came to in-
fluence Kenyan policy and the understanding of informal work in Kenya. This chapter
provides evidence to answer hypothesis one concerning the power relations that influ-
ence the construction of informal work. It covers the history of external influence on
African labor forms from the colonial period through the Moi era (1978–2002).
Chapter 5 addresses hypothesis two through an analysis of the mechanisms of nor-
malization, consent, and coercion. It also reveals the use of subtle tactics to further elite
power in the political, economic, and social realm. This analysis documents the alter-
nating use of state force and concession-making to perpetuate increasingly autocratic
rule.
Chapter 6 highlights how informal workers are not passive recipients of power re-
lations. This work found evidence to support hypothesis three, revealing that informal
workers negotiate macro-techniques of power, contest marginalization, and exert power
in their everyday relations. A visible informal workers’ movement in Kenya is not ap-
parent but the women’s movement in Kenya was analyzed to provide potentially relevant
pre-cursors of informal mobilization that could hint at a future movement.
The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, synthesizes evidence presented in the disserta-
tion to evaluate the hypotheses established in Chapter 1. The study concludes by offering
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES
This work is indebted to the scholarship of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault.
Michel Foucault had a comfortable upbringing in an upper-middle-class home in France,
completed undergraduate and graduate degrees, and taught in academic positions for the
rest of his life. Foucault’s pairing of political activism and political theory is reflected in
his most well-known works, written in the 1960s and 1970s during the height of interest
in structuralism and rejection of existentialism in France. In contrast to Foucault’s priv-
ileged life history, Antonio Gramsci grew up in a poor Sicilian family and immigrated
to Italy for his university education, which he never completed. Nonetheless, Gramsci
became a prolific journalistic writer for Socialist publications (Gramsci 1994:xv). In the
1920s he was arrested and, while imprisoned for the following 10 years, compiled over
30 notebooks of political thought and commentary. This broad and unstructured body of
work remains Gramsci’s most well-known contribution to political theory. However, the
breadth of topics, use of disguised language to protect his work from Fascist guards, and
fragmentary and scattered political theory have challenged translators and scholars alike
in understanding Gramsci’s ideas accurately (Gramsci 1975:x). The following section
will describe Gramsci’s and Foucault’s theories of power, point out areas of congruence
between the theorists, and situate this dissertation within their discussions of power.
2.1 Informal Work and Sociological Theories of Power
Some suggest Foucault’s post-structuralism is incompatible with Gramsci’s neo-Marx-
ism; however, this work acknowledges these difference while finding constructive par-
allels that allows one theory to speak where the voice of other is less audible.
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2.1.1 Foucault’s Political Theory
Central to Foucault’s political theory is his understanding of power, which he is careful
to place in relation to power as conceptualized by Marx, Hegel, and Hobbes. Foucault
specifies that he is not interested in power as a commodity to be traded but in respect
to domination/repression (Foucault 1977:92). Yet, while he writes about power in this
respect, he struggles with the sense that power as repression does not wholly encompass
his understanding of the reach of power. Thus, to power, he has added the bi-directional
relations of knowledge/truth and right/law (Foucault 1977:93).
Foucault uses the triangular relations of power, truth, and right to analyze the imple-
mentation of power in society. He is interested in the relation of power to the creation
of truth discourse, which expresses and judges power, and the juridical system or struc-
tures that both implement and restrict power. Foucault is also interested in the juridical
system or structures that both implement and restrict power. The discourse of truth is
used to construct the juridical, which in turn judges the discourse of truth. Power also
produces the juridical system, which both implement and restricts power.
2.1.2 Gramsci’s Political Theory
While Foucault focuses on multi-directional power relations, Gramsci’s work is explic-
itly State-focused, viewing it as repressive, totalitarian, and capable of holding or seiz-
ing power. The State is composed of political society and civil society, the latter in the
Hegelian sense of “the political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the whole
of society; as the ethical content of the state” (Gramsci 1975:20). The notions of polit-
ical and civil society presuppose the existence of mechanisms of hegemony. Gramsci
(1971:264) writes, “The basis for the State. . . is the hegemonic apparatus of one social
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group over the rest of the population (or civil society).”While this work expands its
understanding of power beyond State hegemony, it does find Gramsci’s discussion of
mechanisms of power applicable.
2.1.3 Mechanisms of Power
Gramsci defines the hegemonic apparatus as consisting of mechanisms of consent and
coercion, wielded by the Party to build solidarity under single leadership. Generating
incentives such as freedom, political power, or material goods for the masses to partic-
ipate in the system is the preferred means of hegemonic power. The term “spontaneous
consent” is used by Gramsci to indicate consent manufactured through strong intellec-
tual and moral leadership that makes the interests of the dominant group seem common
sense, universal, and irrefutable (Gramsci 1971:57, 12). However, if practices of manu-
facturing consent break down, the dominant group may resort to legal (or extra-legal in
many cases) coercive strategies that may include physical force, segregation, discrimi-
nation, shaming, and dismissing oppositional thoughts as irrational (Gramsci 1971:57,
210–11). Gramsci (1971:263) argues that “dominant groups have coercive power, but
they do not need to exercise it regularly over subordinate groups because the subor-
dinate readily acquiesce to their dominance as being the natural order of things. In a
hegemonic situation, the dominant forces are prepared to make concessions when nec-
essary to maintain the acquiescence of the subordinate.” However, should consensus
building fail, coercive power can be employed.
This dissertation uses Gramsci’s understanding of consent and coercion to decon-
struct the various ways the Kenyan government and multilateral organizations main-
tained their powerful role influencing the organization of society. Chapter 4 explores
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the tactics multilaterals employed to encourage the Kenyan State to adopt their policy
recommendations. Chapter 5 focuses specifically on the mechanisms of manufacturing
consent by the Kenyan government (colonial and post-colonial) through giving conces-
sions, privileging loyal members of society, providing political representation, opening
credit and training facilities, co-opting associational leadership, and redefining terms of
identity. When these tactics failed, coercive measures such as forced evictions, concen-
tration camps, imprisonment, beatings, murder, razing of marketplaces, and confiscation
of property were instituted.
While Gramsci sees mechanisms of power as employed by the hegemonic/counter-
hegemonic power to gain and maintain control, Foucault uses these mechanisms to ex-
plain how knowledge influences power. Mechanisms of power arise in Foucault’s dis-
cussion of “normalization,” which he describes as the process where dominant groups
use scientific discourse arising out of the “human sciences” to define and control deviant
behavior and marginal groups (Foucault 1977:96, 104). The rise of disciplinary insti-
tutions, including universities and prisons, that developed mechanisms to control and
segregate populations and subjugate the individual physical body were a key change
brought about in the late 1800s (Foucault 1990:140). A new form of power, which he
calls “bio-power,” arose during this shift that “brought life and its mechanisms into the
realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of
human life” (Foucault 1990:143).1
For Foucault, the dominant group began to seek ways to control and circumscribe
the individual, and part of this process was to make the individual into an object of
scientific study. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1995:24) sets out to analyze the
1Foucault develops his understanding of bio-power in response to the medieval mechanistic under-
standing of body as machine. The body must be regulated through disciplines so the judicial system is
set up to govern it. Foucault expands this notion to the social body where institutions must be regulated
through laws and eventually social norms (Foucault 1990:145).
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penal system, such that through the analysis of “penal leniency as a technique of power
one might understand . . . in what way a specific mode of subjection was able to give birth
to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a ’scientific’ status.” Academic
disciplines arose around quantifying and measuring populations and the human body,
producing knowledge that could be used to control human life much in the same way
academic disciplines arose around quantifying and measuring production and productive
element of labor in developing countries. The academic discourses arising from the field
of development economics and economics more generally have shaped structures and
policies that have influenced the development of the concept of informal work.
Foucault traces the transformation of the usage of power to maintain monarchical
control and sovereignty through visible displays of physical punishment to measures of
control, often bodily control without corporeal punishment, within private institutions
(Foucault 1999:52, 1990:90). This study finds remarkable parallels between Foucault’s
study of the rise of regulatory institutions, particularly the prison form in the penal
system, and the institutions used to control and define informals in the post-colonial
period. Foucault writes that the “modern” prison “form” developed in the 1900s allowed
for the development of procedures,
for distributing individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them, extract-
ing from them the maximum in time and forces, training their bodies, coding
their continuous behavior, maintaining them in perfect visibility, forming
around them an apparatus of observation, registration and recording, con-
stituting on them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and centralized.
The general form of an apparatus intended to render individuals docile and
useful, by means of precise work upon their bodies. . . ” (1995:231).
Foucault’s concept of normalization as presented here in relation to the “modern”
prison form helps us understand the construction of institutions relating to informals.
The institution of the formal marketplace in Kenya has played much the same role in
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distributing individuals to a defined fixed space that served to classify the individu-
als according to this space — “informal traders” in the formal marketplace and small
manufacturers in sheds provided by the government. The attempt of the Kenyan gov-
ernment to fix informals contradicted the nature of trade and hawking, the very essence
of profitability and adaptability that this activity depended upon, in many cases rob-
bing traders of their clientele. On the other hand, small manufacturers already worked
in fixed premises, and the sheds were beneficial in providing shade but changed little
else. Thus, this installation worked with the central characteristics of small manufac-
turers privileging their mode of operation, which was already considered the productive
segment of informal activity by the time of the shed’s construction in the 1980s, while
trying to transform the productivity and morality of traders.
Marketplaces and sheds in Nairobi are constructed such that the activities of all
workers inside could be seen. Marketplaces are walled off to the outside with limited
entrances, there are no individual stalls or walls demarcating space, and the roofs of the
buildings are at least 20 feet above the concrete base, thereby, “maintaining [workers]
in perfect visibility” and making them easier to control. In the marketplace, workers are
monitored by city council policemen who collect taxes and issue a receipt, thus creating
a record of marketplace activity. Foucault writes that the essential function of modern
imprisonment is “the transformation of the individual’s behavior,” which mirrors closely
the function of the markets to transform petty hawkers to productive workers — both as
members of society through the reduction of crime and illegal activities and materially
through the accumulation of capital.
Foucault also remarks that the prison produces a tolerated form of illegality in that
it “helps to establish an open illegality, irreducible at a certain level and secretly useful,
at once refractory and docile; it isolates, outlines, brings out a form of illegality that
23
. . . makes it possible to leave in the shade those that one wishes to — or must — tolerate
. . . now this concentrated, supervised and disarmed illegality is directly useful . . . [as]
an agent of the illegality of the dominant groups . . . extracting from it an illicit profit”
(1995:280). In parallel, the “formal” marketplaces built by the Kenyan government and
municipal council shade “illegal” workers — illegal in the sense that workers are not
required to pay VAT or social security. But this is a tolerated illegality in comparison to
beer brewing, drug smuggling, or gun-running that occur in the informal, unregulated
marketplaces and back alleyways of the central business district. And moreover, illicit
profits can be extracted from these “illegals” in the form of bribes and confiscated goods
by the City Council police.
Yet, the parallels between the prison form and the modern marketplace in Kenya stop
here as Foucault claims the former as “a complete and austere institution” that must be
“an exhaustive disciplinary apparatus” (1995:235). Marketplaces do not encompass the
totality of life and social relations in Kenya and relations can be constituted within,
outside, and across the boundaries of the market limiting the bio-power of the insti-
tution. Despite this difference, the theoretical insights found in Foucault’s analysis of
normalization will help us understand how international organizations and the Kenyan
government effectively normalized a significant segment of Kenyan society.
Foucault’s discussion of the mechanisms of normalization and bio-power are central
to this thesis. Yet, it is important to clarify that this dissertation does not view these as
mechanisms of intent to subjugate individuals. Actors employing development theories
are not intentionally trying to create an alternative and subaltern identity for informal
workers but processes of rationalization, modernization, and normalization have served
to support the construction of certain categories of labor that ultimately influence how
this subset of the labor market is understood to fit into the development of the State.
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2.1.4 Methodology
Both Foucault and Gramsci root their work in a historical perspective that looks at the
antecedents to the current ruling group. Foucault used case studies of the mechanisms
by which discourses and institutions were formed and understood as valid and true, in
order to reveal how knowledge and power are intrinsically but subtly linked (see Fou-
cault 1961, 1990, 1995). For example, in The History of Sexuality, Foucault’s theories
of normalization and bio-power emerges as he traces the change in power over life from
mechanisms of corporeal punishment and physical disciplining to those of regulatory
control in the seventeenth century (1990:139). His political theory is never explicit but
always explained through the history of the institution. Likewise in Discipline and Pun-
ish, Foucault uses an exploration of the history of the penal system to illustrate his polit-
ical theory, concluding this work stating that it “must serve as a historical background to
various studies of the power of normalization and the formation of knowledge in mod-
ern society” (1995:308). These case studies are an appealing way to present the rich
historical data that helps the reader see the processes of normalization and bio-power
unfold before them.
Foucault sets out five important qualifications and clarifications with respect to his
treatment of power in a lecture translated in Power/Knowledge. Other features, which
we will note below, are developed elsewhere.
Effects of Power
First, his critical analysis of power does not seek to address the origin and legitimacy
of institutions, including governments to exert power over their subjects but instead fo-
cuses on the effects of power. He is not, therefore, interested in exploring the right of
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the sovereign to issue new laws or set up juridical structures, but examines the outcomes
of the judicial apparatus at the lowest level, the most marginal and extreme cases. In
this way, he seeks to understand where power is employed in the name of the juridi-
cal to people classified in particular ways. In Foucault’s own analyses, he examined
the extreme cases of the delinquent or the madman to see the effects of power on the
margins.
This dissertation employs Foucault’s focus of the effects of power on the margins,
taking the example of Kenyan informal workers as an economically marginalized group.
The right of the State and multilateral to design laws and policy that affect informals is
not the focus of this study. Instead, this work looks at how governmental and multilateral
institutions, through regulation, discourse making, and implementation, influence infor-
mal workers. In particular, this dissertation will examine the role of the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Labour Organization (ILO), in exert-
ing power through conceptual and linguistic structures developed or influenced by their
subsidiaries, consultants, and government affiliations. In Chapter 3, particular attention
is paid to economic discourses, such as modernization theory and neo-liberalism that
deeply influenced understandings of and policies concerning international development
and associated issues such as informal work. In turn, we will look at how conditionalities
accompanying multilateral policy prescriptions have served a juridical role to reinforce
truth discourses and bolster the authority of power.
Intent
Second, Foucault encourages analyses of power that focus on the actual results of the
implementation of power rather than on conscious intent of the government or institu-
tions that enacted the juridical structures and discourse development. Since Foucault’s
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genealogical method addresses contingencies that prior studies have taken as necessi-
ties, he does not see the results as following necessarily from any given institutional
intent. Rather, they result in a contingent fashion. Analyses of power should ask “how
it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through
a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc.” (Foucault
1977:97).
This work then is predominantly concerned with the practice of development para-
digms to understand how informality was constructed through numerous institutions,
policies, and juridical forces. It is less concerned with the presumed “good” intentions
of multilaterals and States and more so with the outcomes of their broad policy prescrip-
tions and macro-economic theories on the micro-level of informal workers.At the same
time, this study suggests that intent, though not necessarily connected to the effects, had
a role, if only in the maintenance of economic self-preservation or institutional integrity,
and will present evidence in Chapter 4 in terms of a congruence of outcome from diverse
policies.
Power as Particular
Third, Foucault rejects Marxism’s emphasis on class domination, instead viewing power
as existing in a multiplicity of social relations. This multiplicity certainly includes re-
lations of hegemony and hierarchical power but is not limited to this form. Foucault
understands individuals in terms of their ability to exercise power — this ability makes
a person a human being. He uses two metaphors of power relations in society. One is
that of a web: individuals are bound together in diverse power relations. Thus, even
marginalized individuals exert some power over some slice of society such that to be an
individual means that one engages in dynamic relations of power in everyday actions.
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The other metaphor is that of a chain. His point is that there is no single relation between
the dominant and the subject, but the subject is linked to others in similar relationships
of power or dominance. By structuring his methodology this way, he avoids the simplis-
tic focus on individual exercises of dominance, and emphasizes the linked multi-various
relations and effects of dominance in society.
In the realm of informal work, Foucault’s methodology gives power to informals
that they may exercise over others through everyday social interaction. Thus, sovereign-
subject relations are rejected as totalizing in that while the State may exert a powerful
influence over the informal worker, and the informal worker has little control over the
State, the informal worker is not powerless and can exert power in other social rela-
tions. Chapter 5 anticipates this methodological concern and in its discussion of how
the Kenyan State recognized the power of other segments of society and took actions
to both cultivate its support and through co-optation and mitigate its potential for col-
lective mobilization by redefining allegiances based on ethnicity, occupational status, or
gender. Chapter 6 supports Foucault’s claim that individuals are “always in the position
of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power” (Foucault 1977:98), by tracing
the web of power relations where traders are able to exert power over hawkers by form-
ing associations to advocate for their interests. These associations complained to the
Nairobi City Council (NCC) about the nuisance of hawkers and petitioned for changes
to the law.
Foucault’s political theory has important consequences for our understanding of re-
sistance. Resistance is thus conceptualized in the everyday relations rather than the
critical moments of revolution as understood by Gramsci who postulated a positive and
revolutionary role for the construction of discourse and intellectuals. Hegemonic mech-
anisms can be used not only by the dominant group to obtain and maintain power but
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also by counter-hegemonic movements to challenge the dominant group. In fact, Gram-
sci goes as far as to suggest that, to be successful, the subverted group must use these
discursive techniques to reclaim their own knowledges or myths and create new ones
that will bind the opposition together. In this dissertation, resistance is not evidenced
by the nascent stages of a grand overthrow of the powerful regime, but by the local and
particular resistances of workers and their organization for rights.
Micro-Techniques of Power
Fourth, Hobbes’ methodology of analyzing state sovereignty from the center to the base
is turned on its head. Foucault (1977:99) calls for “an ascending analysis of power”
that starts from the local exercise of power to the global. Only once micro-techniques
of power are understood in their local context, can the effects of the macro-techniques
can be analyzed. This study uses this component of Foucault’s methodology when it
considers the effects of dominance on those at the margins. For example, the discussion
of the acceptance of social relations of power intrinsic to market-based trade that were
first maligned as traditional and unproductive and later employed by the World Bank
to explain the dynamism and value of the “microentrepreneur,” initiates the analyses
in local relations of power. Foucault touches on this phenomenon writing that when
mechanisms began “to reveal their political usefulness and to lend themselves to eco-
nomic profit . . . all of a sudden, they came to be colonised and maintained by global
mechanisms and the entire State system” (1977:101). As multiple sources revealed the
potential of the concept of “microentrepreneur,” multinationals and States alike did not
hesitate to redefine and employ this term along politically useful lines. Chapters 4 and 5
will expand this brief introduction to this ascending analysis of power, while Chapter 6
attends to an analysis of the relations of power (including fragmentation and dominance)
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in the women’s movement (potentially foreshadowing an informal workers’ movement)
that were then exploited by the State, the effect of which was to co-opt and break apart
the movement for the time being.
However, this work also proposes that macro-mechanisms of power are so influen-
tial on the micro-sociology, that their use by the global must be understood simultaneous
with and in relation to the particular. This latter understanding of analytical direction
is employed when discussing the effects of global associational forms on local relations
of power. The new organizational forms promoted by multilaterals have heavily influ-
enced the local form of association (adding unitary leadership and a sort of advisory
board) and the power members hold over each other and the surrounding community.
This external input has changed the relations of power between associational members
and transformed associational forms into mirrors of State apparatuses that do little to
question the applicability of external categories of knowledge. Chapter 6 will continue
this discussion of associational forms and the influence of mechanisms of power.
Rejection of Grand Theory
Fifth, Foucault rejects the notion that global knowledges are ideological. That is to say,
he understands macro mechanisms of power to arrive at knowledges inductively (i.e. by
working things out or “muddling along”) and not by some guiding a priori grand theory
specifying an ideological intent. This understanding of power and knowledge applied
to the example of discourse on informal works leaves us with the question of whether
multilateral or dominant State discourse invokes an ideological bent. If such a bent
is absent, why is it that so many of the policies that come out of various arms of these
mulitlaterals and applied in a variety of countries, have similar recommendations? If this
macro-knowledge building were simply empirical instead of rational, why are programs
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that are by most accounts failures, resurrected in other countries? These questions will
be discussed further in Chapter 4 in light of the empirical analysis by the World Bank
Voucher Program in Peru, supported by Hernando de Soto and the Institute for Liberty
and Democracy (ILD), and later implemented in Kenya.
Thus, although indebted to Foucault’s general methodology and political theory, this
work diverges from Foucault’s understanding of the interrelation of power and knowl-
edge in that “guiding motifs” in the form of grand development theories are seen as the
markers for multilateral and State policy during that era. Although this work does not
go so far as to say these motifs are ideological, in particular because it is not assumed
that policies are developed explicitly to be in line with the theories, there is remark-
able confluence between these motifs and dominant policy prescriptions of the period.
This dissertation hypothesizes that this phenomenon in part stems from similarities in
educational field and systems of the dominant players in such institutions. Although
dissenting and oppositional theories and perspectives exist in these institutions, they do
not constitute the dominant paradigm. As such, they are less likely to pass through the
bureaucracy unscathed, hence the end result of similar policy prescriptions issued in a
variety of contexts. We can see this most clearly in the high profile exit of Joseph Stiglitz
and Ravi Kanbur from the World Bank but also in the rejection of Singer’s Redistribu-
tion with Growth model as discussed further in Chapter 3.
In summary, this dissertation is rooted in the political theory of Michel Foucault, but
bolsters his discussion of mechanisms of power with Antonio Gramsci’s discussion of
consensual and coercive tactics. Using Foucault’s case studies as a model, this work
explores the relations of power from the micro-level interactions within informal mar-
ketplaces to the relations of power present in constructing discourses of development
that have become normative through the juridical system of guidelines and programs
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agreed upon bi-laterally and multilaterally. However, this work diverges slightly from
some of Foucault’s methodological considerations as related to the interaction of power,
truth, and right to construct a history of global and particular informal identity. The
following section will expand upon the methodological choices of this dissertation.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Location
This study focuses on Kenya, a country with a long history of local trade, marketplace
development, and policy debates about how to define informal work and treat infor-
mal workers. Kenya shares some similarities with other African nations, making cross-
country comparison possible. Like many other countries in Africa, the population in
Kenya has been predominantly rural for much of its history but urban densities have so
rapidly increased recently that they are close to outnumbering rural populations (Davis
2006). Kenya has a long history of local trade between ethnic groups and before ur-
ban centers developed, trading caravans played an important social and economic role
in mediating relations between different ethnic groups (Leakey 1977 in Bryceson and
Potts 2005; Robertson 1996; Bujra 1975).
Like other African nations, Kenya’s historical trajectory has led to the development
of a primary city that absorbs most of the rural-urban migration and informal labor. Cur-
rently, it is estimated that between 70 and 80 percent of Kenya’s non-agricultural labor
force is employed informally, which is similar to estimates in other African countries
(Republic of Kenya 2005b; Akinboade 2005).2 In nearly all African countries, infor-
2Official counts of informal work have large margins of error due to the geographic and occupational
32
Figure 2.1: Map of Kenya
Source: Robertson (1997b:xii)
mal workers cluster in densely populated areas that attract customers, such as streets
in the Central Business District (CBD), parking lots, tourist attractions, informal mar-
ketplaces, and bus stops, where confrontations with municipal authorities are likely to
occur (Setsabi and Leduka 2008:222; Mitullah 2003a, 2004; Popke and Ballard 2004).
Similar to many other African countries, business ownership and land tenure in
Kenya is highly gendered and proving business ownership, especially for women, to
mobility of workers and changing definitions of informality (measurement error can come through differ-
ences that manifest either in self-identification or official measures) between countries.
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secure one of the scarce licenses issued by the government is extremely difficult (Robert-
son 1997b; Bujra 1975; Kovacevic 2005). Likewise leadership opportunities for women
have historically been limited by a number of cultural traditions restricting voice and
ownership, which is similar to the predominantly patrilineal societies in East and South-
ern Africa and elsewhere (Akinboade 2005; Tripp 1996, 1997; Bass 2000; Mitullah
2004). However, women compose the majority of informal workers, particularly in the
service and retail sectors, in many African countries (Setsabi and Leduka 2008; ILO
1972:62–63; Sethuraman 1981; Mitullah 2004).
The history of colonial control policies in Kenya such as pass laws and hut taxes
creates a comparable historical narrative with other British colonies (and to a lesser de-
gree other European colonies) on the structure and gendering of trade. In particular,
the British colonial government instituted municipal by-laws to curtail petty-trading and
small enterprise activity that they viewed as competition for British-owned enterprises.
Many of these outdated ordinances are still in effect giving complete control to the mu-
nicipality to control space and place in the city (Tripp 1997; Gichira 1991; Bromley
2000; UN-HABITAT 2006).
Like most other African nations, Kenya experienced market-oriented policy inter-
ventions under the SAPs in the 1990s. During this time informal workers experienced
high levels of harassment from local officials and reduced social services similar to other
countries in Africa. The lack of social services created a niche position for informal
work that led to its growth and the development of a patron-client relationship between
state and informal workers that is especially apparent during election periods.
However, Kenya is also unique in several ways. Despite similarities in the existence
of a primary city, the particularities of urbanization of Nairobi, the main city studied
in this analysis, may be quite different from other African countries. One such area
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is the construction of the railway that introduced a new group of entrepreneurs to the
region, namely the Indian railway construction workers who soon became key players
in trade and enterprises. The railway also facilitated regional trade with Uganda, created
an export/import hub at Mombasa, and centralized local trade by creating a physical
site for transactions, namely the urban marketplace. In addition, even though Kenya
experienced subordination to British colonial powers similar to other African nations,
specific contingencies, such as the LFA/Mau Mau Movement, a Kikuyu first president,
the loss of the Kikuyu highlands under colonial rule, and the high percentage of Kikuyu
who fought in World War I, influenced the demographic make-up of traders by setting
the stage for the predominance of one ethnic group, thereby creating a unique narrative
for informal employment in Kenya.
Nairobi is also unique in that it is an area with vibrant and diversified informal em-
ployment, which allows for the comparison of different marketplaces through a com-
bination of interviews, surveys, and oral histories. Not all African primary cities have
such an expansive and long-standing system of marketplaces. However, despite its long
history of informal work, Nairobi does not seem to have strong formal-informal linkages
in the way of subcontracting as other countries in Africa (or especially in Asia), particu-
larly those that produce a significant amount of garments for export, may have. Finally,
Nairobi has become a locus of empirical and theoretical studies of informal work, seeing
the most prolific scholarship on the topic of any country in Africa (ILO 1991; Feldman
and Ferretti 1998; King 1996).
Nairobi quickly became a laboratory for studying informal work when the first
World Employment Program (WEP) Mission headed for Kenya after the 1971 confer-
ence where the term “informal sector” was coined (McNeill 2004). The intense focus
on theorizing and studying the informal sector led the Government of Kenya to enact
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some of the first policies on informal work of any country in Africa. This bold step by
the government opened the door for other non-governmental and development agencies
to establish the first programs targeting informal workers in Africa (King 1996).
The long history of empirical and theoretical analysis paired with the intervention of
the Kenyan State to create or transform the identity of informal workers has provided a
narrative of the forces that shaped definitions and policies on informal work. Studying
informal work in such an environment offers the unique opportunity to review studies
from the past half-century that may lead to a better understanding of the production and
reproduction of informal work in Africa.
2.2.2 Unit of Analysis
While the majority of the thesis discusses power relations exerting influence on informal
work in general, the field research conducted for this dissertation focuses exclusively on
the urban retail subsector of informal work in order to develop an in-depth understanding
of the local impact of power and the potential for contestation. Retailers, as the unit of
analysis, are defined as traders in semi-fixed positions of individual sales, excluding
whole-sellers, small-scale manufacturers, service-workers, and hawkers. Surprisingly
few studies have focused solely this subsector, despite that they make up the majority of
informal workers (between 55 and 65 percent depending on the source) (Riley and Steel
2000; Akoten 2007). This research attempts to fill this lacuna by investigating retailers
in Nairobi, Kenya, their relationships with other sectors of the labor market, both formal
and informal, and their negotiation of forms of power. Table 2.1 provides a summary of
the personal characteristics of retailers interviewed for this study.
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Table 2.1: Personal Characteristics of Respondents
Gender 60 percent were male
Age The mean age was 32 years
Marital 57 percent were married
Children The average was fewer than two children
Education
45 percent had completed secondary eduction
while another 10 percent had been to college
2.2.3 Sampling
Snowball sampling was used with life-history and qualitative semi-formal interviews
to overcome context limitations including a local history of exploitation and fear of
people collecting data or recording their opinions. Recording of these interviews was
conducted when oral permission was granted. Initial contacts were identified in various
ways including through students at a local university, church affiliations, and visiting
the marketplaces and speaking with individuals. Some individuals were more open to
sharing their life histories and introducing me to their co-workers and friends. Individ-
uals with these attributes were visited repeatedly for a period of three months in 2007
and again in 2008, providing me not only with their own life histories but with multiple
contacts within their social or work network. Contacts within the geographic and age
constraints of the study were also interviewed and those most open to discussing their
livelihood and life histories with me were visited repeatedly during the interview periods
in 2007 and 2008.
Systematic sampling was used to complete the micro-level quantitative survey in-
strument. Interviewers were instructed to interview one retailer and then take 15 steps
before interviewing another seller. Individuals were excluded only if their age, geo-
graphic location, or sub-sector of informal work (whole-sale, small-scale manufactur-
ing, ambulatory selling, transport) fell outside of the study constraints or if they declined
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to give consent to be interviewed. All participants were informed of the research pro-
cess from the beginning and consented to being part of the process before any interviews
were conducted. Less than five percent of respondents refused to be part of the interview
process or stopped the interview part of the way through.
Surprisingly few children under the age of 18 were found in the marketplaces on
weekdays. Those that were found (and necessarily excluded from the study due to
Human Subjects approval restrictions) primarily fell into three groups: children too
young to attend primary school, street children/orphans/extremely poor children, and
teenagers that were school leavers, primarily working in food service/hawking. From
my interviews and participant observation, the majority of young school leavers seemed
to be employed as more transient and marginal hawkers or as (unpaid/poorly paid) small
manufacturing apprentices then as retailers with fixed stalls and an elevated level of
initial capital investment.
Young males are more highly represented than young women in the used cloth-
ing hawker sub-sector and the small manufacturing sub-sector while young women are
more highly represented in home-based work and produce/prepared food hawking. A
significant number of potential interviewees were excluded based on sub-sector (since
many informal work opportunities outside of retail exist) and geographic location (since
many informal workers are not positioned within a marketplace of at least 200 sellers.
However all of the approximately five million informal workers in Nairobi could not
be interviewed and exclusion based on certain characteristics was necessary for under-
standing certain processes within informal work.
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2.2.4 Site Choice
The local aspect of the study of identity formation is purposefully rooted in the ge-
ographically defined space of the marketplace. By marketplace I mean a geographic
location where people are free to come together to buy and sell goods. In contrast, the
word market does not indicate a spatial location but is simply an economic term for
where goods and services are bought and sold. Marketplaces chosen in this study have
permanence by virtue of several decades of existence, where the same set of sellers re-
turn to the same spaces weekly, and retailers unofficially own land. All marketplaces
discussed are located in Nairobi and have at least 200 vendors and are open on a daily
basis, even if there are certain specific “market-days” which have higher traffic.
Table 2.2: Typography of Marketplaces in Nairobi
Periphery Suburb Central
Middle–High Income
City Park* Gikomba*
Westlands Muthurwa
Highridge Kariokor
Garissa Lodge City Market
Nyamakima
Ngara
Low–Middle Income
Kawangware* Toi* Shauri Moyo
Kangemi Burma Kamukunji
Kariobangi Ziwani
Mathare Wakulima**
Mutindwa City Stalls
Note: * Marketplaces used for study
** Marketplaces used for pilot
Marketplaces are an exciting setting for this study because they contain a variety
of interconnected economic activities, including formal and informal businesses, paid-
employment, self-employment, small-scale manufacturing, services, transport, subsis-
tence level laborers, upper-tier laborers, individual retailers, and wholesale retailers.
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Table 2.3: Labor Characteristics of Respondents
Length of Time in
Market
65 percent of respondents had been selling in that marketplace less
than 6 years while 35 percent had been selling for more than 6.
Employment
43 percent of respondents had come from other informal jobs, 24 per-
cent had come from school, and 16 percent of respondents had come
directly from formal employment. Very few had been unemployed
previously.
Satisfaction
55 percent of respondents were satisfied with their work and/or
wished to remain in informal work.
Hours of Work
Only 17 percent worked less than 8 hours; 51 percent worked be-
tween 11 and 12 hours a day.
Phone
59 percent of respondents had a cell-phone they used for business
purposes.
Documenting the interaction between these economic forms of production revealed the
power structure underlying social structure. The Kenyan State has sought to maintain
control through spatial regulation, often forcing traders and hawkers into government
run marketplaces. These exertions of power have been perceived by traders as a threat to
their very livelihoods and as a result traders in Kenya have not accepted the forced relo-
cations passively. Taking Lefebvre’s (1977:341) statement that, “Space is not a scientific
object removed from ideology and politics; it has always been political and strategic” as
a starting point, this work uses the spatially bound marketplace to observe contestations
over identity and political power.3
Twenty-two informal marketplaces, defined as being central sites of informal eco-
nomic activity, having at least 200 vendors, and being open on a daily basis, were iden-
3At the same time, as much as the spatially embedded informal marketplaces of Nairobi, Kenya are
key to boundary making, they are not isolated microcosms of identity formation. Retailers have social
networks outside their marketplaces, especially in terms of supply routes and commodity chains. Cell-
phones also have certainly changed the ability of retailers to communicate with people outside of their
day-to-day interactions, but my field research showed that most business related calls still occur between
marketplaces (i.e., finding out the availability of stock from another marketplace) or to provide entry to
the marketplace for an outsider (i.e., contacting a farmer to bring more stock). Microfinance also can
create trans-local linkages outside the spatial boundaries of the marketplace, but few such services exist
for retailers in the marketplaces included in my study.
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tified in Nairobi.4 These markets were separated by location and rough income level
of customers. Three main categories were identified (periphery — low to middle in-
come; suburb — middle to high income; and central middle to high income) to provide
a representative sample of marketplace types in Nairobi.5 One site from each category
(Kawangware, City Park, and Gikomba) was chosen for in-depth interviews market-
place surveys, and photo-elicitation methods. Two additional sites were chosen as pilots
— Wakulima for qualitative interviews and Toi for quantitative surveys. To create com-
parability between commodities and marketplaces, the retailer, was chosen as the unit
of analysis within the market. Characteristics of work within these three marketplaces
is displayed in Table 2.3.
2.2.5 Site Details
Gikomba
Gikomba is the central distribution and retail marketplace for almost all goods and serves
a range of income levels. Under colonial residential segregation policies, the area below
River Road was allocated to Indians who set up small retail and wholesale stores. Less
formal businesses such as workshops and small-scale manufacturing enterprises that
needed more space and acceptance of noise moved even further south. This area, called
Quarry Road, was the border of British colonial officers and civil servants and Indian
4During the research period, riots and gang-violence forced the prolonged closing of several additional
marketplaces. Thus, the total number of marketplaces observed in this study does not equal the total num-
ber of marketplaces within Nairobi city limits. Established marketplaces include Kangemi, Kawangware,
Toi, Westlands, City Park, Highridge, Nyamakima, City Market, Wakulima/Marakiti, Muthurwa, Kar-
iokor, Ziwani, Gikomba, Shauri Moyo, Kamukunji, Mathare, Mutindwa, Kariobangi, Burma Market,
Ngara, City Stalls, and Garissa Lodge.
5In the “central — middle to low income” category, three of the five markets listed (Shauri Moyo,
Kamukunji, and Ziwani) are predominantly small manufacturing sites and since these fall outside the
purview of this study, this category was only used as a pilot site.
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Figure 2.2: Map of Marketplaces in Nairobi
Source: Robertson (1997b:20-21)
Note: At the time this map was created, not all marketplaces identified in this study were
formed or were well-known. To be an accurate representation of Nairobi in 2007–2008,
marketplace markers should be added at Kariobangi Mathare, Muthurwa, Kamukunji,
and Ziwani. Furthermore Garissa Lodge is in Eastleigh and Mutindwa is farther east
in Buruburu, City Park and Highridge, are in Parklands, slightly north of Kariokor, City
Stalls are between Kamukunji and Ngara, Nyamakima is southwest of Ngara, Burma is
near Gikomba, City Market is located in the CBD, and Wakulima is next to Muthurwa
on the edge of the CBD.
residential and business space. Remnants of this era including a Gujarati cemetery and
crematorium, Hindu temple, and Sikh temple are still standing but have been all but
abandoned and taken over by squatters. Further West are Starehe and Pumwani which
still have some of the oldest “African” housing in the city (King 1996).
The Africanization of industry after independence encouraged the entrance of Afri-
cans into the area South of River Road and all the way to Government Roads, eventually
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forcing the Indians and British out. Quarry Road Market was one of the first govern-
ment sanctioned African markets. Consisting of 243 stalls located in three concrete-
block buildings, the market still exists but has been surrounded by the unofficial stalls of
Gikomba. The stalls within Quarry Road are regulated by City Council in that they are
restricted to specific space limitations, must pay a license, and operate certain types of
businesses (primarily new textile products, such as school uniforms and crocheted home
decorations, created by tailors and seamstresses). Quarry Road Market is two kilometers
east of the city center however Gikomba has expanded all the way to old Country Bus
station, which is less than a kilometer from Nairobi’s city center (McCormick 1998:12;
Akoten 2007:60).
Figure 2.3: Gikomba Market
The Nairobi City Council has unofficially ceded the land under Gikomba but has not
provided an access to electricity, water, financing, or structures (King 1996). Wooden
stalls have been built by retailers and covered with mabati sheets to protect the goods
from sun and rain. However, with no official infrastructure, the areas between stalls
become very muddy when it rains. Informal latrines have been erected by private indi-
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viduals who maintain and clean them based on a small usage fee. Retailers contribute
small fees to a communal pot to provide security in the form of Maasai men.6 Despite
these retailer-initiated improvements, tenure is far from secure. Occasionally, council
askaris sweep through and arbitrarily destroy stalls. More recently, as part of the Nairobi
River clean-up project, all stalls within twenty yards from the river are scheduled to be
destroyed, with no plans to relocate retailers or reimburse them for this significant loss.
City Park Hawkers Market
During the colonial period of residential segregation the neighborhoods around City
Park were areas of Indian residence. Although this forced segregation no longer exists,
many Indians remained in this area, in part because of the growth of Indian-focused
services such as the Hindu temple and green-grocers selling Indian foods and spices.
In the 1990s, the Nairobi City Council enacted repressive measures against hawkers
and retailers. In particular, they forced all traders out of the central business district.
Many expelled retailers set up shop at Ngara Market, but there was not enough space
and informal sellers and hawkers spilled over into the park grounds. In 1991, the Asian
Foundation donated funds to establish a marketplace while the government provided the
land title. One retailer who had been at the market since the beginning remembered how
President Moi came to the dedication of the marketplace and told the retailers that they
were the future of the country (City Park 6.2.07).
6Neuwirth also observed this trend in Kibera, remarking “Every evening, merchants pay them 10 or
20 shillings per kiosk to patrol the shopping street at night. The Masai are not necessarily big, and they
don’t necessarily have better weaponry, but they are known as good fighters. . . . Although no one I spoke
with could explain why, there’s a belief that Masai cannot be attacked. ’If you are with a Masai,’ Julia
continued, ’Even the police cannot arrest you.’ Recently, freelance Masai have started hanging out late at
night near the major bus stops. For 20 shillings, they will escort you home” (2006:272).
44
The marketplace was built with basic infrastructure including toilets, water, roofs,
stalls, garbage collection area, an external fence, storage areas, and drainage ditches but
no electricity. Retailers pay a small fee for security and marketplace cleaning, taxes to
city council, storage fees, and sometimes rent. Muraya (2006:127) found that in com-
parison to other marketplaces in Nairobi, in City Park, with the “installation of basic
infrastructure, and the elimination of both rigid regulations and the threat of demoli-
tion, the enterprises perform more efficiently and new enterprises come up diversifying
neighborhood economies and creating job opportunities.” Nearly all retailers have ob-
tained an annual license. The customer base, predominantly Asians and Europeans, has
a significantly higher income than the majority of other markets in Nairobi, adding to
the ability of retailers to turn a profit. In addition, City Park was one of the only mar-
kets where I saw value-added measures taken with produce retailing, such as wrapping
vegetables for better presentation.
Figure 2.4: City Park Hawkers Market
City Park attracts Kikuyu who own shambas (farm plots) on the outskirts of Nairobi
and commute into the city every day. Proprietors of stalls cannot live in the surrounding
area and have little opportunity for part-time family assistance in the business due to the
distance from the homestead and cost of transportation.
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Kawangware
Kawangware has a central legal market encircled by a stone wall, surrounded by illegal
stalls erected on the nearby dirt roadways. The central market operates one day a week
while the external stalls operate daily. Kawangware started in the 1930s as one of the
sites where Kikuyu women brought produce from Kiambu. Since it is three miles from
the city center, traders there faced considerably less harassment than those in Kariokor
or Shauri Moyo. However, during the Kikuyu purge under The Emergency, almost all
businesses closed in Kawangware because the area is nearly exclusively Kikuyu.
Figure 2.5: Kawangware Market
Few services exist in Kawangware; however the government did recently install a
huge street-light to provide more security in the morning and evening. In contrast to the
other markets, most retailers live in the surrounding neighborhood and can have family
members help out with monitoring the stall if they need a break. Today, most of the pro-
duce still comes from Kiambu; however other items are sourced from Gikomba. Some
foreign or non-Central Highlands produce is sourced from Wakulima, Nyamakima or
from farmers, through middlemen. Today few government officials or tax collectors
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visit the marketplace making Kawangware the cheapest of all marketplaces studied to
do business.
2.2.6 Methodological Choices
There has been a pernicious and divisive split between quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods in the social sciences. However, each set of methods has its strengths and weak-
nesses. Quantitative work can help to easily identify trends, relationships between vari-
ables, and causal pathways. Methods are standardized allowing for broad-scale compa-
rability and generalizability. However, quantitative methods also must aggregate units
in order to identify patterns of variables in large populations but important informa-
tion about relationships between units can be obscured. Morrow and Brown argue that,
”The search for causality becomes a matter of searching for nonspurious relationships
between variables (not social relationships)” (1994:205). Quantitative work can seem
isolated from the context and temporality giving a false sense of “objectivity” to a sub-
jective process of choosing variables or populations to study. Moreover, the results of
quantitative work can sometimes be assumed to be self-evident leading the researcher to
neglect the importance of theoretical mediation. In the study of informal work the use
of data collected under the term “informal economy” led to the cross-country compari-
son of trends that were ultimately based on different cultural understandings of informal
work. In such a case, researchers run the risk of mistaking multiple trends or populations
as singular and comparable (see Mead and Morrisson 1996).
On the other hand, qualitative work focuses on recording thick description of seg-
ments of society, capturing local language and images to understand local interpreta-
tions, and documenting the rich complexity of social life. Qualitative measures can help
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to ground quantitative work in indigenous categories of knowledge and to highlight the
influence of immeasurable forces acting upon variables in the quantitative study. Epis-
temologically, qualitative research privileges local knowledge imbedded in the social
relations of the actors. Yet, by studying in great depth a small segment of society at a
particular time, the researcher trades off some ability to predict, generalize, and deter-
mine causality reliably (Morrow and Brown 1994:206). Researchers also must interpret
the data and are subject to non-local biases despite best attempts to root the work in
an emic perspective. In the field of informal work, the well-researched, in-depth study
of female, Kikuyu bean traders in Kenya conducted by Claire Robertson (1997b) is in-
sightful for understanding colonial and post-colonial economic and social relations in
and around Nairobi but leaves the reader questioning whether this thick description has
a broader applicability.
Employing only one method in a site with multiple narratives and power structures
can fail to capture the complexity of the situation. Mixed methods research is an im-
provement over mono-method approaches because it offsets the weaknesses of a par-
ticular method and draws on the strengths of the combination of methods. Due to the
drawbacks of using only qualitative or quantitative methods to study a complex topic
and field site, I employed mixed methods.
Mixed-method data collection techniques can provide a broader and more complete
understanding of informal work by encouraging attention to local meanings and power
structures and by suggesting innovative ways to capture different perspectives at multi-
ple levels (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). The mixed-methods approach views sur-
veys, participant observation, mapping, photography, life-histories, literature reviews,
and rich description all as valid mechanisms to collect data. Quotes, pictures, numerical
data, and narratives can complement and enrich each other and previous understand-
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ing. This dissertation combines macro- and micro-level historical data with micro-level
qualitative and quantitative data.
Limitations of Mixed-Methods
Adding an additional method to a mono-method study can significantly increase the
length and complexity of the research project. Employing multiple methods requires
more time to learn their benefits and drawbacks, appropriately mix them in the research
design, and collect the data. Often more than one researcher or a research team is
required to share the load. The additional time, researchers, and data collection instru-
ments needed to conduct mixed-methods studies can augment the costs of conducting
research, a limitation especially relevant for graduate students.
To address this limitation in my own research project, I started studying method-
ological issues early on, applied for multiple sources of funding to cover additional
costs, and hired a team of students to conduct the surveys. Training and monitoring the
team was a time-consuming and costly process; however, without this research group,
I would not have been able to obtain data on a large enough sample within each of the
three marketplaces. Also, leaving the survey administration to the research team freed
me to spend more time in the marketplaces conducting in-depth qualitative interviews,
an aspect of the research design I would not have felt comfortable delegating to less-
experienced researchers. In sum, mixed-methods often take more time and resources to
implement, but these limitations can be mitigated by planning the research process far
in advance.
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2.3 Data Collection
Hypotheses one and two were evaluated primarily through secondary historical data.
Macro- and micro-level historical data was collected and analyzed both before and after
periods of field research. The prior analysis provided me with a record of the types of
questions that had already been explored and helped me define my own research design.
Much of the theoretical development of critical theory has relied on historical so-
ciology to understand systems of disenfranchisement and marginalization. Historical
sociology requires more than just providing the historical background to social con-
cern or identifying significant events in the past that contributed to the organization of
the present. Historical sociology is first a recognition that ideas and events today are
constantly being constructed and framed by a whole slew of factors; second, it is a com-
mitment to study the processes that gave rise to these factors not only to understand the
past, but also the present and the future (Abrams 1982).
We can look to scholars such as C.Wright Mills, Michel Foucault, and more recently
Timothy Mitchell, who use historical sociology to question notions we take for granted,
such as policy-making, capital punishment, and the economy. Their work asks ques-
tions to uncover the historical roots of such processes. Where do opinions, stereotypes,
and frames come from? Why is one paradigm more dominant at this time than another
paradigm? Who are the particular actors (i.e., states, institutions, corporations, or indi-
viduals) that are most influential in constructing frames in this society, and how did they
come to get this power? How did these structures come to be put together in this partic-
ular formation? To answer these questions, we have to look at the historical process of
social construction, the particular forms of social structure that resulted, and how those
forms influence us today (Abrams 1982).
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My research benefits from critical theory and use of historical methods and soci-
ological inquiry to study social transformation, pairing critical theory with historical
sociology to explore how the form of informal work we see today has been constructed
by on-going relations of agency and social structure, mediated by power. At the macro-
level, this work examines the interplay of academic and multilateral institutions and
the construction of discourse necessarily using a socio-historical perspective. At the
micro-level, this work analyzes transformations in education, identity formation, the so-
cial mobilization of informals, and state and local government policy prescriptions to
understand the construction of contemporary forms of informal work.
Historical methods require the use of secondary data and as such reflect its short-
comings. Most relevant for my study, with secondary data the researcher cannot control
the target population of the data collection. It may be difficult to find secondary studies
that have been conducted on the target population during the years desired. In addi-
tion, the frames used to identify populations may have changed over time, leaving the
researcher unsure about how the population of other periods compares to contemporary
populations (McTavish and Loether 2002:212). For example, the target population of
my study is informal workers, specifically retailers; however, informal workers were
lumped together with the unemployed by colonial and post-colonial regimes. It was not
until 1970 that this contemporary frame was employed to identify the specific subset
of the population I wish to study. Some datasets, such as the Demographic and Health
Services (DHS) series and the Key Indicators of Labor Markets (KILM) survey, do not
employ the frame of informality in the service sector when surveying respondents about
labor market activities. Thus, these potentially lucrative sources of secondary quantita-
tive data had to be abandoned for the purpose of this study. With secondary data, the
researcher is confined by the categories previous researchers or institutions found useful
or politically pragmatic.
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Qualitative secondary research is also limited by a lack of knowledge about the data
creation. The researcher was not a part of the original project and as such is not privy
to the social context in which the data was created. McTavish and Loeether (2002) of-
fer an example of trying to interpret a historical letter without knowing the relationship
between the recipient and the sender or the consequences of sending the letter. Without
these key pieces of information, it becomes more difficult to accurately interpret the data
gleaned from the letter. This limitation influences this research because it relies upon
secondary data that was collected under unknown circumstances. Perhaps the survey
was conducted under threat of force or duress, or the respondents did not feel they could
answer honestly because of the race, ethnicity, gender, or occupation of the interviewer.
Without knowledge of these components of the social context, I risk perpetuating any
original misrepresentation in data interpretation. While qualitative secondary data is of-
ten criticized for its reliance on inference and subjectivity, it is important to recognize
that all types of data, whether qualitative or quantitative, primary or secondary, requires
interpretation and subjective decision-making that introduces bias. Mitigating these bi-
ases as best as possible is the ethical responsibility of the researcher.
Hypothesis three was evaluated using mostly primary micro-level qualitative and
quantitative data. While in Kenya during the summers of 2007 and 2008, I trained a
team of Kenyans in survey techniques so they could conduct micro-level surveys of the
three marketplaces, yielding both quantitative and qualitative data. During this time,
I conducted in-depth interviews, participant observation, and photo-novella to gather
qualitative data from key informants. This primary data collection raised new ques-
tions, especially about the activation of power through policy, and after I left the field I
revisited the macro and micro-level historical data to fill in the gaps.
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Macro-level data can highlight large-scale processes and transformations but micro-
level data is needed to understand the persistence of the marketplaces and benefits ac-
cruing to its participants. Due to the paucity of accessible micro-level data on informal
employment in Kenya, I hired and trained university-educated students to conduct 211
open-ended surveys of retailers in three marketplaces around Nairobi, providing quanti-
tative and qualitative data at the marketplace level.
Five students (three males and two females) pre-tested the questionnaire during three
days of fieldwork. The questionnaire was subsequently revised and the research teams
(3 males, 1 female) conducted the new surveys in pre-determined geographic locations
based on the marketplace typology. Researchers were instructed to interview retailers
over 18 and to start surveying at opposite ends of the marketplaces to increase variation
in commodity-type and to decrease the chance of locational bias. Researchers were
also trained on the ethics of research and were required to read an oral consent form
and receive consent before proceeding with the survey. Multiple practice interviews
were conducted in order to assure ethical responses to interviewee questions, preference
not to participate, or desire to stop during the survey. The data obtained allows for
an analysis of the benefits that accrue to marketplace retailers, reasons for entering the
marketplace, from where they (or their parents) have migrated, desire to pass on the
career to children, and several quantitative indicators such as level of education, marital
status, and age. The preliminary findings are presented in Table 2.4.
Qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews, photo-novella, and community
mapping offer a unique lens on participants’ processes of personal and collective iden-
tity formation. The in-depth interviews give particular insight into the process of mi-
crostratification in the informal economy and the (sometimes unintended) effects of state
policies. To augment the data collected through in-depth interviews, the innovative tech-
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Table 2.4: Findings from the 2007 Survey
1 Retailers at the central and suburban market had more education
than their counter parts at the slum market
2
Retailers at the central market had been selling the longest com-
pared to other marketplaces with over 35 percent having been
at the central market for over 6 years
3
More retailers at the slum market (25 percent) had left formal
employment than those in other markets. The central market
had a higher percent of school-leavers/graduate.
4 46 percent of retailers at the central market had a cellphone for
business purposes compared to 17 percent at the slum market
5 Surprisingly, respondents who did not want to change jobs re-
ported working longer hours than those who did want to change
6 Of those who were not interested in changing 58 percent were
married and 34 percent were single
7 37 percent of those who did not want to change enterprises
would pass their business on to their children
8
21 percent of those who did not want to change jobs reported
no limitations to expanding their business while 47 percent re-
ported financial difficulties
9 Younger respondents were more interested in changing jobs
than older respondents
nique of photo-novella was employed to provide insight into the values and relations of
retailers at times when I could not be present in the field (Harper 2002). Until recently,
researchers have understood the social world primarily through the written word; how-
ever, visual techniques can highlight patterns, relationships, and concentrations that may
not be otherwise apparent (Harrison 2002).
Following visual sociology methodology, key informants took photographs to create
a data set of visual knowledge. This reversal of the typical researcher-informant rela-
tionships rejects traditional Northern views of power and the construction of knowledge.
The legitimation and priviledging of local knowledge, categories, and perspectives give
the photographers a “photo-voice” with which to record their lives and values (Wang
et al. 1996). However, as with all data collection methods, there are limitations to
photo-novella techniques.
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Qualitative research is often criticized for its subjective, imprecise nature, and its
limited use in generalizing, predicting, and determining causality (Morrow and Brown
1994). Moreover, bias can occur if the researcher interprets the photos according to cat-
egories of knowledge outside the culture. To reduce ethnocentric interpretation, I dis-
cussed the meanings of the photographs with participants on an individual level. How-
ever, bias can still occur since participants may have been providing an interpretation of
the photos based on what they believe the researcher wants to know. In an attempt to
limit this type of bias, I only introduced the photo-novella method with key informants
with whom I already had a strong relationship. No photo-novella interviews were con-
ducted earlier than after one month of spending nearly every day with participants and
before being introduced to at least one family member.
A more practical limitation to photo-novella methods in my research was the con-
nection of cameras with white tourists. Few adult participants had used a camera before
this research, and their experiences on the receiving end were limited to professional
portraits. Participants struggled to take candid pictures of other retailers, many of whom
were uncomfortable with the presence of the camera and unwilling to give permission
to be photographed. I had originally planned for participants to take a roll of pictures
per week — starting with twelve exposures and moving to thirty-six as they became
more comfortable. However, I struggled to get the participants to complete their rolls of
film in one week. They took the project very seriously, and wanted to capture the most
important elements of the weekly theme, but would take only one picture to capture
that theme. The notion of capturing an image or process from multiple angles was not
easy to convey. Historically, much of the research using photo-elicitation has focused
on Northern contexts familiar with cameras, the perspectives of children, or participants
from rural or small communities (Harper 2002:23–24). Researchers have had signifi-
cant success with visual sociology methods, particularly photo-novella, among children
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(Driskell 2002; Auyero and Swistun 2007; Ewald 2000). However, I struggled to trans-
late the methodology used in these contexts to the crowded urban marketplace.
Ultimately, photo-novella can only capture part of the social world. Processes oc-
curring outside the frame influence what is happening inside, and thus a snap-shot in
time can offer a skewed image. Visual sociology uses interviews with participants to
understand processes occurring outside the frame, but ultimately this method must be
paired with others to more fully capture social life. One last benefit of photo-novella and
qualitative research in general is that these methods encourage the researcher to question
her place in the study and how her own biography may frame the results. The following
section will discuss this issue of self-reflexivity in more detail.
2.4 Self-Reflexivity
Objectivity in social science is clouded by the biases, viewpoints, and personal histories
that the researcher brings to the study. While it is important to mitigate these influential
factors as much as possible, it is also essential to recognize the subconscious influence
they may exert on the research process and outcomes, especially given the context of the
research site. In the context of Kenya, divisions based on race, class, gender, and eth-
nicity have been used to justify domination and exploitation for centuries, and as such,
inequalities stemming from such categorizations are deeply imprinted on the minds of
the researcher and the researched. White, middle-class British men played a large role
in formalizing boundaries between constructed categories of being to their own benefit.
Although I am not rooted in these colonial categories of power, I do come from a nation
exerting hegemonic influence in the modern global economic system and am recording
the identity of Kenyans that in some small way may contribute to formalization. I do
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like to think though that my experiences living, studying, and researching in Africa, my
long-standing study of the continent, and my subsequent appreciation for local knowl-
edge systems have contributed to a more broad perspective than would otherwise be
expected given my ascribed characteristics. I do not take the role of researcher in a for-
eign culture lightly and exerted great effort to record the words and perspectives of those
whom I interviewed accurately and completely to reveal their voice in this work.
2.5 Why Informal Work?
In classic development literature informal work has often been viewed as subordinate
to formal work due to its lack of political recognition, diffuse boundaries, lack of per-
manent premises, and absent data on economic contribution. According to modernist
theories, informal work should eventually be replaced by formal work (Cross 2000).
However, recent empirical studies have revealed the rising importance of informal work
in the demographic, economic, political, and social status of developing nations. Demo-
graphically, informal workers are thriving, occupying up to 85 percent of the urban labor
force in Africa (Akinboade 2005; ILO 2002). Economically, increased profitability from
this type of labor offers new avenues of research on its macro-economic contribution and
its approximation of the wages and benefits offered by formal employment. Politically,
the persistence and breadth of informal work is forcing governments to recognize their
own institutional and professional dependence on some aspects of this form of employ-
ment. Sociologically, participation in informal work raises new and interesting ques-
tions about social stigma, identity formation, class consciousness, social movements,
and strong and weak social ties. This section will explore the increasing relevance of
studies of informal work for understanding trends in demography, economy, politics,
and social development.
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2.5.1 Demographic Importance of Informal Work
Over the last decade, massive population shifts have occurred between rural and urban
localities in nearly all nations. For the first time in the history of the planet, the number
of people living in cities will soon outnumber those living in rural areas (Davis 2006).
Rural-urban migration is often viewed as catalyst for the reproduction of informal work.
In Kenya, there has not only been a significant amount of rural-urban migration but also
urban-urban migration, whereby up to 40 percent of recent migrants to Nairobi are from
other urban centers, thus exacerbating primary city bias (Zulu et al. 2006). This trend
is especially important for the study of informal employment because many residents of
secondary urban areas work for informal firms and can be expected to transfer their skills
more easily than farmers to the urban areas, thereby making these migrants potentially
more successful in urban informal work.
The over-representation of certain marginalized groups in informal urban work is
also concerning to demographers and development practitioners. Informal work is as-
sumed to be less stable, economically rewarding, and protected than formal work, sup-
porting concerns that structural disenfranchisement and gendered labor markets have
contributed to the increased presence of vulnerable sub-populations in informal em-
ployment. For example, Charmes (2000) found that 83 percent of Kenyan women not
employed in agriculture were employed in the informal sector whereas only 59 percent
of men not employed in agriculture were similarly employed (Akinboade 2005:262).
Akoten (2007) found that age and ethnicity had a significant effect on profitability and
poverty. Informal work can operate as a release valve for over-burdened public and pri-
vate sectors; however this results in a large number of urban dwellers shifting between
positions with and without pensions, benefits, and hourly wages.
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Table 2.5: Yearly Employment Statistics for Kenya
Year
Total employed
off-farm
(mil)
% In wage
employment
% Self employed
& unpaid
% Informal
1988 1.74 77.5 2.5 20.0
1989 1.80 76.2 2.5 21.3
1990 2.40 58.8 2.0 39.2
1991 2.56 56.4 2.0 41.6
1992 2.75 53.1 2.0 44.9
1993 3.00 49.2 1.9 48.9
1994 3.36 44.8 1.7 53.8
1995 3.86 40.4 1.6 58.0
1996 4.33 37.4 1.5 61.1
1997 4.70 35.1 1.5 73.5
1998 5.04 32.7 1.5 65.9
1999 5.48 30.5 1.2 68.2
2000 5.89 28.4 1.1 70.4
Source: Government of Kenya, Economic Survey (Manda 2004:19)
Note: These statistics should not be taken at face-value due to the changing under-
standing of informal work. In particular, the percentage of informal work in 1988 seems
unrealistically low. Despite this limitation, they do offer an important window into the
government’s perspective on informality, in this case viewed as a relatively recent phe-
nomenon.
2.5.2 Economic Importance of Informal Work
Informal employment increasingly contributes to the economic and social development
of a nation. In Kenya, informal enterprises contribute approximately 18 percent of GDP
(Republic of Kenya 2009b).7 A study of 200 informal entrepreneurs in Kenya revealed
that they invest over a million shillings (approximately 14,000 USD) into their busi-
nesses per annum and are a significant source of capital accumulation and reinvestment
into the local economy (Macharia 1993). The ILO estimates that 98 percent of small
7This is a surprisingly high statistic given that it probably significantly underestimates the number of
informal workers because it is based on the 1972 ILO definition of the “informal sector” (2007). Daniels
(1999) estimated that MSEs make up only 13 percent of GDP. However, more than ten years after the
original survey of informal workers was conducted, the government is still using the results as its official
estimate of informal sector productivity (Republic of Kenya 2009b).
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businesses in the country are informal and that this sector has a growth rate of 12–14
percent, resulting in an informal workforce of 4.6 million people in 2001 (Riley and
Steel 2000; Government of Kenya 2002 in Muraya 2006). In many places, the market-
clearing wage of the informal sector is higher than the urban minimum wage, even in
low-status jobs like candle-making in Nairobi (King 1996; UN-HABITAT 2006). With
the wage differential between rural and urban jobs being a key force in rural-urban mi-
gration, the urban minimum wage theoretically must be significantly higher (usually at
least 30 percent according to Arthur Lewis’s hypotheses) than rural wages to make in-
formal employment a more profitable option than farming (Lewis 1954:150 in Fields
2007a).
Small-enterprises, especially manufacturing, have been seen as essential for reduc-
ing dependency on high cost foreign imports. Local manufacturers can provide indus-
trial inputs at a fraction of the cost of importing them. Moreover, local production of
high-quality, low-cost goods provides competition for formally manufactured goods and
can serve to stabilize or decrease prices of products (UN-HABITAT 2006).
In certain parts of the world, especially Latin America, Asia, and garment-producing
countries such as Mauritius in Africa, informal work is a key component of multinational
success at the global scale (Lall 1998:107). Such countries rely on strong backward
linkages with suppliers of inputs and labor and use informal businesses as an essential
method of keeping costs minimal during the production process. Although subcontract-
ing from multinationals composes only a tiny fraction of informal employment in Kenya
and is virtually non-existent in the informal marketplaces, multinational and national
corporations do employ significant numbers of workers as commission sellers (Kenya
Human Rights Commission 2004; Bromley 1978b:1167). Thus, most of the informal
business licenses in Nairobi are given to commission sellers of consumption goods like
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Coca-Cola and newspapers like the Daily Nation. Whether through backward-linkages,
subcontracting, or commission selling, informal workers play an important but often
hidden role in the productive processes of commodity chains.
2.5.3 Political Importance of Informal Work
The rise in percent of population, education level, and mobilization potential of infor-
mal workers has forced governments to pay attention to the needs and demands of the
working class, especially during election periods. Mike Davis suggests that “Altogether,
the global informal working class . . . is about one billion strong, making it the fastest-
growing, and most unprecedented, social class on earth” (Davis 2006:178). If mobilized,
informal workers who make up a significant proportion of the national population could
become a strong political force.
Political leaders in Kenya have addressed this rising concern in predominantly three
ways. First, they have deterred the development of class-consciousness and solidarity
by inciting ethnic tensions that serve to divide the urban working class and ultimately
divert attention from class concerns. Prior to independence in Kenya, the colonial ad-
ministration encouraged the development of “tribal associations” to ostensibly care for
the concerns of their tribespeople; however this had the result of fragmenting the in-
terests and mobilization base of Africans (Furedi 1973). Mitullah (2002:4) argued that
in post-colonial Kenya “in order to counterbalance this presumed ‘hegemonic project’
of the Kikuyu and the Luo, the leading political players from non Kikuyu-Luo groups,
notably, Masinde Muliro, Ronald Ngala and Daniel Moi resorted to the expedience of
ethnic mobilisation” by establishing new ethnic boundaries aligned with the control of
material and social goods.
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More recently, the contested 2007 presidential elections offered a glimpse into ethnic
boundary-making closely aligned with the political machinery. Ethnic tensions between
the Kikuyu and Luo arose over political and economic grievances that included the his-
torical lack of Luo representation in the presidency and the resulting limits on social
and economic privilege.8 Ethnic tensions between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin stem from
Kenyatta’s redistribution of British plantations in traditional Kalenjin territory to Kikuyu
settlers after Independence. Kenya’s first and third presidents were Kikuyu, while Presi-
dent Moi was Kalenjin, but all have used their political power to obtain special privileges
in business and land ownership, which they have in turn exchanged for political patron-
age.9 President Kibaki, elected in 2002, has continued policies of ethnic favoritism by
appointing primarily Kikuyu to his ministry and being unwilling to address issues of
land reform. In contrast, the primary opposition leader Raila Odinga, a Luo, made a
campaign promise to “end Kikuyu favoritism and share the fruits of Kenya’s growing
economy with all tribes” (Gettleman 2008).10
The months preceding the election were calm on the surface but ethno-political ten-
sions were broiling underneath. The Luo felt they were entitled to the presidency and
all of its spoils after many years of Kikuyu and Kalenjin leadership. When Kibaki
won by a very slim margin amidst reports of vote-rigging, the long litany of grievances
the Luo harbored manifested itself in violence. The Kikuyu were viewed as having
benefitted from years of political favoritism allowing them control over the rest of the
populace as slum landlords, prominent business-owners, and lucrative traders. The Luo
8See April Gordon (1995) for an excellent nuanced historical account of the rise in animosity between
Kikuyu and Luo.
9The murder of the highly-respected Luo leader Tom Mboya in 1969, suspected to be a political
assassination conducted by Kenyatta’s administration, has added to the sense of anger and entitlement of
Luo’s seeking the presidency.
10Raila Odinga is the son of another Luo leader during the independence movement, Oginga Odinga.
Odinga Sr. was the first vice-president of Kenya but resigned after disagreements with Kenyatta, to be
replaced by Moi. Odinga Sr. tried to form an opposition party but was prevented by an amendment to the
Constitution making Kenya a one-party state after a coup attempt against Moi in 1982.
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targeted these sites of perceived grievance, razing Toi market and Kikuyu-owned struc-
tures within Kibera and Mathare (Gettleman 2007; Interviews 06.2008). In rural ar-
eas Kalenjin were angered that the unfair land distribution would not be redressed and
lashed out at Kikuyu. The sad irony of the violence is that the people most affected were
poor Kenyans, those unlikely to benefit significantly from ethno-political favoritism. In
summary, the example of the 2007 presidential election gives evidence of how political
elites use politically-constructed ethnic tensions to distract from class-based political
mobilization that could benefit the poor (Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luo alike).
Figure 2.6: The Destruction of Toi Market during the 2007 Presidential Election Vio-
lence in Kenya
Second, political elites have deterred class mobilization through brutal repressive ac-
tions on certain sectors, while favoring other sectors. Such policies have restricted class-
based solidarity and contributed to a segmented working class. As will be discussed in
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detail in later chapters, President Moi enacted policies in the 1980s that favored small-
manufacturers in Kenya while failing to require that the Nairobi City Council (NCC)
reform municipal bylaws that criminalized hawkers and traders (Gichira 1991). Poli-
cies of confiscating goods, razing kiosks, and imprisoning or fining hawkers and traders
continued while the state erected sheds for the small-manufacturers and encouraged the
provision of credit to this sub-sector. Such differential treatment resulted in a bifurcation
of perceived grievance against the government and restrained collective mobilization for
broad-based reforms.
Third, governments offered infrastructure or development concessions in return for
political patronage (Portes et al. 1989:27). In Kenya, months before the multi-party
democratic elections in December 2007, the incumbent party postponed its planned
forced removal of street vendors from Nairobi City Center and promised to create a cen-
trally located marketplace that would house several thousand vendors in the future. In
order to prove it was making good on their promise, the government began construction
on the new marketplace shortly before elections (Muthurwa 06.25.08). The incredibly
abbreviated planning and construction time (especially given that it took more than two
years to complete a nearby mile-long section of major roadway) that went into building
the marketplace indicates the political objectives of the commissioner of the project and
his desire to placate and persuade a significant portion of urban dwellers immediately
preceding the general election.
Informal work is also politically important because it is a significant source of rev-
enue for the local government through taxation, fees, and fines. In Nairobi marketplaces,
the average taxation rate for retailers was Ksh 50 three times per week.11 For an aver-
age marketplace of 3,000 vendors, this adds up to over 23 million shillings per annum,
which is nearly 350,000 USD. This is a large sum of money, especially when consid-
11At the time of research 72 Ksh = 1 USD
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ering that there are over 20 marketplaces in Nairobi and some, especially those on the
periphery, are yet to be taxed.
Licenses purchased from City Council for informal businesses cost Ksh 5,000 per
year. Even by selling a small number of licenses, say 3,000, the government can make
nearly 210,000 USD in revenue per annum. The current trend is to encourage govern-
ments to increase the number of allotted licenses, and if this policy is implemented,
the city would obtain a significant amount of additional revenue. In addition to profits
gleaned from taxing and licensing, the city council also collects fees for transporting
goods into the city limit and charges fines for non-compliance with a myriad list of rules
and antiquated bylaws set by the city council. Certainly there is corruption in the mon-
itoring process that siphons money away from city council coffers, despite the receipt
system to set up to legitimate the transactions, but it is clear that the city council still
makes a considerable amount of money from regulating informal business (Blattman
et al. 2004).
2.5.4 Social Importance of Informal Work
Finally, the study of informal work is essential to understand social development in the
wake of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which left many developing
countries without key social services after the 1990s. The provision of informal services,
such as water taps, latrine exhaustion, informal schooling, health-care, and transport
often filled in the gap for social services lost under SAPs, albeit at higher prices than
would be expected under government control (Gulyani 2006; Gulyani and Talukdar
2006). Informal service provision often makes the most difference for the low- and
middle-class; however, all classes benefit from the production and retail of consumer
65
goods. Indeed, 90 percent of Kenyan retailers purchase and sell unique local products
that do not have competition from imports such as undergarments, hats, blankets, school
bags, uniform and sweaters (Akoten 2007:62).
A recent article in the Daily Nation reported that many women living in the residen-
tial estates were returning to the central market downtown to purchase their household’s
staples due to the rising costs of food in the supermarkets (Bonyo 2008). In 2003, mar-
ket stalls and street traders commanded 58 percent of the market share in fresh fruit
and vegetable sales while supermarkets contributed only four percent (Neven and Rear-
don 2004:671).12 In addition, the Daily Nation reports from time to time that even the
wealthy come to Gikomba to buy their suits and clothes because of the unique style and
high quality offered there (for example, see “Political Face of Fashion,” Odero 2008;
O’Callaghan and Juma 2009). These articles are substantiated by field research con-
ducted in 2007 and 2008 that documented wealthy clients buying produce and goods
from informal retailers in all three marketplaces under observation.
Informal work also engenders opportunities for entrepreneurship and innovation,
providing workers the freedom to develop themselves without oversight. Kenneth King
(1996) documents the creative ways small-scale manufacturers have designed and cre-
ated metal work equipment by hand. This ingenuity has led to the development of local
goods to meet local needs and provides a sense of pride for workshop owners who work
on their own terms. Many such workers were previously employed in the industrial
area but left due to harassment, low pay, and unhappiness with the lack of control over
product and process development. For those at the very bottom of the economic ladder,
informal work can also provide a survival mechanism. Almost anyone can sell a product
by the side of the road or carry used-clothing bales between wholesale and retail sites. In
12Neven and Reardon (2004:671) cite a consistant 18 percent annual growth rate for supermarket mar-
ket share over the past eight years due to improved economies of scale and identifying underserved pop-
ulations.
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Figure 2.7: Fashionable Clothes in Gikomba Marketplace
lieu of a welfare system or public assistance such as soup kitchens or homeless shelters,
this small income might be enough to provide them food and housing for the day.
2.6 Conclusion
The chapter began by rooting this work in sociological theory. In particular, this dis-
sertation employs Michel Foucault’s political theory and methodology but with a few
noted caveats. In addition, Gramsci’s discussion of mechanisms of consent and coer-
cion are discussed as useful addendums to Foucault’s mechanisms of normalization and
bio-power.
In light of Foucault’s methodological considerations, this chapter highlighted the
methodological choices made to research the three hypotheses. The chapter also ex-
plained why the setting of Nairobi, Kenya was an appropriate field-research site based
on its long history of informal sector research and its comparability with other nations
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in Africa, and provided a justification for studying informal work, giving particular at-
tention to demographic, economic, political and sociological considerations.
The following chapter builds on Foucault’s discussion of how the dominant group
begins to seek ways to control and circumscribe the individual, partly by making the in-
dividual into an object of scientific study. In “Discipline and Punish,” Foucault analyzes
the penal system as a technique of power revealing how “a specific mode of subjection
was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a ‘scientific’
status” (1995:24). Academic disciplines arose around quantifying and measuring popu-
lations and the human body, producing knowledge that could be used to control human
life much in the same way academic disciplines arose around quantifying and measuring
production and productive element of labor in developing countries. The academic dis-
courses arising from the field of development economics and economics more generally
have shaped structures and policies that have influenced the development of the concept
of informal work. To this discussion we now turn.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELING INFORMAL WORK: KEY ECONOMIC THEORIES AND
THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Foucault argues that power cannot exist without a knowledge system or a discourse
through which it transmits authority, while at the same time knowledge demands a
system of authorization and dissemination to be considered “true,” “valid,” or “com-
mon sense.” He writes, “power and knowledge directly imply one another; . . . there is
no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”
(1995:27). Discourses are most powerful (and dangerous) when the truth claims they
issue are internalized as “natural” because of the juridical authority behind them and can
be used to define normative behavior.
In the field of development, large multilateral institutions exert a powerful influence
over the development of a wide-range of policies. As Foucault argues, these institu-
tions would not exert such a powerful influence without an accompanying discourse to
lend authority to their policies. Multilateral institutions rely on an array of consultants,
many of whom hold positions or were students at key Northern academic institutions,
to analyze empirical evidence, create models, and hypothesize outcomes of interven-
tions. While a diversity of perspectives are presented by consultants, these institutions
exert a powerful influence by “framing” discourses as part of grand paradigms, result-
ing in what Foucault termed the power of normalization. Discourses stemming from
these multilaterals have defined the norms of practice in fields as varied as governance,
industry, economic development, resource management, and even cultural preservation.
This chapter traces the influences of certain economic paradigms rooted in academic
institutions and the concurrent rise of fields of knowledge around international develop-
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ment, that when adopted and implemented by international organizations became quite
influential in forming dominant understandings of labor, labor markets, and ultimately
informal work.
3.1 Economic Theories of Development
Two dominant macroeconomic paradigms that presented opposing conceptualizations of
economic development arose in the 20th century to guide economic thought and political
action (Moore 1995). In both, scholars were influenced by recent historical events, such
as the Great Depression and the World Wars, and sought ways to prevent such calami-
ties through markets and the government. These paradigms influenced many policy
decisions but ultimately destabilized when new and conflicting evidence was privileged,
instigating a paradigm shift.
Keynesian economics reached its heyday in the 1940s and 1950s. Stemming from
John Maynard Keynes’ experiences in the Great Depression and World War II, Keynes
supported an interventionist government that would regulate the economy and thereby
maintain a reasonable level of employment, economic growth and stability, and a decent
standard of living for its citizens. His economic models became increasingly important
during the development of the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreements, which regulated inter-
national financial capital and economic world order by managing exchange rates, setting
guidelines for Europe’s post-war reconstruction, and creating international regulatory
bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although
these agreements supported an open system of trade, they also made provisions for gov-
ernment intervention (Hoover 2003:3). After the recovery of European economies post
World War II, much of the attention of economists was diverted to focus on understand-
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ing how to accelerate national economic growth in colonial and ex-colonial states. Many
early development theories were rooted in Keynesian economics and as such, envisioned
the state as the primary actor in fomenting development (Leys 1994; Moore 1995).
Keynesian economics influenced a number of British economists at the Institute for
Development Studies (IDS-Sussex) who conducted some of the first empirical research
on informal labor. In particular, IDS-Sussex helped to popularize the term “informal
economy” in the 1970s through academic and institutional publications, by hosting con-
ferences, and by providing development economists to lead the World Employment Pro-
gram (WEP) at the ILO (McNeill 2004).
Across the pond, libertarianism, exemplified by the Chicago School of Economics
(CSE), challenged the prevailing macroeconomic theory of Keynesianism. Economic
theories and models based in free-market economics and monetarism coming out of
CSE around the middle of the 20th century aided in the construction of U.S. domestic
and international economic agenda (Hoover 2003; Rayack 1987; Mitchell 2006). Al-
though CSE scholars did not write directly about international informal labor markets,
their models supported a widely-accepted discourse that privileged certain constructed
views of informal work. Although CSE is seen as the ideological center of American
economics, economists at other elite institutions such as Harvard, MIT, Columbia and
Yale, have made significant contributions to American economic policy (Hoover 2003).
With CSE’s promotion, libertarianism began to dominate economic theory in the
United States. By the 1980s, with the endorsement of Reagan, Thatcher, and Volker, ne-
oliberal theories exerted a chokehold on the political and economic agendas of the North
(Hoover 2003:213-215). Between these two periods of time, the world saw the rise
of a new institutional form — the multilateral development organization. Modeled on
Keynesian calls for interventionist government, institutions coming out of the post-war
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agreements at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, such as the World Bank/IBRD and the
IMF began to amass a great amount of influence, in part because of their intended role
of monitoring international capital (Hoover 2003:3). However, these institutions were
quickly rendered subservient to the political agenda of the U.S. and Europe through the
mechanisms of leadership and funding. By the 1980s, the most powerful of these insti-
tutions, the World Bank and the IMF, were heavily influenced by neoliberal economics
(Leys 1994). This paradigm depended on a certain subset of economic theories devel-
oped by economists embedded in elite academic institutions, for validation. Multilateral
institutions then privileged and publicized this knowledge over alternative theories such
as dependency theory (Mitchell 2002, 2008; Boas and McNeill 2003).
In recent years, economists have been playing an increasingly important role in in-
ternational organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Trade Organization, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the African
Development Bank (Mitchell 2002, 2006). The dominance of one field of inquiry has
renewed the importance of and reliance upon field-specific theories that can be modeled
with relative ease (Boas and McNeill 2003; Rayack 1987). The following sections trace
the influence of theories and models rooted in the two previously discussed macroeco-
nomic paradigms on the development of the global understanding of informal work and
policies relating to informal labor.
3.2 Modernization Theory
Rooted in Enlightenment ideals of reason, freedom, democracy, modernization theory
privileged rationality and order. It was the task of the State or empire to provide this so-
cial structure, leading to the obsession with regulatory control and outcome of power, as
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highlighted in several of Foucault’s case studies. The underlying logic of modern theory
rests with Keynesian economic theory that sought a balance between market and state
to obtain economic development. According to John Cross (2000:33) the Keynesian
“system emphasized, on the one hand, the centralization of production and distribution
in the hands of mega-corporations built around the theory of economies of scale. On the
other hand, it emphasized the regulatory role of the state in managing relations between
workers, managers, owners, and consumers.” This section traces the influence of Key-
nesian thought on development theory through the Singer-Prebisch theory and Import
Substitution Industrialization.
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) arose in Latin America in the 1950s as
a practical response to the Great Depression, when their dependency on international
trade crippled their national economies. Brazil, Chile and Argentina were forced to look
inward and develop domestic manufacturing to replace over-priced foreign imports and
find local markets for the sudden surplus of local products. ISI was “a policy of neces-
sity” but it ultimately led to a questioning of classical economics (Love 1980:51). Out of
this material and ideational crisis, arose the Singer-Prebisch theory, developed in 1950
independently by Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer.1 This theory argued that terms of trade
1Singer studied under John Maynard Keynes at Cambridge, receiving his PhD in Economics in 1936.
Singer held several directorships at the UN, including the Director of the United Nations Research Insti-
tute for Social Development (UNRISD) during the time he developed this Singer-Prebisch theory. After
resigning in 1969 he moved to IDS-Sussex where he was quickly recruited to become the director for the
ILO’s new World Employment Programme (WEP), leading the first two missions (Singer et al. 1998).
From an early age Raul Prebisch showed promise. After completing a master’s degree in economics in the
prestigious Economics Department at the University of Buenos Aires, Prebisch was appointed to several
key positions in the government, including an advisor to the ministries of finance and agriculture, and the
director-general of the Argentine Central Bank. Although he had been trained in the classical economics,
including comparative advantage international trade theory and with its doctrine of export-led growth,
the Great Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s and Argentina’s subsequent dependency on trad-
ing partners offering increasingly imbalanced terms of trade pushed him, like many economists around
the world, to rethink domestic and international economic policy. By his own admission, he was deeply
influenced by Keynes, especially after hearing his ideas at the World Monetary Conference in 1933 for
remedying the economic vulnerability facing Argentina. He would later publish a book Introduction to
Keynes (1947). After being exiled by the Peron regime, Prebisch took various positions in key multilater-
als, becoming the director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (UNECLA),
then United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and finally United National
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between low-income countries producing primary goods for export and high-income
countries importing the raw materials deteriorate over time, becoming increasingly un-
favorable for the low-income country. Every year, each ton of primary product exported
would purchase fewer inputs such that low-income countries were unable to develop
domestic manufacturing and thus became dependent on the manufactured imports from
the high-income country (Singer et al. 1998). These ideas were crucial to later theories
of uneven development in which southern income is stagnant or lags behind northern
income indefinitely.
In order to counter this trend of economic dependency and the ensuing foreign polit-
ical interference, Prebisch advocated for ISI policies that encouraged the local manufac-
turing of strategic substitutes for high-priced imports, tariffs to help protect these nascent
manufacturing industries, and import incentives for machinery (Shivji 2006). Accord-
ing to Keynesian economics, this initial protectionism was one way an economy could
benefit from government intervention. In theory, import substitution policies would en-
courage local manufacturing and provide more job opportunities to the unemployed.2
As competition grew domestically through the proliferation of firms, technology, and
technical knowledge, local industries would be forced to become more efficient and
innovative to stay in business. However, in order to allow domestic manufacturing to
develop to reach this level of self-sufficiency, a certain degree of protection was needed
against large, well-developed multinationals and foreign firms.
Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning. Institutional lineages hold important impli-
cations for the types of paradigms that influence scholars as well as their social network for disseminating
these ideas and influencing others. By virtue of their highly influential positions, the theories of both
economists garnered wide-spread recognition (Love 1980).
2Unemployment was a major concern in part because the term “informal sector” had not yet been
conceptualized. As a result, all non-modern sector adults were considered unemployed. This number
rapidly increased from the 1950s onward in Kenya. Kitching (1980b:378) reports that between 1948 and
1969, “the total adult male African population of Kenya rose by 84.5 per cent whereas formal sector
employment rose by only 39 per cent.”
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In Kenya, the newly independent government of Kenyatta instituted ISI policies
along with the Africanization of politics and industry. This was doubly beneficial for
Kenyan elites who now not only received industries as political favors, but also gained a
protected supportive economic environment through ISI policies (Muller 1981; Swain-
son 1978). ISI remained an economic policy in Kenya until the late 1980s when World
Bank and IMF’s structural adjustments introduced market liberalization.
The support for ISI by the World Bank and IMF in the 1950s and 1960s may seem
surprising given the liberalization policies they support today. However, both institu-
tions were birthed in Keynesian economics and only began to shed that paradigm with
the advent of neo-classical economics in the 1980s. Although, ISI policies privileged
capitalism in that they pushed countries toward industrialization and ultimately interna-
tional trade, their protectionist bent was viewed by neo-classicists as hindering the nat-
ural self-correcting mechanism of the market (Moser 1978:1045).3 The Singer-Prebisch
model received short-lived support from the World Bank and other multilaterals that pre-
ferred free-market strategies for economic growth based on competition (Shivji 2006).
In the 1950s and 1960s, other theories of economic development began to replace
the Singer-Prebisch model. In particular, Rostow’s Stages of Growth hypothesis postu-
lated that developing countries could transition to a high level of economic growth and
human development by following the economic path of rapid industrialization taken by
Northern nations. Rostow (1960) argued that societies with a higher percentage of “tra-
ditional” economic activities were unproductive, highly reliant on agriculture, and had
strong social hierarchies that limited the economic growth that could bring about im-
proved well-being (Fields 2007b). Modernization was presumed to occur linearly so
3In predominantly agricultural countries, the World Bank encouraged policies of “intensification of
the monoculture agriculture for export . . . and throwing open of the extractive and resource based in-
dustries to transnational corporations” in order to build up the necessary capital reserves to embark on
industrialization (Shivji 2006:2). Under modernization theory, such agricultural societies were seen as
pre-modern.
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that to reach the final stage of “a high mass consumption society,” the previous stages of
economic generation, growth, and maturity had to be accomplished (Todaro and Smith
2003).
An essential component of the modern-sector enlargement model was the existence
of a modern and traditional sector that were complimentary so that growth in one would
trickle-down to the other (Fields 2007b; Todaro and Smith 2003). Nobel prize win-
ner Arthur Lewis, trained at the London School of Economics, developed an economic
model for modernization that established the modern sector as being composed of ur-
ban industries with high productivity and wages at least thirty percent higher than the
traditional sector (Fields 2004b). The traditional sector, also known as the rural sector,
was primarily composed of subsistence farmers who had no marginal labor productivity.
Since adding or subtracting one more unit of labor would not affect their productivity,
rural workers were truly surplus labor (Fields 2007b).4 Labor could be withdrawn from
the agricultural sector without reducing total productivity up to the point where the ex-
panding modern sector would exhaust the surplus labor supply and wages would begin
to rise. Informal work was not differentiated in these theories but viewed as part of a
“traditional sector” that was underperforming, inefficient, and did not contribute much
to economic development (Todaro and Smith 2003). The introduction of modern-sector
enterprises would eliminate this underperforming traditional sector work.
The key to Lewis’ model was that labor markets in developing countries were based
on differential pay for the same work and that this wage dualism was the mechanism that
propelled rural farmers to move to urban areas looking for modern sector employment.
Thus, rural earnings set the wage floor for urban capitalists who would have to pay
significantly more to persuade rural workers to make the shift (Fields 2007a). At the
4This premise differed considerably from another hypothesis in development at the time that posited
that when more people crowded into the low-wage economy, wages decreased (Fields 2007b:30).
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same time, wages were seen as constant in each sector because beyond this rural wage
floor, urban industries would not have to raise wages or further incentivize the transfer
of labor until all surplus rural labor had been absorbed.
Thus, to rapidly absorb rural labor into urban industry and to increase the standard of
living in poor countries, extensive urban industrialization was proposed. At first, income
inequality and unemployment were expected to rise as industries were forced to become
more efficient by reducing bloated labor forces (Kuznets 1955). However, as industries
experienced growth and increased demand for outputs, the labor demand curve in the
modern sector would shift upward (to the right). Although this increased employment
was seen as a positive outcome of economic growth, workers in neither sector would
experience an increase in wages since there still would be surplus labor in the traditional
sector. As technological development occurred and economic growth was stimulated,
the traditional sector would be incorporated into the modern sector up to the point where
supply met demand and wages would equalize across sectors. In other words, Lewis pre-
dicted that once this surplus labor was exhausted and urban industries needed to attract
more workers, wages in both sectors would rise, thus justifying the temporary (at least
in theory) situation of low wages and rising inequality while the economy “modernized”
along a path of industrialization (Boas and McNeill 2004; Fields 2007a).
3.2.1 Policy Implications of Modernization Theory
Rostow and Kuznets’ theories made a large impact on American economic theory and
policy. Rostow expanded his influence beyond the academy, serving as a political ad-
visor to John F. Kennedy and later President Lyndon B. Johnson’s National Security
Advisor influencing policy decisions for developing countries towards free-market poli-
77
cies. Rostow was rewarded for his contribution to furthering U.S. national interests with
the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1969 (McNeill 2004).5
Modernization theory was closely related to the U.S. State Department and its for-
eign policy at the time focused on the ideological battle against communism (Tipps
1973:200). Much of this Cold War battle was fought through “development” in the
global South and relied on a development theory that took as its premise that both
democracy and economic growth would come with emulation of the North’s economic
trajectory. As a result, after the 1960s, development theories lost their basis in struc-
turalist and Keynesian theory and its obvious political commitments and call for equality
and/or redistribution. The freedom of the American academic institution was restricted
through the witch-hunt instituted under McCarthyism such that development ideas were
encouraged to fit under a specific ideological paradigm (Hoover 2003). Thus, in the
U.S., dependency theory and petty-commodity-production theory did not gain the pop-
ularity they might have otherwise seen without the ideological constraint of the Cold
War.
At the macro-level, the exportation of raw materials was not discontinued based on
Rostow’s hypotheses. However, in order to emulate the North’s rapid industrialization
process, policies of modern-sector enlargement were encouraged by the international
financial institutions (Todaro and Smith 2003). Although moderate successes were seen
in human development in the context of education and health, rapid industrialization
had not led to a significant increase in employment opportunities for ordinary Africans
5Walter Rostow, a staunch anti-communist, demonstrated his loyalties through the subtitle of his trea-
tise on his Stages of Growth theory that read: “A Non-Communist Manifesto” (Rostow 1960). Simon
Kuznets is often credited with bolstering Keynesianism in the 1950s and 1960s through his inverted-U
hypotheses. His theory caused alarm over rising inequality, which led to a call for increased govern-
ment intervention to reduce the impact on the poorest segment of the population, as we will see later in
the ILO’s Redistribution With Growth (RWG) model. However, it is important to note that he did not
consider himself to be a Keynesian and set out to challenge some of Keynes’ hypotheses concerning the
relationship between income and savings and provided empirical analysis that would form the basis for
future work by Milton Friedman of CSE (Singer et al. 1998; Todaro and Smith 2003).
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by the 1980s. It was clear that the models that explained economic growth for Europe
were not appropriate for Africa where the initial economic and political conditions dif-
fered significantly (Boas and McNeill 2003; Shivji 2006). Even a cursory glance at
developing countries will suffice to show that there is often surplus labor and unemploy-
ment in urban areas despite the modern sector activities present, a concern also raised
by Kuznets. It is also questionable whether the skills acquired through agricultural la-
bor would transfer well into modern industrial contexts. It is more likely that the skills
and business acumen of urban or rural informal workers would have higher rates of
transferability.
In his model, Lewis also assumed that the rate of new employment creation in mod-
ern industries mirrored the rate of capital accumulation and re-investment. Thus, the
capital earned in the modern industrial sector was reinvested into producing more labor-
intensive jobs rather than invested in new labor-saving technology. Moreover, the model
assumed that capital was invested back into the domestic economy rather than going into
the pocket of the owner or moving to external investments (Todaro and Smith 2003).
Given the level of corruption in many developing countries, including Kenya, this as-
sumption was hard to support (Mwangi 2008; Blattman et al. 2004).
Most importantly for this work, modernization theory privileged the elite capitalist
class, who was contributing to national development through industrialization, while
considering “traditional sector” jobs as backward, superfluous, and nurturing of values
that hindered economic development (Leys 1994:16; Bromley 2000). This modernist
perspective influenced generations of urban planners and municipal officials who fo-
cused on processes of efficiency and productivity when organizing African cities. As
part of the “unproductive” sector, traders were not given space in the city and treated
as trespassers without legal rights to their livelihoods (Setsabi and Leduka 2008). In-
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formal workers, as part of the “traditional sector” that would become obsolete under
modernization theory, were viewed as external to this modernist realm of efficiency, and
productivity and thus were excluded from inclusion in city plans (Cross 2000). Munic-
ipal and State officers likewise used the planned obsolescence of informal workers as a
justification for their eviction and repression through often brutal means.
Despite inconsistencies within modernization theory, aspects of the theory had re-
markable staying power in economic and policy circles. Fields (2001:36) argues that
the “Kuznets curve was regarded as more than a central tendency; it was seen, rather,
as a “law” of economic development.” It was not until the 1980s and into the 1990s
that a significant body of work developed around testing Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothe-
ses using cross-sectional and longitudinal data (Fields 1980:94; Lindert and Williamson
1985; Deninger and Squire 1998; Bruno et al. 1998; Kanbur and Lustig 1999); see
also Fields 2001:35-65 for a review of this literature). Cross-sectional data revealed that
middle-income countries had higher income inequality that either poor or rich countries
thus seeming to support Kuznet’s hypothesis that that economic development would
initially spike income inequality, which would subsequently taper off as markets and
economies of scale developed. However, a dissection of the results showed that the sta-
tistical method used to reach these findings (ordinary least squares) biased the result and
when fix effects estimation was employed, the inverted-U disappeared. Moreover, lon-
gitudinal research showed that the inverted-U appeared only in a minority of cases and
the pattern did not appear to be linked to the rate of economic growth or initial inequal-
ity present in the society. Due to these studies, modernization theory was trusted less
and less as a grand theory of development and the door was opened to new alternative
paradigms.
80
3.3 Dependency Theory and Redistribution with Growth:
The Interparadigm Years
As cracks in the modernization paradigm were appearing and the neo-liberal paradigm
had yet to fully grab hold, the 1960s and 1970s left space open for alternative paradigms.
This section will explore two such paradigms that gained some traction during the inter-
paradigm years.
Critiques of modernization theory arose from the Latin American intelligencia, par-
ticularly in the writings of Fernando Cardoso, R. Mauro Marini, and Raul Prebisch in
the 1960s and 1970s.6 In general dependency theorists argued that in order to maintain
their hegemony, Northern states had created structural conditions through imbalanced
trade regimes and the promotion of virulent forms of capitalism that disadvantaged and
indebted already vulnerable countries in the global South (Frank 1966; Leys 1994:10).
Colin Leys argued that “eventually even the international ‘development community’ felt
obliged to accommodate some of [dependency theory’s] perspectives: for instance, the
International Labour Office’s 1972 call for ‘Redistribution With Growth’ and the World
Bank’s adoption in 1973 of the principle of meeting ‘Basic Needs’ were both influenced
by the (unacknowledged) impact of dependency thinking” (1994:10).
Modernization theorists predicted an initial rise in inequality in developing nations
resulting from modern-sector enlargement policies. The threat of increased income in-
equality was a serious concern to economists at the ILO’s new World Employment Pro-
gramme (WEP). Instituted by the ILO in 1969, the WEP focused on developing poli-
cies that would allow economic growth while mitigating the effects of inequality on the
6With the exception of a few countries, dependency theory was not adopted explicitly as the basis for
State policy prescriptions in Africa. However, dependency theory did serve as a philosophical and moral
foundation for the populist discourse of authors such as Ngugi wa Thiong’o (who, in fact, was imprisoned
for his radical literature) (Leys 1994:12).
81
poor. Many of the leaders and team members of the early missions under the WEP came
from IDS-Sussex.7 In 1971 IDS-Sussex hosted a conference on “Urban Employment in
Africa,” inviting a small subset of scholars well-known for their pioneering work on
informal employment.8 The term “informal sector” was first used at this conference in
a paper written by Keith Hart who studied workers in Nima in Accra, Ghana (Bromley
1978a).
Many of the participants from this conference went on to join the ILO Country
Employment Mission to Kenya in 1972. IDS-Sussex provided early leadership to the
WEP in the form of its director, economist Dudley Seers, who led the first and second
employment missions to Colombia in 1970 and Sri Lanka in 1971. In 1972, the WEP’s
third employment mission headed to Kenya under the leadership of Hans Singer, the
former UN economist who later joined IDS-Sussex (McNeill 2004; Ghai 1999). Singer,
in fact, was a key player in the rise of a new model of development eventually advocated
for by the Kenya Mission.9 He describes this new policy of Redistribution from Growth
as stemming from the goal of achieving a
rapid increase in the incomes of the poorest, more rapid than could be
achieved if one relied on growth alone. . . . [Suppose that] the Kenya econ-
omy were to grow at a future rate of 6 per cent, but with the increments of
growth channeled into forms of investment directed towards increasing the
incomes and production of the poorest. The incomes of the poorest would
rise much more rapidly - but the process of redistribution from the incre-
ment of growth would mean that one would be adding to the income and
assets of the poorest without having to take away from anyone else’s in-
come, thereby avoiding both economic disruption and political opposition
(Jolly 1998:175).
7Many dependency theorists including Manfred Bienefeld, Raphael Kaplinsky, Henry Bernstein, and
Colin Leys were at IDS-Sussex at this time (Leys 1994:10).
8Participants included Colin Leys, Herb Werlin, Dudley Seers, Michael Todaro, Keith Hart, and John
Weeks (O’Brien 1972).
9Despite their original pairing with capitalist development, the Singer-Prebisch theory and ISI also
spurred modernization theory’s counter-movement, dependency theory. Singer remained a life-long ad-
vocate of more balanced economic policies, but he never adhered to the dependency paradigm himself
(Singer et al. 1998).
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Despite initial misgivings about Singer’s idea, the Kenya employment mission came
on board. To bolster the theory, IDS Sussex, through Dudley Seers, suggested a collab-
orative study between the World Bank, the WEP, and IDS Sussex. A series of working
groups, conferences, and working papers on the topic occurred over the next few years,
culminating in the path-breaking Redistribution With Growth report being released in
1973 (Jolly 1998:174; Chenery et al. 1973). Hollis Chenery, one the main architects
who was then Vice President for Development Policy at the World Bank and a leader in
the “patterns of development” approach, teamed up with economists from IDS-Sussex,
including Richard Jolly and Dudley Seers, the latter who was heavily influenced by
Keynesian economics and Kuznets’s inverted-U hypothesis (Todaro and Smith 2003).
Employing the cross-sectional data available at the time, Seers and Chenery found the
same relationship between inequality and economic growth as Kuznets, further bolster-
ing their call for a redistribution of assets in early stages of economic growth to offset
the rising inequality (McNeill 2004).
3.3.1 Policy Implications of Redistribution with Growth Theory
Despite the enthusiasm by the Kenya Employment Mission and the ILO for redistribu-
tive policies, the U.S. State Department had a hard time supporting the proposal, in large
part because of the “Marxist” sound of redistribution while the Cold War was still be
fought in Africa and elsewhere. Walter Galenson, an ILO employee remarked,
A draft document designed to serve as the basis for discussion at the [1976
WEP] Conference was drawn up by the Office. . . . A subtle shift of emphasis
away from employment and towards the fulfillment of unspecified basic
needs was (also) noted. . . . The meeting [between US Officials to discuss
the draft] was a heated affair, with the US participants denouncing the draft
on many counts. . . . [including, that] there was Marxist language in the draft
that had no place in such a document (Galenson 1981 in McNeill 2004:45).
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Without support from the U.S, redistributive policies made little headway as a devel-
opment agenda. The influence of the ILO was waning, especially after the World Bank
pulled its support and focused its attention on more market-friendly approaches that re-
duced ISI policies. Shortly thereafter, the World Bank issued a new report on Kenya,
Kenya: Into the Second Decade, which ignored the RWG ideas in favor of “increasing
efficiency through factor price changes and the direction of resources into sectors with
high returns on investment” (Leys 1979:315). The reliance on financialization and lib-
eralization became even stronger as the first loan based on structural adjustment entered
the global market in the 1980s.
3.4 Neoclassical Economic Theory
Building on the strength of previous development paradigms, neoclassical economic
theory incorporated elements of modernization theory. In particular, it maintained the
central principle that economic growth was a precursor to national development, re-
placing only the mechanism of “industrialization” with “liberalization.” Much of the
conceptualization of labor markets also remained dualistic, building on the concept of
complementary sectors that were assumed to provide trickle-down benefits. These two
tenets became the centerpiece of neoclassical development strategies in the 1980s and
1990s (Fields 2007b). However, neoclassical economic theory differed significantly
from modernization theory in its approach to informal workers; previously informal
workers had been seen as espousing traditional values contrary to modernization. In
contrast, neo-classical theory treated workers as entrepreneurs who had the right drive
and values but who lacked the resources (financial, training, etc.) to significantly con-
tribute to national development (Leys 1994).
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Neoclassical free-market theory got its start in the late 1940s. At this time, propo-
nents of laissez-faire economics and monetarism assembled at the University of Chicago
Law School under the Free Market Project. Under the organization of Milton Fried-
man and Friedrich Hayek, this close-knit group of like-minded and influential scholars,
several of whom eventually won the Nobel Prize in Economics, became known as the
Chicago School of Economics (CSE) (Hoover 2003; Mitchell 2006). Formulating the-
ories around the desirability of a free and unhindered market, scholars from several
departments at Chicago rejected classical Keynesianism and developed a modern take
on monetarism (Rayack 1987).
Through the CSE, the closely-affiliated Mont Pelerin Society (based in Switzerland,
where the group would meet every year), and conservative think-tanks that pushed pro-
posals for legislation, neoclassical economics became the dominant paradigm for in-
ternational economic development as expressed by the “Washington Consensus” (Slim
1995). In developing countries the neoclassical influence took the form of Structural
Adjustment Policies (SAPs) that encouraged the privatization of state-run firms, devalu-
ation of the currency, export expansion, increased foreign direct investment, removal of
trade barriers and tariffs, reduction of regulations on commerce, and incentives for pro-
duction through international competition (i.e., anti-protectionism) (The World Bank
1997; IMF 1996; Slim 1995; Todaro and Smith 2003).
Although CSE economists were not specifically concerned with labor markets in
developing countries, they were concerned with influencing the economic and political
development of other countries. Mitchell (2006:12) describes the process of interna-
tional disbursement of neoliberal policies as follows:
By [1979] what had begun as a fringe right-wing intellectual current had
become the most powerful political orthodoxy in the West. The neoliberal
movement was now trying to extend its network to other parts of the world.
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In 1981, a close collaborator of Hayek, Antony Fisher, established the Atlas
Foundation for Economic Research. Its goals was to coordinate activities
and corporate funding among the network of European and American think
tanks and to extend it by developing and financing a group of neoliberal
organizations outside Western Europe and the United States.
The first organization the Atlas Foundation helped form and fund was the Institute
for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) run by the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. De
Soto was something of a goldmine for the neoliberal movement. Heralded as an intellec-
tual from the third world who decried dependency theory (and ignoring his privileged
upbringing and work life in international organizations in Geneva), de Soto added to
the credibility of the global expansion of neoliberalism. Andrew Natsios, the Adminis-
trator of the USAID, commented that, “Since [de Soto] is Peruvian, he can make this
argument credibly” (Mitchell 2006:14). And in this way, he became a puppet Northern
institutions advocating for neoliberal reform, which used him at every instance to bolster
their legitimacy.
Even the title of de Soto’s most popular book, The Other Path, The Economic Answer
to Terrorism, was ideological and highlighted a more general rejection of dependency
theory and RWG. Dependency theory was criticized in the U.S. mainly for its Marxist
base and orientation. Dependency theorists tended to “assume the availability of some
unspecified alternative development path, . . . which was not — in the absence of stronger
and more mobilized social forces at the periphery, and more sympathetic support from
abroad — readily available” (Leys 1994:11). The title The Other Path addressed de-
pendencistas, suggesting that their “alternative path” to development lay in neoliberal
reform, not in state-led development. The title also addressed followers of “the Shining
Path,” a militant organization that sought to organize local movements for land reform
and redistribution, outlining a non-revolutionary “other path” to economic development
through neoliberal reform.
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Under the Reagan administration, the Center for International Private Enterprise
(CIPE) was founded to fund neoliberal organizations in the developing world. Similar
to the Atlas Foundation, CIPE’s first grant, accompanied by a guidebook on neoliberal
tactics, went to de Soto at the ILD. With all this financial and organizational support, the
ILD began to get involved in writing legislation and training new politicians. Mitchell
(2006:15) quotes an ILD alum, now at the World Bank, claiming the ILD became “a
kind of school for the country. Most of the important ministers, lawyers, journalists, and
economists in Peru are ILD alumni.” Perhaps as an omen for other countries, neoliber-
alism had seamlessly integrated into Peruvian politics.
To develop popular support for neoliberalism, de Soto and the ILD focused on solv-
ing the highly-visible informal housing problem instead of the highly-politicized issue
of property rights (Mitchell 2006). Contrary to previous understandings of informal
activities, the informal economy was portrayed by de Soto as filled with dynamic en-
trepreneurs who were highly organized and operated their community through a sys-
tem of well-coordinated “extra-legal norms” in the absence of governmental support
(de Soto 1989:13). Informal businesses were far from criminal, marginal, and unorga-
nized activities. Instead, de Soto blamed the state for its overwhelming bureaucracy that
limited small-business registration and licensing, implicitly forcing many hard-working
and well-meaning people to seek illegal ways to survive. In the lacunae of legal ways to
establish a business and make a living, the informal economy sprung up as “the people’s
spontaneous and creative response to the state’s incapacity to satisfy the basic needs of
the impoverished masses” (de Soto 1989:xiv).
To allow informal entrepreneurs to reach their full potential and become an “engine
of development,” de Soto argued that the state needed to be reformed, not by making it
more equal and redistributive as the ILO had argued with RWG policies, but by opening
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it to liberal free-market forces that would simplify and decentralize government bureau-
cracy. De Soto (1989) proposed to reduce the size and influence of the state apparatus
by emulating the policies of deregulation, debureaucratization, and privatization that
ushered in an era of unprecedented economic growth in Europe without a violent “pro-
letariat” revolution. This theory directly refuted Keynesian economics by suggesting
that government involvement limited entrepreneurship and that small-businesses func-
tion best on their own given an unrestrictive economic climate.
3.4.1 Policy Implications of the Neoclassical Free-Market Theory
The classical liberalism of CSE dominated U.S. domestic and international policy pre-
scription from the late 1970s onward. Economists Michael Todaro and Stephen Smith
offer the following explanation for the expansion of neoclassical free-market theory into
developing countries,
Neoclassicists obtained controlling votes on the boards of the world’s two
most powerful international financial agencies — the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. In conjunction and with the simultaneous ero-
sion of the influence of organizations such as the International Labor Orga-
nization (ILO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which
more fully represent the views of LDC delegates, it was inevitable that the
neoconservative, free-market challenge to the interventionist arguments of
dependence theorists would gather momentum (2003:18).
By the 1980s, the power of states had been dwarfed by the dominance of multina-
tional corporations and international capital. Under the regime of capital liberalization,
international capital interests dominated local capital interests. Supported by condi-
tions attached to IMF/World Bank loans, governments found themselves implementing
policies that supported economic policies favored by international capital. With few
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restraints on the international movement of capital, states no longer had control over
their national development process, nor was this arrangement encouraged. Neo-liberals
rejected the previous theories on what was restricting development and suggested that
the problem lie in thinking the state could bring about development. As the World Bank
put it, “effective” government is a “scarce resource” that should be used “sparingly”
(Leys 1994:22). In a sharp break from the past, neo-liberals were not afraid to criti-
cize the governments of the global South for being self-serving and uninterested in the
long-term development of their country and especially for instituting policies that re-
stricted the self-correcting nature and equilibrium of the market. After the oil crises of
the 1970s and the fall in world commodity prices, poor nations were forced to turn to
the IMF and World Bank for help. In no uncertain terms did the World Bank express its
preference for the limited involvement of the state in the economic affairs of the global
South, attaching to loans conditions that guaranteed the liberalization of markets.
De Soto’s focus on dynamic entrepreneurs who needed little but the removal of
government regulations fit well with the existing trajectory of development discourse
in the 1980s and 1990s. Self-help policies were consistent with the neoclassical agenda
coming out of the North and were in direct contradiction of Keynesian and dependency
theories that encouraged government intervention and redistributive policies to target
the exploitative conditions that gave rise to global inequality.
De Soto (1989:191) argued that given the degree of corruption and lack of trans-
parency in contemporary governments, redistributive policies would simply serve to
“redistribute” goods and capital back into the pockets of the government or those of
their allies. In contrast to dependency theory, de Soto’s conceptualization of informal
labor markets was highly appealing to Northern nations. Indeed, De Soto’s rhetoric
of “freedom” that workers would obtain through liberalization harkens back to Fried-
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man and Hayek’s argument that a free-market was fundamental for achieving political
freedom. Much has been written about the appropriation of liberal development lan-
guage such as participation, empowerment, freedom, and autonomy by the neo-liberal
paradigm and this fight over terminology continues in the realm of informal work (see
Gore 2000; Taylor 1997; Mitchell 2002; Boas and McNeill 2004).
With the evidence of the positive effect free-market policies could have for poverty-
reduction, development banks, government aid agencies, and multilateral institutions
could openly pursue privatization, deregulation, and debureucratization - policies that
also heavily benefited Northern economic interests and multinational corporations -
claiming mutuality and a commitment to reducing poverty. Privatization, already at
the core of the neoliberal paradigm, became a means not just for economic growth but
also for poverty-reduction, thereby providing dual-pronged support for the ideological
war against anything resembling communism.
De Soto did not limit his call for privatization to large industries as previous theorists
had done. Instead, he advocated for the privatization of property at the micro-level to
turn “dead capital” into tradable assets for the urban poor that could be used as collateral
for business loans. Land tenure would give small-business owners assurance that their
business would not be arbitrarily destroyed, allowing them to reinvest newly liberalized
credit into their enterprise. Small-businesses would flourish becoming de facto formal
industries that would carry Peru (and other developing countries) into the modern age
(de Soto 1989).
Neo-liberal free market theory remains the dominant discourse in today’s global-
ized world. Although structural adjustment policies and the Washington Consensus in
general are widely viewed as having disastrous effects on low-income nations, sim-
ilar market-friendly reforms are still encouraged by multilaterals today in what Har-
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vey (2004) terms the “new imperialism” characterized by “accumulation by disposses-
sion.” Increasingly, this agenda includes support for the financialization of the world’s
poor, spurred on by highly publicized successful examples such as the Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh.
3.5 Conclusion
By reviewing key labor market models rooted in competing orthodox macroeconomic
theories of the era, this chapter revealed how these models have in turn paved the way
for multilateral agencies to define economic activities. Heterodox theories such as de-
pendency theory have also contributed to the debate over defining informal work, but
the multilateral agencies influencing institutional and state policy have been reticent to
engage with such discourse because of its connection to Marxism.
Using Foucault’s discussion of the relationship between power and knowledge via
the mechanism of normalization, the role of key multilateral organizations in popular-
izing and disseminating dominant discourse about informal work through their more
general paradigm for economic development was also introduced in this chapter. In par-
ticular, the close relationships between IDS-Sussex and the ILO and among the CSE,
U.S. State Department, World Bank, and IMF were identified, creating a powerful base
of legitimacy. The next chapters extend this analysis to explore the relationship between
the production of knowledge in multilaterals and the dominant discourses of the State.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MULTILATERAL AND STATE POLICY
INTERVENTIONS
When applying Foucault’s concept of power to the multilateral system with more dif-
fuse relations of power, we have seen that power is exercised through the production of
knowledge in the form of consultants from academic institutions and a system of “ex-
perts” that build a discourse of development. This discourse influences the “juridical” or
in the case of multilaterals, the guidelines for policy, interventions, and loan structures.
These applications reinforce and redefine discourses of truth and ultimately legitimate
the relations of power (Foucault 1977:94).
This chapter traces the relationship between the development paradigms discussed
in Chapter 3 (expressed either directly through the colonial state or in later eras through
multilateral institutions) and the implementation of key policies concerning informal
work in by the Kenyan government. This analysis will help us grasp how these dis-
courses have become accepted as the norm outside the environment in which they were
created through the “juridical” influence of the multilateral. Moreover, this chapter in-
troduces the discussion of Gramsci’s mechanisms of consent and coercion to create and
maintain power, especially over the means of production.
4.1 Colonial Policies Regarding Trade
Between the 1890s, when Kenya became a Protectorate, and 1963, when it gained in-
dependence, Kenya was ruled by the British crown. Like most colonized countries in
Africa, Kenya’s economy was tied to the colonial economy and focused on exporting
raw materials and goods manufactured in foreign-owned factories. The majority of
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physical labor fell on the shoulders of Africans who were forced into capital production
through tax laws. In comparison, little emphasis was placed on developing indigenous
industry within the country of origin to turn raw materials into value-added manufac-
tured goods that could be exported at a higher price (Shivji 2006).
In order to provide cheap labor for the European-owned factories, the colonial ad-
ministration adopted policies that encouraged the pricing of basic commodities to re-
main at low levels in order to support the African workforce. Thus, the government
allowed food and sundries traders from rural areas to sell goods for local, primarily
African, consumption within Nairobi without licenses. As time went on, the admin-
istration became more concerned with maintaining control over its increasingly rowdy
African populace and instituted policies of coercion and consent. Such policies are dis-
cussed in detail in the following chapter but suffice it to say, harassment and expulsion
towards hawkers and itinerant traders significantly increased in the 1940s and 1950s.
4.2 Trade Policies After Independence
The drive for Independence caught the British by surprise. In 1962 they instituted a rapid
Africanization of local government in Nairobi in preparation for the imminent transfer
of power. Newly empowered African leaders had little time to construct a vision for
the direction of the newly independent State. Despite calls for African Socialism and
Africanization in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the change from colonial to post-
colonial represented little more than a power shift from British to African elites and
Kenya remained one of the most capitalist countries in Africa. Leys (1979) argued that
activities like trade helped this nascent class accumulate large profits prior to indepen-
dence, which ultimately translated into political power upon independence.
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It was this class which formed and led the modern nationalist movement,
and moved into the hegemonic position in the “power bloc” (the group of
classes whose power was reflected in and served by the state) when indepen-
dence was achieved in December 1963. With this transition, the indigenous
bourgeoisie greatly accelerated the move which it had begun already during
the colonial period . . . out of the sphere of circulation and into both agricul-
tural and manufacturing production, greatly expanding its numbers and the
scale of its collective capital (Leys 1979:302).
After independence, there was a close relationship between the power bestowed by
the state apparatus and the process of indigenous capital accumulation through the man-
ufacturing sector (Muller 1981; Swainson 1978). In addition to already being in a posi-
tion of controlling the means of production, the new elite class comprising the indepen-
dence government inherited the power structure and laws established by the colonists
and whether by lack of experience or by a desire to maintain class power, left many
colonial artifices in place that cemented their dominant position in the class hierarchy
(Macharia 1993).
The case of the Nairobi municipal by-laws can be used to illustrate one such colo-
nial artifice. As the colonial infrastructure came crashing down, the municipal by-laws
concerning urban trade, created under the colonial administration, were invalidated by
the court in 1962. However no new ones were created so in 1963 the newly independent
government of the Republic of Kenya simply reinstated the colonial by-laws. These
by-laws have yet to be substantially revised despite their irrelevancy to modern issues
facing traders, hawkers, and urban dwellers in general (Macharia 1993; Gichira 1991;
Mitullah 2003a).
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4.2.1 Africanization
The newly formed Kenyan government quickly adopted import-substitution policies rec-
ommended by the World Bank and IMF. They paired these policies with an Africaniza-
tion of industry in order “to hoist Kenyan Africans directly into mainstream commerce
and industry” (Government of Kenya 1964:41 in Himbara 1989:219). The Trade Licens-
ing Act of 1967 institutionalized these policies, allowing the government at any time to
remove a non-Kenyan manager and replace him with a Kenyan and restricted trade by
non-citizens to major urban areas and uncommon commercial goods. This deeply af-
fected non-Kenyan Asians who were engaged in rural trade since pre-Independence.
However Asian and European industries were protected by the Foreign Investment Pro-
tection Act and other attractive offers that encouraged foreign-owned industries to re-
main in Kenya. As a result, the majority of large firms were still owned by non-resident
Europeans and Asians (Leys 1979:299-300).
In the late 1960s, the newly independent government encouraged the growth of large
and medium-sized firms through parastatals while balking at the opportunity to empower
small firms. Ownership of the following enterprises gave the government the ability to
encourage import substitution and growth of local industry at the upper-class level. Only
one program, the Joint Loan Boards, was targeted towards traders.
• Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) was the post-
colonial spin-off of the colonial IDC1 to promote commercial and industrial devel-
opment through financial assistance to purchase machinery and equipment. One
of its subsidiaries, Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE), was charged with promoting,
financing, and administering Small-Scale Enterprises (SSEs) by erecting sheds,
promoting import substitution industrialization, and clustering businesses (Ikiara
1990; Himbara 1989).
1The Industrial Development Council was established in 1954 under Ordinance No 63 to, “facilitate
the industrial and economic development of the colony by initiating, assisting or expanding industrial,
commercial and other undertakings in the colony” (Swainson 1978:121).
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• Industrial Development Bank (IDB) was owned by the government but used
the World Bank as the main line of credit to provide training and access to funds
for African entrepreneurs to ”purchase existing firms, acquire shares in them, or
found new ones” (Himbara 1989:224). This bank only served medium and large-
scale industries desiring medium and long-term loans of at least Ksh. 400,000
(Ikiara 1990).
• Kenya National Trading Corporation (KNTC) was set up to coordinate fair
terms of trade between African enterprises and foreign companies. It ended up
creating monopolies that were inefficient, unprofitable, and which could not com-
pete with other businesses (Himbara 1989).
• National Construction Corporation promoted African construction workers and
contractors, but it founded only one construction company that operated briefly
(Himbara 1989).
• Joint Loan Boards funded and promoted African traders but poor management,
corrupt accounting, fictitious loan granting, and client defaults led to their demise
(Himbara 1989).
The Africanization approach was not extended to small retailers and traders, who
were ignored in favor of vaulting Africans into larger industries. Under modernization
theory, indigenous cultural practices, such as reciprocity and tight social networks, were
constructed as backward and deleterious to progress and development (Leys 1994; Cross
2000). Instead, modern sector enlargement was encouraged, which meshed well with
the post-colonial government’s policies to Africanize medium enterprises while still al-
lowing for foreign ownership of larger firms. As a result, hawker harassment, arrests,
and deportation increased, eventually outgrowing the persecution seen under the colo-
nial administration. Although pass laws had ended with the new administration, calls
for movement controls on hawkers had resurfaced in NCC committees.
A populist movement developed in the mid 1960s against the exclusionary policies
of the new Kenya African National Union (KANU) government. The Kenya Peoples’
Union (KPU), which represented the demands of the bottom 40 percent of the income
distribution who only contributed 11 percent of GDP, and other unions, initiated strikes
in several industries in the mid and late 1960s. The government responded with tactics
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of repression and coercion. It passed the Trade Disputes Act in 1965 to prohibit strikes
in key industries, banned the KPU in 1969, arrested leaders of other unions, and heavily
encouraged collective bargaining over strikes. The government also offered leadership
positions in parastatal offices to ex-KPU officers and provided state civil service po-
sitions to unemployed school-leavers who had supported the KPU. These methods of
repression and co-optation effectively subdued the populist movement for the moment,
although strikes and popular unrest matched by government co-optation and repression
reappeared in the 1970s (Coughlin and Ikiara 1988; Leys 1979).
4.2.2 Adoption of a New Understanding of Informal Work
In 1969 the ILO began its World Employment Programme, which had near worldwide
influence on employment research and the development of policy (Bromley 1978a).
The WEP’s third country mission produced a ground-breaking report on the working
poor in Kenya. Contradicting the prevailing development paradigm of modernization
theory that asserted the informal sector would eventually be phased out as a country
modernized, the ILO Kenya Report, rooted in the Redistribution with Growth paradigm,
emphasized the productivity of the sector (Feldman and Ferretti 1998:vii). This new
conceptualization of informality was quickly inducted into Kenyan policy as Bromley
(1978a) explains:
Within a year [of the IDS-Sussex Conference] the concept [“informal econ-
omy] was incorporated in substantially revised form into the ILO Report on
Kenya and shortly afterwards the Report was debated in the Kenya Parlia-
ment, carrying the informal sector into the political arena. From then on,
the informal sector was incorporated into the conceptual underpinnings of
much of the urban research in the ILO’s World Employment Programme,
and subsequently into the urban research programmes of other international
organizations. Thus, a whole stream of related research and close cross-
referencing came into being and an international academic and policy-pre-
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scribing network grew up around the concept and its application (Bromley
1978a:1036).
The 1972 ILO Kenya Report was widely influential on Kenyan policy, and not only
because it defined a phenomenon that had troubled the colonial and post-colonial gov-
ernments for decades. In the face of failing large-scale industries and a world recession,
Kenya borrowed Ksh 24 million in 1974, Ksh 19 million in 1975 and Ksh 8 million in
1976 from the IMF (Leys 1979:311). The recession reversed economic growth in Kenya
and the loans further restricted government spending, forcing the government to look for
low-cost solutions to national development that favored “self-help” policies. At the same
time, popular unrest was brewing and the KANU government was looking for ways to
retain its power. Under J.M. Kariuki, the KPU was transformed into an opposition po-
litical movement that sought to mobilize “a political alliance of the rural landless, poor
and middle peasants, and urban unemployed and workers” (Leys 1979:304). The gov-
ernment responded both with violence and concessions. Kariuki was murdered (likely
by state police) other prominent parliamentary critics were detained, the radical nov-
elist Ngugi Wa Thiong’o was jailed, and demonstrations by University students were
disrupted violently by the police (Leys 1979).
On the other hand, the government offered concessions to small-manufacturers and
the formal workers by requiring all Asians to transfer their trading businesses to Afri-
cans, extending ICDC loans, including workshops under the localization program, and
raising the minimum wages (Leys 1979:304). Moreover, the ILO’s new-found confi-
dence in the informal sector was attractive to the struggle government because it offered
concrete ways to placate this segment of the population and to harness the workers’ “nat-
ural” entrepreneurship to help bring about national development through cost-reduction
in terms of imports, exports, and local development. Colin Leys quipped that “From be-
ing the Cinderella of underdevelopment the ‘informal sector’ could thus become a major
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source of future growth” (Moser 1994:15 in Rakowski 1994). This new social and spa-
tial category was objectified as the means to national development and maintaining elite
social position.
4.2.3 Preferential Treatment of Small Manufacturing
The 1972 Report also hailed the informal sector as an efficient way to redistribute re-
sources that were trapped in the formal sector controlled by the upper class.2 To get
the full benefit out of the redistributory potential, reforms such as developing backward
linkages with the informal sector and subcontracting needed to be made. However, for
these linkages to be efficient and profitable, training needed be provided to small manu-
facturers with existing industries (House 1984).
Emulating the bias of the Report, research and policy in the decades after the release
of the Report focused nearly exclusively on small manufacturing enterprises, excluding
other sectors of informal work such as hawkers and vegetables sellers (see Aryee 1977;
Ikiara 1990; Livingstone 1991; House 1984; Macharia 1993; King 1996; Manda 2004;
Bigsten et al. 2004; Akoten et al. 2006).3 The World Bank further supported suggestions
to develop small enterprises, as evidenced by policy papers such as Employment and
Development of Small Enterprises released in 1978 (McNeill 2004).
President Moi came to power in 1978 after Kenyatta’s death and quickly insti-
tuted policies based on ILO recommendations to 1) focus less on the Africanization
of medium and large-scale industries and encourage the growth of small enterprises;
2For a review of the ILO’s Redistribution with Growth development paradigm and how it differs from
the modern-sector enlargement perspective of modernization theory, see Chapter 3.
3This also contributed to the gendering of informal work in that small manufacturers were nearly
exclusively men while most women working informally were hawkers and produce traders (Robertson
1997b).
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and 2) improve the public image of informal workers to reduce harassment and increase
productivity.4
The state, responding to ILO Report recommendations, chose to privilege
[small manufacturers] as recipients of permanent workspace. The Kenyan
Development Plan for 1979 to 1983 included provisions for building space,
investment advice, loans, extension services, marketing facilities, and pref-
erential treatment in governmental purchasing programs. The 1982-83 Re-
port on Unemployment stated that manufacturers only formed 14.8% of
informal sector workers in 1977 and 16.4% in 1982, compared to the over
70% in trade, but recommended that the former be given training at vil-
lage polytechnical schools (Kenya Report on Unemployment 1982/83:27,
212–216, 259 in Robertson 1997b:264).
President Moi continued his support for such policies by encouraging the govern-
ment and modern sector industries to subcontract work from the informal sector (King
1996:13). With the primary goal of institutionalizing aid to small manufacturers through
a government office, he established the Small-Scale Enterprises Unit within the Ministry
of National Planning and Development in 1987 (King 1996). In 1984, Kenya Indus-
trial Estates (KIE), a government parastatal, was restructured to reduce its average loan
amount to make it more conducive to supporting small-scale enterprises. KIE clearly
favored the small manufacturing sector, reporting in 1987 that 82 percent of loans went
to small manufacturing industries and 15 percent to the service sector (Ikiara 1990).
4.2.4 Reduction of the “Pejorative View” of Informals
The 1972 ILO Report expressed concern over the recent increase in harassment of infor-
mal workers, tracing the incidents of violence back to a “pejorative view” of the sector
4In many ways, this was reminiscent of the 1941 Stirton report that called for the colonial government
to stop supporting businesses that needed large capital inputs and to focus again on the small businesses
that could feed the local market demands and had the potential to eventually progress into the formal
sector (Himbara 1989).
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(ILO 1972). The ILO report redefined the nature of informal workers, posing them not
as marginal but instead as productive, dynamic, economically efficient, and capable of
generating employment. By emphasizing these positive contributions, the Report hoped
to improve the government’s perspective on informal work thereby reducing harass-
ment.5 This aspect of the Report was quickly adopted by the Kenyan government and
multilaterals, (in part because it certainly is much easier to change language and hope
that that will make the needed change then to implement programs) and almost imme-
diately, informal workers were portrayed much more positively in official literature.
Shortly after coming to office, President Moi implemented the ILO’s recommenda-
tions regarding positive attitudes toward the informal sector. One of his first changes
was to reverse the popular derisive understanding of informals, particularly small-scale
manufacturers. Moi facilitated this shift encouraging the growth of discourse framing
the jua kali as hard-working, skilled small-manufacturers that would bring the country
into the modern era.6 The President further legitimated this group by naming the shel-
ters his administration built to provide workers with shade, Nyayo Sheds. The use of the
5Bromley critiques this approach suggesting that it was nave at best and purposefully disingenuous
at worst to propose that ”government support and recognition will automatically convert informal enter-
prises into formal enterprises, as they will no longer possess the defining characteristics based on the
absence of government support and recognition. This approach may also combine with a simplistic ’tar-
get group’ view of the informal sector, which assumes that the only obstacle to growth and prosperity
for informal sector enterprises is the negative attitude of government towards the sector. In this view,
government support is a virtual guarantee of success. This neglects the complex competitive and subor-
dinate relationships of small enterprises with larger enterprises, and the wide range of strategies available
to monopoly capitalism to suppress the competition of small enterprises (particularly through differential
pricing and ’media pressure’ on consumers), or to harness those enterprises to the service of big-business”
(1978a:1035).
6Jua kali, literally translated as “hot sun,” was first used in 1985 to refer to those who labored in
the scorching heat without shade, particularly metal-work artisans, carpenters, machine-makers and other
small manufacturing enterprises that already produced a significant amount of heat. Moi used the term
to define a positive normative and economic category, paralleling the introduction of the term micro-
entrepreneurs in Egypt to represent a “new category” of workers that would carry the country forward into
modernity (Elyachar 2005). Moi played a significant role in redefining small-scale manufacturers, and as
Ikiara et al. point out, Moi gradually consolidated power to the point that there was “little autonomy for
ministers, permanent secretaries and other organs of the government to make decisions without approval
from the Office of the President. . . . The erosion of parliamentary power and the enhancement of the
executive and the presidency have had serious implications on policy formation and implementation in
Kenya” (2004:220).
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president’ nickname lent a sense of favoritism, credibility and familiarity to jua kali. The
Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth marked
another turning point for small manufacturers in Kenya (Republic of Kenya 1986). It
provided the first formal government recognition of jua kali using positive rhetoric and
posed informals as “one of the hopes the country has in terms of economic development
as they enter the 21st century” (Macharia 1993:35).
Figure 4.1: Jua Kali Artisans
Building on the popularity whipped up by Moi for jua kali, the Minister of Industry
announced a new program entitled Jua Kali Development Programme, stating “Kenyans
should learn to respect the informal sector popularly known as ’Jua Kali’ businesses
because even the biggest things have to start small” (The Standard, October 19, 1987
in Macharia 1993:31; Standard, 28 May 1988 in King 1996:27–28). This officially ce-
mented the replacement of the term “informal sector” with “jua kali” in Kenyan policy.
NGOs, foreign governments, and multilaterals jumped on board sending millions of
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shillings to help jua kali programming and confirming the “natural” bifurcation of the
sector into productive and unproductive elements (King 1996:20, 26, 29; UN-HABITAT
2006:106; Riley and Steel 2000).
Moi also adhered to the ILO’s suggestions to reduce stigmatization by implement-
ing education reform to increase the acceptance of small manufacturing as a legitimate
career path. The government added new subject areas that focused on developing the
student’s appreciation of arts and crafts and business education. Positive perceptions
of jua kali artisans and legitimizations of their work were scattered throughout various
subject areas in order to subtly influence society to accept this new social class. The in-
clusion of informality in the national educational curriculum signified the government’s
support of the ILO perspective that informal work was a legitimate form of employment
that contributed to national development (King 1996:164).
Finally, Moi provided physical support to this new class of entrepreneurs by encour-
aging the development of a market for training small enterprises. In the beginning, the
government provided vouchers to help link entrepreneurs with training facilities, but
with the fiscal reforms instituted by the World Bank and IMF’s SAPs, the government
was advised to withdraw its financial support from the training programs in hopes of
developing a self-sufficient private sector market for training. In 1988, President Moi
formed the Jua Kali Development Programme within the Ministry of Technical Train-
ing and Applied Technology (MTTAT). This program sought to further legitimate small
manufacturing via a Jua Kali Artisan Identification card (Republic of Kenya 1992).
The Kenyan government received praise in an ILO-World Bank report for its adop-
tion of policies stemming from the ILO Report suggestions:
To its credit, Kenya, unlike most developing countries, has in official de-
velopment policies recognized informal enterprise as more than a residual
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employer for the survival of poor households. In its Sessional Paper Num-
ber 2 of 1992 on Small Enterprise and Jua Kali Development in Kenya, the
government identifies the small-scale and jua kali enterprise sector for sup-
port to assist it to ”graduate into the formal sector” and to become a major
player in the creation of new jobs and economic growth (Riley and Steel
2000:1; Republic of Kenya 1992).
Although the Kenyan Government made little progress on some of the more radical
policies suggestions in the ILO Report, they had invested significant energy into cre-
ating a better operating environment for small-scale manufacturers. Traders, hawkers
and the lower strata of the informal workers benefitted little from these policies and the
government continued its policies of arbitrarily harassing and destroying the property
of traders. It was evident that the government sought to reduce the potential political
power of informal workers by limiting the development of a collective identity between
the lowest and highest strata (Leys 1979:317). As we will see in later chapters, the moti-
vation to enact such significant changes was little more than a seizing of an opportunity
to act upon the interests of the State.
4.3 Multinational Policy and Jua Kali Development Under the Neo-
liberal Agenda
In accordance with modernization theory, international policy of the 1960s and 1970s
emphasized urban modern sector development. The ILO nuanced policy direction for
a brief stint in the 1970s, advocating for the development of proto-industrialists along-
side industrialization through their RWG agenda. Other multinationals followed this
paradigm change, including the World Bank, which loaned 1.97 billion USD to 63 pro-
grams with the expressed purpose to develop small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
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between 1977 and 1985. Further driving this urban bias, the IBRD and ILO commis-
sioned research on fixing urban labor markets, producing influential reports such as, The
Task Ahead for the Cities of the Developing Countries (McNeill 2004).
A disastrous constellation of events occurred in the early 1970s that led to the re-
jection of import substitution and RWG policies, and ultimately resulted in the demise
of the ILOs WEP (McNeill 2004). The oil shocks of the 1970s, the dramatic fall in the
world price of raw exports and the tremendous spending binge by the Kenya Govern-
ment led to a bulging national debt. With the collapse of the economy between 1980
and 1990 including a budget deficit at ten percent of GDP, the account deficit at 11 per-
cent of GDP, inflation at 100 percent, and unemployment rates hovering between 35 to
40 percent, Kenyan purchasing power was reduced severely, leading to the closure of
many domestic industries by the 1990s (Malick 2004; Kenya Human Rights Commis-
sion 2004:12).
Bryceson and Potts (2005:44) explain the severity of the crisis for ordinary Kenyans:
Urban dwellers were plunged into an economic vortex of declining pur-
chasing power and economic insecurity. Inflation caused the price of basic
goods to soar beyond the reach of urban consumers earning fixed wages and
salaries. Cutbacks led to job redundancies for many, whereas others chose
to leave their jobs to redress the dwindling purchasing power of their wages.
During the ensuing period of structural adjustments, poor and moderately wealthy
Kenyans experienced significant hardships.
4.3.1 Structural Adjustment
The World Bank and IMF offered stabilization packages to the Kenyan government in
the form of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1980, which was retooled in
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1993. The SAPs furthered the neo-liberal agenda of market-friendly economic reforms
that reduced import-substitution industrialization policies, deregulated licensing, re-
moved protections and subsidies from small businesses, and forced domestic industries
to compete with heavily subsidized, well-established Northern agribusinesses (Davis
2006:153). By the mid 1980s, it was clear that Singer’s RWG plan for economic de-
velopment that paired modern sector enlargement with protections for small-enterprises
was officially dead.
The IMF and World Bank made the relaxation of labor standards and the increased
fluidity of the labor market conditionalities of aid. In 1994, the Kenyan Government
indicated their willingness to proceed with such measures by amending portions of the
Employment Act to exclude union involvement in the Export Processing Zone (EPZ),
repeal minimum wage laws, and increase the employers’ power to hire and fire with-
out paying benefits. Moreover, the government introduced outward-oriented industrial
policy measures such as a zero import duty on industrial intermediate inputs. These
amendments not only increased the informalization of formal labor, it informalized in-
formal labor while trying to formalize it. Under the ILO 1972 recommendations and the
Sessional Paper of 1986, subcontracting links were posed as secure and prosperous for
small-manufacturers, in order to help develop the sector. Under SAPs sub-contracting
opportunities were only available when companies in the EPZ received an order larger
than they could fill in the requisite time. Informals had to bid on the contracts in a race to
the bottom; ultimately, this has led to the current weakened state of backward linkages
in Kenya (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2004).
SAPs simultaneously reduced the provision of public goods by targeting government
spending through privatization. The devaluation of currency, causing the prices of goods
sold on the domestic market (i.e. those made by informal workers) to fall substantially,
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paired with the loss of social safety nets created severe difficulties for ordinary Kenyans.
In addition, the limitations placed on government spending by the SAPs (through the
wage bill, cuts in civil service, removal of subsidies, and the elimination of price con-
trols), reduced demand for domestic goods even further and severed recently encouraged
backward linkages between the government and the informal sector (Manundu 1997).
Since many workers had been retrenched or faced declining wages, the subsequent
curtailing of human capital investment, including universal primary education and subsi-
dization of technical training, was especially painful. Most households could not sustain
the rising costs of education, health care, water, housing, transport, sanitation on top of
the loss of their incomes, and a concomitant rise in informal housing, employment, util-
ity services, and transportation occurred during this period (Davis 2006; Bryceson and
Potts 2005:56–57; Manundu 1997; Osirim 1996:213). This rapid informalization of
services and labor was treated by the World Bank as an example of how citizens could
meet their own needs once the bonds of dependency on government services was broken
(Mayer 2003).
With the implementation of the SAPs, the World Bank began to take an increasingly
important role in developing policy concerning informal work, especially in the small-
manufacturing sector. They were able to exert a powerful influence over the nation-
state by “framing” discourses according to their agenda. The World Bank appropriated
the notion of social capital to explain how the social reciprocity of poor communities
would sustain them despite the elimination of a significant number of social services
under the SAPs (Pickvance 2003; Mayer 2003). This ability to control state policy
depended on the legitimacy derived in part from models developed in highly respected
academies and in part from the reputation of the World Bank for technocratic solutions.
In Kenya, policy documents offered recommendations reminiscent of those proposed
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Figure 4.2: Manufacturing Wage Indices in Kenya During SAPs
Source: Key Indicators of Labor Markets (KILM), (ILO 2007)
Key: M = Adult Males; F=Adult Females; MF = Total Adult Population
by the ILD and employed language in line with the neoliberal paradigm. In particular,
Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1992 called for the reduction of government bureaucracy
through the provision of an “enabling environment,” the development of a human capital
market by the private sector, and privatization to reduce dependency on the government
(Republic of Kenya 1992). After the fallout from the SAPs, multilaterals, NGOs, and the
Kenyan State increasingly touted post-modern ideals that viewed the formalization of
the “micro-enterprise sector” as the hope for economic stimulus, even while municipal
policies toward informals still reflected modernist ideals of order and control (Cross
2000). These opposing views have resulted in contradictory policies for and treatment
of informal workers (Setsabi and Leduka 2008).
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4.3.2 Limited Purview of Government
As part of its agenda to limit government involvement in national economic affairs to
providing an enabling environment, the World Bank encouraged the development of
a broad-reaching project. In 1992, the Kenyan government released Sessional Paper
No. 2 on Small Enterprise and Jua Kali Development in Kenya, promising to develop
an enabling environment by reducing macro-economic, legal, infrastructural, and fiscal
obstacles to small enterprise (Republic of Kenya 1992). The Paper states its intentions
and limited purview clearly:
As a facilitator, Government will concentrate on creating the infrastruc-
tural facilities and the economic environment in which entrepreneurs can
emerge, develop, and grow . . . moreover the importance of the private sec-
tor in economic development and employment creation will actually grow
in future because of the structural adjustment policies of liberalisation and
privatisation (Republic of Kenya 1992:3 emphasis added).
At the turn of the century, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government
committed itself to creating an enabling environment for medium sized enterprises.
Based on de Soto’s recommendations couched in World Bank policy, the government
formed the Kenya Local Government Reform Programme in 1999 to remove unneces-
sary regulations and licensing barriers on trade through the provision of a Single Busi-
ness Permit. The revised permit is intended to streamline the process of obtaining a
permit to reduce the cost of doing business while also protecting customers from public
health dangers.7 The Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development also devel-
oped a Task Force in 2003 to review the municipal bylaws that were still in effect since
the colonial era that prohibited certain small businesses and trade; however, prohibitions
7See Appendix D for the official government document on the Single Business Permit. Given its
confusing and overlapping categories, I doubt this document will significantly improve the likelihood of
traders and hawkers obtaining licenses.
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on hawking within the Central Business District (CBD) were to be maintained (Mitullah
2003a).
4.3.3 Private Sector Involvement
In 1994, the Kenyan Government established the Micro and Small Enterprise Training
and Technology Project (MSETTP) funded largely by a 24 million USD loan from the
World Bank. The World Bank exerted control over the policy agenda by attaching con-
ditionalities on program design to the offer of funding. As part of the agreement to fund
the project, the World Bank required that “the Government of Kenya would provide evi-
dence of (i) bonafide membership (registration list) in the Jua Kali Association; (ii) clear
individual or Association ownership (copies of letter of allotment purchase receipt, and
lease hold title) or sites (Kisumu and Mombasa) designated for infrastructure provision
under the project” (World Bank 1993b:29–30 in King 1996:37). This was the beginning
of the push for the provision of title deeds to small businesses, widely advocated for by
de Soto’s ILD.
Under MSETTP, a Jua Kali Voucher Program was set up to develop the skills and
attitudes necessary for small-business success. Based on a previous pilot voucher pro-
gram, the World Bank designed the Kenya program with the intent of creating a market
for training provided by the private sector, ultimately allowing it to be self-sustaining.
The first Voucher Program in Peru in 1993 faced significant challenges in part due to
corruption and the stipulation of tying training to credit provision.8 Despite the lim-
ited success the Peruvian model achieved and before the World Bank had ample time to
8The World Bank was working closely with de Soto and the ILD in Peru at this time with titling for
small entrepreneurs. Instituting a voucher program was the next step in the neoliberal agenda of instituting
free market solutions to “build the capacity” of these entrepreneurs. Land titling, training, and a reduction
in bureaucracy would be the “other path” to economic success in Peru but the first two components of the
plan never produced the intended results (Mitchell 2006).
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learn from its mistakes in Peru, the voucher program was exported (with modifications)
to other countries, including Paraguay and Kenya (Goldmark 2000).
The Kenya Jua Kali Voucher Program targeted small-enterprise needs with several
different types of vouchers (textiles, woodworking, metalworking, motor vehicle me-
chanics, and food processing) targeting both small manufacturing firms and microenter-
prises run by women (Haan 2001). However, whatever benefits could accrue under the
program were limited to entrepreneurs who could fill out the eight-page application and
who owned permanent premises for their businesses (Riley and Steel 2000). As detailed
previously, such stipulations highly favor predominantly male small-manufacturers and
seriously disadvantage produce and garment traders and hawkers, especially those who
are female. Ultimately, as in Peru, the program fell victim to significant collusion
between client and provider where they would split the profits of the voucher with-
out the provision (or receipt) of training (Goldmark 2000). Despite these and other
problems, demand-side solutions were touted as being more responsive to the needs of
small-enterprises and not creating the same problem of dependency as the supply-side
programs instituted by the government. However, in Kenya, as in Peru, a market for
small-enterprise training has yet to gain any significant traction (Haan 2001).
4.3.4 Privatization
The SAP that Kenya accepted in 1980 targeted the privatization or restructuring of paras-
tatals, reduction in state services and public employment, and fiscal reform. In 1987,
Kenya received 300 million USD from the IMF in balance of payments support to help
implement these reforms (Bryceson and Potts 2005:187). Shortly thereafter, the govern-
ment issued Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1991 on Development and Employment in Kenya
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that underlined the urgent need to divest from deteriorating state corporations (Republic
of Kenya 2005a).
Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE), a government parastatal responsible for small-enter-
prise training, loans, provision, and clustering, was caught into the swirl of restructuring.
As part of the wider reforms, KIE was forced by the government to sell off its sheds and
technical service centers, increase interest rates on loans, and avoid exchange risk on
foreign currency transactions. This decapitated KIE and its ability to provide small-
entrepreneurs with beneficial terms of trade or additional services such as the purchas-
ing of international inputs at wholesale prices. These services were removed according
to the justification that the provision of subsidies, training, and protections to small-
scale enterprises shielded them from competition and inhibited “effective development
of entrepreneurial capacity . . . and should substantially inject the entrepreneurial spirit”
(Ikiara 1990:18). To truly be entrepreneurs, as the ILO claimed they were, business-
people needed to stop hiding behind government subsidies, join the capitalist system
of risk/reward, and share the burden of risk that would ultimately lead their industry
to reward (or alternatively lead it to failure, but this was not often discussed). The
business-owners who took this approach were the “true entrepreneurs” that would lead
Kenya forward to economic development (Elyachar 2005).
While damaging small-industries, this earlier package of reforms did little to in-
crease economic growth in Kenya and in 1993 another adjustment program was insti-
tuted to bring about economic reform, through a reduction in the fiscal deficit and en-
hanced monetary discipline; devaluation of currency to reduce inflation; liberalization of
external and internal markets; initiation of parastatal reform to reduce mismanagement,
corruption, and inflated marketing costs for smallholders; and improved government
management through reduction of the size of the civil service and reorganizing key min-
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istries (The World Bank 1997; King 1996:43; Republic of Kenya 2005a). In 1992, the
Kenyan government ordered divestiture in 207 non-strategic enterprises, while retaining
control of 33 commercial enterprises of strategic interest (Republic of Kenya 2005a).
In 1998, the IMF produced a timeline for the divestiture in the remaining non-strategic
government holdings (IMF 1996).
Neo-liberal policies and terminology, particularly the emphasis on market-friendly
reforms, re-energizing the private sector, providing training and access to credit, limit-
ing government purview to providing an enabling environment, have been consistently
employed in Republic of Kenya reports including the recently released government pol-
icy for SMEs. The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation
2003–2007 provides a ”recovery outline centered on re-energized private sector activity
and investment and specifically Micro, Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (MSME)
development. . . [The project] seeks to increase the competitiveness of MSMEs” by im-
proving ”Access to Finance,” ”Strengthening Enterprise Skills and Market Linkages,”
and ”Improving the Business Environment” (Republic of Kenya 2009b). In other words,
the report encourages market-friendly reforms and limits government intervention to
providing an enabling environment. Ultimately, the report suggests the implementation
of these policies will ”create incentives for informal MSMEs to graduate to higher levels
of formality . . . [which] will assist the Government in implementing the simplified taxa-
tion regime for micro and small businesses” (Republic of Kenya 2009b). Likewise, the
Economic Recovery Action Plan seeks the binary goal of accelerating economic growth
and reducing poverty through “job creation through sound macroeconomic policies,”
”improved governance,” “efficient public service delivery,” and creating an ”enabling
environment . . . to reduce the cost of doing business” (Republic of Kenya 2009a). These
documents show that discourses developed by multilaterals with generic recommenda-
tions for economic development have had a powerful influence on Kenyan State policy.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter traced the influence of development paradigms on the history of infor-
mal work in Kenya in the colonial and post-colonial periods. At the beginning of the
colonial period in Kenya, the British government exerted direct control over policies
in the colony. The Singer-Prebisch theory and ISI directly influenced the post-colonial
government in Kenya. Such policies were suggested by discourses rooted in Northern
development paradigms and supported by international institutions.
The draw of modernization theory quickly surpassed the support procured for the
Singer-Prebisch theory. Foreign advisors to Kenya recommended rapid industrialization
as the agent for social and economic transformation. The formation of various paras-
tatals and development finance institutions that catered to the needs of large and medium
sized firms in the 1960s revealed how quickly modernization theory infiltrated the policy
directives of the Kenyan state. While providing token acknowledgement of dependency
theory through Africanization and Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism,
the Kenyan State pursued the capitalist policy of “modern sector enlargement “ while
neglecting the “traditional and backward” activities of petty-trade and subsistence agri-
culture. As Leys (1994:12) suggests, dependency theory served as a philosophical and
moral foundation for the populist discourse opposing the shift from British to Kenyan
bourgeoisie with little change for the mwananchi (populace).
The 1972 ILO Kenya Report, supported by the RWG paradigm, was quite influential
on government policies. Indeed President Moi advocated for a new conceptualization of
small-manufacturers in response to reports calling for an improved view of the sector’s
productivity and worth, leading to the development of the new social category of jua
kali. The oil and debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s effectively ended the ILO’s RWG
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policies and ushered in a new era of market-friendly reforms. SAPs offered by the World
Bank and IMF left the Kenyan government little choice in the direction of its agenda for
national development. The standard of living of informals declined due to the repeal
of labor laws, removal of subsidies, increased in loan interest rates, and privatization of
training. For the first time, informal trading and hawking was no longer economically
productive and contributed to increasing urban marginality (White 1986).9
As government spending on social welfare was decreased by the reforms, the Kenyan
government had to increasingly rely on self-help policies of ordinary Kenyans, NGOs,
and the private sector. This change in policy led to a strong emphasis on the self-
sufficient capacity of informals. Around this time, the World Bank created a new funding
category for microentrepreneurs that portrayed them as the engine of national develop-
ment given the right macro-economic and legal environment (Elyachar 2005:4; Himbara
1989:227). To receive loans from international organizations, state policy writers and
NGOs began to incorporate the new category into national and local policy, effectively
creating a new social group. The praxis of self-help was developed, sold, bought, and
institutionalized through this period allowing for a justification of the failure of the state
to play a role in national welfare development.
Ultimately, the interplay of institutions (i.e., states, universities, and multilaterals)
exerted a powerful influence by “framing” discourses (to use Foucault’s terminology)
concerning informal work. The next chapter will further the discussion started here on
the Kenyan State’s formation of new social categories according to the needs of the rul-
ing development agenda through mechanisms of normalization, consent, and coercion.
9White (1986) persuasively argues that non-waged workers (including prostitutes and informal traders)
should be considered “petty bourgeoisie” not “proletariats” because they enjoyed a firmly middle class
existence that allowed for capital accumulation and class-consciousness and mobilization. Referencing
House (1978), she supports her claim that informal workers were more prosperous than waged workers
at that time with earnings data. On average, waged workers received Ksh 352 per month while jua kali
workers earned Ksh 1,184 and traders earned Ksh 1,600.
115
CHAPTER 5
THE USE OF NORMALIZATION, CONSENT, AND COERCION TO
MAINTAIN POWER IN KENYA
The first part of this chapter provides a history of the political construction of trade and
social hierarchy in Kenya by Foucault’s notion of normalization and Gramsci’s idea of
manufacturing consent. This work views normalization as an aspect of consent-building,
where constructed discourses help to generate consent about the “naturalness” of the
created structural condition. Gramsci understands consent as a mechanism of power to
build legitimacy for the rule of dominant group. Through this lens we can see that the
characteristics that make work “informal” were constructed by the colonial and post-
colonial regimes through Foucault’s triangular relations of power, discourse creation,
and right/regulation. As we will see in this chapter, every regime ruling in Kenya created
discourses to assert its power and define normative behaviors and relations of power.
Foucault (1977) also writes about the juridical system that is constructed both by
power and the discourse of truth, which in turn both judges the discourse of truth and
restricts power. Especially under democratic political systems, a juridical system both
limits power and influences the construction of truth and norms, which lend legitimacy
to relations of power. However, in Kenya, dictatorships and single-party politics limited
the extent to which the juridical system could monitor authoritarian power. As Ikiara
et al. (2004:210) write, “[President] Moi’s rule was characterized by an acceleration
of consolidation of the power of the executive at the expense of parliament and the
judiciary, a development which had started in Kenyatta’s regime . . . a political culture
emerged in which the authority of the president . . . was largely unquestionable.” The
second half of this chapter reveals how in Kenya, Foucault’s triangle was tilted heavily
in the favor of knowledge and power, with a weak juridical component that both di-
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rected the legal system to reinforce power and enable extra-legal measures of repression
through the use of police action.
5.1 A History of Pre-Colonial Trade in Central Kenya
Women conducted the majority of short and long distance trade in Kenya prior to the
colonial period. Reports dated to the late 19th century in Kenya from Louis Leakey,
Lord Lugard’s expedition, and missionaries confirm that trading caravans of a hundred
or more women regularly traveled on foot between the Central Highlands, Maasailand
and Ukambani trading produce, animals, skins, dyes, sundries, and woven goods. The
caravans were organized and led by an unmarried or barren woman or a mother who
had an older female child or co-wife to leave in charge of the household. Often the
caravans included an emissary who was bicultural, knew the languages and cultures
of both groups, and could facilitate trust and lifted trade barriers in the era before rapid
mass communication. Women were essential for this long-distance trade since they were
protected by a “market peace rule” that did not apply to males (Robertson 1997b:71).1
Although long-distance trade was better documented than local trade by Leakey
and his British peers, the latter was occurring much more frequently. Local markets
were operating up to four days a week in permanent premises and trade was conducted
exclusively by barter. While the traders were predominantly women, men contributed
to local trade by guarding the markets (Robertson 1997b; Bujra 1975).
1See Godfrey Muriuki, The History of the Kikuyu, 1500–1900, (1974) for a more detailed discussion
of the “market peace rule” and Claire Robertson, “Gender and Trade Relations in Central Kenya in the
Late Nineteenth Century” (1997a) for a superb detailed discussion of early trade in Kenya.
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5.2 Colonial Policies Regarding Trade
In 1899, the Mombasa-Kampala railway, constructed largely by Asians laborers drafted
by the British from the crown colony of India, reached a low-lying swampy area where
a trading depot was established. Soon the town of Nairobi grew around the depot, be-
coming the capital of the British protectorate and later the colony. The British insti-
tuted spatial segregation and economic control over both the indigenous population and
Asians.2 The British colonialists quickly dispossessed the Kikuyu of their land in the
Central Highlands and the Maasai of their grazing land in the Rift Valley, choosing
the most fertile, temperate, and malaria free zones for their extensive plantations and
ranches. By the 1920s, Europeans had displaced Africans from half of the arable land
in Kenya (Marris and Somerset 1971). Asians, meanwhile, were restricted in the types
of enterprises they could run and where they could settle.
5.2.1 Control of Reproduction
Colonial policies drew rural peasants into direct relations with capitalist modes of pro-
duction as Africans were forced to earn cash income to pay various taxes. In 1901, a
hut tax was instituted on all households and by 1904 Africans could only pay this tax in
cash. The combination of the loss of farmland, the restriction of movement via passes,
and the requirement to pay a cash tax to the new administration forced African males
into the service of European farms and factories. Although contestation of these new
regulations occurred at first, their constant application over time, the normalization of
policies through colonial discourse and action, and the recognition of the inevitability
2Many of the Asians who built the railroad system returned home. However, in the early 1900s, a new
influx of Ismali and Gujarati Indians arrived in Kenya, in part due to their ties with the coastal trade routes
(Hirst and Lamba 1994).
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of the policies served to help manufacture consent.
In 1915 the Registration of Natives Ordinance created pass laws that sought to limit
who could come to Nairobi and where they could settle, thereby balancing supply and
demand and reducing the chance for violent revolution by the unemployed (Hay and
Harris 2007). In rural areas, “Native Reserves” and the pass system (kipande) were
instituted as part of the colonial “pacification” scheme. Since ethnic groups were sep-
arated from each other, restricted to their “tribal areas,” and made to list their ethnicity
on their pass, previously fluid ethnic identities began to be cemented and linked to clear
geographic locales (Robertson 1997b). Likewise, normative racial categories were con-
structed based on the supposed economic, intellectual, and moral superiority of British
society. Laws based on this discourse of superiority enforced the racial segregation of
housing, politics, and economy and had the effect of making European rule seem natu-
ral. While contestations of European rule occurred preventing this hierarchy from being
completely normalized, many Kenyans accepted a subservient social position.
Control of Social Reproduction
Racial and ethnic categories were created by the Europeans to institute social control.
The population was separated into a rigid pyramidal triple caste system with the Eu-
ropeans at the top, Asians in the middle, and Africans on the bottom. These social
categories also created a social identity for the members based on normative judgments
such this quote from the Minister of Health in the early 1900s:
Such was Nairobi in January, 1902 — a town of mushroom growth, un-
drained, insanitary and foul, sheltering some 5000–6000 Inhabitants mostly
of alien extraction who bringing with them their caste prejudices, oriental
vices, and inherent love of filth, darkness and overcrowding, attracted the
Native in numbers who quickly acquired all the vices and immorality his
119
Eastern superiors could teach him, which he practiced with such terrible
results to himself and the community at large (Ministry of Health quoted in
Robertson 1997b:12–13).
The social categories were cemented via physical segregation such that Africans
were restricted to “native locations” and Asians were not allowed to own land in either
the European areas or the “native reserves.” This left Asians with little alternative but to
turn to urban and rural trade and small manufacturing (Swainson 1978). Within Nairobi
they were accorded land around the railway depot — an area called Landhies. Between
the Asian and African parts of town sprouted Nairobi’s first marketplace, the Indian
Bazaar. Asians were also the first to build permanent shops in rural Kenya and bring in
large shipments of imports to serve both the African population and the British colonial
and missionary population (Marris and Somerset 1971).
The colonial administration also encouraged tribal associations that would divide
workers in Nairobi along ethnic lines. Kikuyu were predominant in Nairobi and formed
the Young Kikuyu Association and the Kikuyu Central Association (Furedi 1973). Other
similar groups formed, albeit on a much smaller level. To institutionalize these eth-
nically-based associations, the government set up the Native Advisory Council with
twenty representatives from missionary societies and “tribal associations.” The latter
was a concept designed by the colonial administration but by drawing indigenous lead-
ership only from these institutions, consent over their construction was manufactured.
Control of Sexual Reproduction
The colonial administration enacted legal and normative measures to control sexual re-
production as well as social reproduction. African families were increasingly separated
as men headed to Nairobi for work or were drafted to fight in World War I for their colo-
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nial masters and women remained on the shamba (farmstead).3 Rural wives were not en-
couraged to migrate to the city with their husbands because rural household production
was an essential component of cheap urban labor by “subsidizing” male wages through
the provision of food to the homestead. In addition, urban farming was not possible
in the poorly drained soil of the African housing settlements (particularly Pumwani)
(White 1986). This led to temporary urbanization or circular migration where the men
would rotate between Nairobi and the shamba depending on the seasons and availability
of work (Hay and Harris 2007).
The high number of male migrant workers in Nairobi created a demand for cheap
food, sundries, and sex and men turned to prostitutes to fulfill these needs and desires.
Prostitutes not only provided sexual services but also could cook, provide warm bath-
water, and clean his clothes for additional income. The colonial administration tolerated
this to some degree when it remained quietly within the household, but when African
troops and Italian Prisoners of War began to visit the African quarters for such ser-
vices, the government instituted a strong curfew (White 1986). However, prostitution
adapted, forming a less conspicuous service behind closed doors that economically prof-
ited women.
Under the Vagrancy Act, prostitutes were removed from the city if found, while
female traders were generally not, providing an incentive for prostitutes or former pros-
titutes to engage in petty-trade at least on the side. Female traders were an essential
component of keeping labor costs low for European industries. In fact, trade conducted
by women from Kiambu became the main source of fresh produce for Nairobi and uji
(porridge) favored by African industrial workers and female traders at this time were not
restricted by the pass laws that prevented men from coming to Nairobi without waged
3Robertson (1997b) suggests that Kiambu, a Kikuyu area in the Central Highlands, likely supplied the
highest percentage of African soldiers by population for both WWI and WWII.
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employment. Thus, colonial ordinances prevented wives from settling with their hus-
bands in the city but encouraged economically useful women to “service” male low-
wage labor.
A 1903 ordinance forced hawkers to obtain a license to sell anything but their own
produce, which favored women who could make the short trip to Kiambu every day or
two (KNA Nairobi Administrative District AR 1926:55 and Wood 1974:39 in Robertson
1996:52). This itinerant lifestyle was reinforced by the colonial government’s periodic
demolition of low-cost self-constructed housing.
According to the 1906 Employment of Servants Ordinance, employers were required
to house employees, but in reality, this ordinance was unenforced. Since Africans were
not allowed to settle in Nairobi, they constructed “villages” or self-constructed settle-
ments on the outskirts (Obudho and Aduwo 1989:18). Concerned by their lack of control
over these settlements and the inability to enforce the pass laws entirely due to the need
of European firms for African labor, municipal officials razed the five African housing
areas in Nairobi4 between the 1920s and 1940s and resettled the African population
onto municipal-owned land north of the Nairobi River and east of downtown. These
more centralized neighborhoods were called Pumwani (“the resting place”) and Shauri
Moyo (“business of the heart” or “my own business”) (Hay and Harris 2007).5
4Mji wa Mombasa, Pangani, Maskini, Kaburini and Kileleshwa — Pangani was the wealthiest of these
African settlements (Bujra 1975; White 1986). These towns have clear linkages to the Kenyan coast and
indeed White (1986) reports that the majority of land-lords and prostitutes in Pumwani (the consolidation
of four of the five villages) were Muslims from the Coast and not Kikuyu from the Central Highlands,
although many new residents quickly converted. As a result, many of the houses were constructed in the
Swahili style where a central corridor bisects rooms and leads to communal cooking and bathing in the
rear (Hay and Harris 2007).
5In part, this consolidation occurred because of the breakout of venereal diseases. Bujra (1975) doc-
uments a letter “from a Committee appointed by a public meeting convened to consider the question
of venereal disease . . . in which the importance of the Native Location as a first measure towards the
controlling of native prostitution was urged.”
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Figure 5.1: Map of African Housing in Nairobi During the Colonial Era
Source: (Hirst and Lamba 1994)
Note: See Appendix C for an enlarged map
After the demolitions in Nairobi, the government allowed men and women to reg-
ister for land titles (which could be passed to their heirs or “designated heirs”), con-
struct houses, or the right to rent rooms in Nairobi. With this concession, the municipal
government built consent over the demolition of Pangani and the consolidation to the
more controllable settlement of Shauri Moyo. At the same time, through the policy of
usufruct, they maintained economic control without the hassle of managing the everyday
affairs of Africans.
Many women invested their accumulated capital from prostitution into petty-trade or
the housing market, in part to provide themselves with “legal” employment that reduced
government harassment and evictions to rural reserves under the Vagrancy Act. By the
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1930s, women made up a significant proportion of urban home-owners in the “Native
Locations.” In Pangani in 1932 and Pumwani from 1943 through 1971, just over 40 per-
cent of the houses were owned by women (Bujra 1975:216, 232). This was a significant
change for Kikuyu women who did not own the land they lived on in rural areas only
had rights to farm it for their husband.6 White (1990a:420) records the importance of
this change through an interview with a woman who moved to Nairobi in the 1920s, “At
home, what could I do? Grow crops for my husband and father. In Nairobi, I can earn
my own money, for myself.” In some ways, the colonial regime unintentionally provided
opportunities for female capital accumulation and female inheritance far beyond what
was available previously. When Pangani was destroyed, ninety percent of its female
landlords accepted the opportunity for lifetime leases of stone tenements that they could
rent out in the newly created Shauri Moyo.7 While these buildings could not be passed
on to heirs, they were a source of stability and guaranteed income for the remainder of
the woman’s life (White 1986).
But these new housing developments could not accommodate the population growth
that occurred in 1937 when labor demands skyrocketed and the African population
jumped from 28,000 in 1936 to 40,000 in 1938 (White 1986). The Municipal Native
Affairs Office reported in 1938 that “. . . very large numbers of natives . . . for lack of
accommodation are unable to sleep in Pumwani [the official native location]. . . . It is
estimated that some 600 are in River Road and Canal Road alone, living in undesirable
squalor” (Furedi 1973).8
6See Robertson (1997b:64–70) for a detailed discussion on the pre-colonial rights of ownership for
Kikuyu women.
7The 175 stone houses originally built by the municipality for landlords expelled from Pangani to
move to in Shauri Moyo, today house much of the wholesale sector of mitumba (used clothing) sales in
Gikomba.
8To better understand the life and living conditions of casual laborers in Nairobi at this time see Meja
Mwangi’s fictionalized historical account “Going Down River Road” (1976).
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Figure 5.2: Colonial Era Housing in Pumwani
More official surveys estimated that housing had been constructed for about 9,000
people in Pumwani and Shauri Moyo, leaving approximately seventy-five percent of
Nairobi’s African population to fend for themselves (Hay and Harris 2007; Obudho
and Aduwo 1989). Furedi (1973:281) estimated that in 1941 there were at least 1,500
informal workers (tailors, masons, hawkers, petty traders) in Nairobi, 2,000 to 3,000
unemployed persons, and 2,000 Kikuyu traders entering Nairobi on a daily basis.
The imposed social hierarchy and equation of female traders with prostitution led to
increasingly negative views of traders proffered by the colonial government.9 Traders
were considered unproductive and illegitimate forms of work. In the 1930s, an admin-
istrator described traders as:
unemployed and mostly unemployable . . . As they emerge from the mission
school their main ambition appears to be the achieving of a competency by
means of petty cheating . . . This finds expression in the incredible number of
middle men — traders who are found on almost every reserve road trading
9Oftentimes in Africa, “loss of economic control over traders is equated with loss of sexual control
over women” (Gracia Clark 1988 in Robertson 1997b:91).
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on a miserable capital, but persuading the native producer . . . to dispose
of his produce at a figure much below the market prices. It further finds
expression in the shops . . . butchers and “hotels” which has sprung up like
mushrooms and owe their existence to that misguided patriotism which is
the last refuge of the scoundrel (Van Zwanenberg and King in Robertson
1997b:79).
In 1944 the District Commissioner denigrated the value of local trade as:
An ugly development recently has been the petty trading done by women
who, buying produce at one market, take it to a different part of the district
and dispose of it at a handsome profit. . . . The spread of petty trading . . . has
clearly gone too far. . . (Robertson 1997b:104).
Characterizations of traders showed increasing concern on the part of the colonial
administration with the freedom of movement traders had been accorded. The colonial
administration responded by tightening its control over the African population through
food ordinances, movement restrictions, the division of the working class to prevent
class mobilization, and the physical repression of traders. Thus, the late 1940s saw an
increase in reports of citizens feeling threatened both economically and physically.
5.2.2 Control of Production
Restriction on African Trade
European settlers were particularly unhappy with the proliferation of illegal channels of
produce into the export and local market and demanded regulation to protect their own
economic interests. Untaxed produce movement by Africans was also significantly cut-
ting into the revenues of the colonial government, which enacted a series of ordinances
to address the problem. As part of the Food Control Ordinance in the late 1920s, a Food
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Control Board was established to impose price controls, distribute licenses, prohibit the
exportation of staples and provide famine relief in the Reserves (Robertson 1997b).
The Market of Native Produce Ordinance instituted in 1935, further centralized mar-
kets, licensed traders, and provisioned for the inspection of produce and grading of
staples. African and European produce was graded separately with European produce
always commanding more value and a higher grade for being produced on white-owned
farms. Thus, from the very beginning, the colonial system created a dual labor mar-
ket in Kenya with European products inherently commanding higher prices than similar
African small-holder products.
In 1939, the Native Advisory Council was set up to improve tax collection and deal
with other native affairs. The purpose of implementing this mechanism was to develop
consent and legitimacy for colonial regulations that would increase taxable channels and
restrict the benefits Africans could derive from agricultural trade (Furedi 1973; Himbara
1989). Although the Native Advisory Council had little actual power, its members did
enjoy special privileges and higher social status. In 1946, the African Advisory Council
(AAC) could nominate two members to the Nairobi Municipal Council (NMC), thereby
securing African representation in urban issues (Furedi 1973).
In the meantime, ordinances invoked by the colonial administration made legal agri-
cultural trade difficult for ordinary Africans again created a two-tiered system where
the elite Europeans had easy access to markets while artificially limiting African trade.
After 1940, the administration heavily enforced the 1901 pass laws, forcing traders to
have both a license and a pass to operate in Nairobi, to control movement of people and
goods out of the Reserves. In 1942 alone, two hundred people a month were deported
from Nairobi and forced to return to their native reserve (Robertson 1996). In 1946 a
municipal ordinance was passed that permitted the removal of any African from Nairobi
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for any reason without recourse. Ordinances passed in 1949, presumably under the nose
of the two AAC members of the NMC, further limited the movement of people and trade
in and out of Nairobi (Robertson 1997b).
In 1952, the forced evacuation of the labor force when a state of emergency was
declared and the limitations placed on traders who provided cheap food to support cheap
labor, led to a labor shortage in Nairobi. This created consternation among European
industrialists who were suffering low productivity in their firms. Formal sector growth
remained sluggish without enough workers and the informal sector was slow to recover
as well since there was, for a time, employment availability in the formal sector at a wage
well above the market-clearing wage (Kitching 1980b:401). The colonial administration
was forced to repeal some of its previous controls on movement.
Enterprise controls on Africans traders were more repressive after the Emergency
was declared by a colonial government concerned about the Land and Freedom Army
(LFA).10 Laws such as the Emergency Powers Order in Council and the Public Order
Ordinance gave the government nearly complete free-will to control Africans. Raids
were conducted on traders, marketplaces were targets of police violence, and fences
were built around African marketplaces to physically control the population (Robertson
1997b). However, non-coercive policies to generate consent for colonial policies were
still preferred. In particular, the administration attempted to create a loyal group of
followers and cement their allegiance through preferential treatment. To this end, a new
policy asserted that only loyalists could receive business or trade licenses.
10Also known as the Mau Mau, the LFA fought a guerilla style war against the British administration in
the 1950s. Attacks by the LFA on rural farmers and the difficulty of determining who was part of the LFA
led to the declaration of a state of emergency in Kenya in 1952. The LFA was predominantly made up of
Kikuyu who were facing serious land shortages in the Central Highlands due to land-grabs by European
farmers and the return of war veterans after World War II (Koinange 1955:18).
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Privileging of Small Industries
After World War II ended, Kenyan War Veterans returned home bringing with them new
capital. Many veterans, especially the Kikuyu from the Central Highlands, had lost their
land to White settlers during this time and returned to Kenya with no rural land-holdings.
Many of the Kikuyu returning from World War II had been previously employed in
Indian or European firms in Nairobi but due to tightened pass laws and a labor surplus,
could not return to their previous employers. Thus, many capitalized on the skills they
had learned and invested their new capital into new machinery, causing a boom in the
number of African businesses listed with the Registrar of Companies between 1945 and
1949 (Himbara 1989). The competition from established Indian workshops, standards
imposed on construction, and the prohibitions on credit provisions to African businesses
was too great for the nascent African businesses in rural areas and most collapsed before
long (Marris and Somerset 1971; Koinange 1955:16–18). Mbiyu Koinange writes first-
hand his account of the causes for failed businesses during the 1940s,
Africans were allowed to build shops of permanent material in trading cen-
ters . . . a time limit was placed on the completion of these shops after which
the builder lost his trading license and trading site. In the Central Province
alone which has about eight districts each district had about 2,000 shops
costing about 8,000 /- (over $1,000) each. . . . The result is that if you vis-
ited any of these trading centers . . . in one shop you would find only a bar
of blue soap, one blanket and a lantern. The African, having spent 8,000 /-
of his savings on permanent materials did not have any money left to buy
trading goods for his shops (1955:17–18).
Many of the small businessmen had taken advantage of the opening of colonial pol-
icy toward the initiation of Africa enterprise; however, with the mass failure of African
enterprise, the colonial government shifted their focus to developing a more stable con-
tingent of entrepreneurs.
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Due to the failing businesses and slow growth in the formal sector, the colonial
regime also became increasingly concerned with rising unemployment and its implica-
tions for class revolutions. Protests, strikes, and riots in Mombasa in 1939 highlighted
the potential for social unrest and worried the colonial administration. Early colonial
censuses did not record non-wage employment and since “employed” adult males rarely
exceeded twenty-five percent of the total adult male population, an “unemployment” rate
of seventy-five percent was viewed with concern for its potential for generating social
unrest (Kitching 1980a). To manage the rapid increase in small enterprises, social unrest
evident in urban areas, rising unemployment, and migration from ”native reserves,” the
colonial government set up the Rural Industries Committee in the 1940s. The Commit-
tee was tasked with creating a middle class of small-entrepreneurs that would provide
goods for local markets, absorb the unemployed, and eventually graduate workers into
larger industries (Himbara 1989). These legal constructs manufactured normative un-
derstandings of small-scale enterprises that played an important role in the construction
of informal identity starting in the colonial period. They also privileged colonial eco-
nomic interests by helping to keep labor costs low and small entrepreneurs loyal and
dependent on the colonial administration. The Nairobi Municipal Native Affairs Officer
articulated this purposeful construction of an African urban entrepreneurial class in the
1941 Annual Report:
The aim is to evolve a class which will, with a little capital, be able to supply
more people at lower prices. . . He usually lives in the most overcrowded
parts of Pumwani. . . What is desirable is a more stable figure living at a
higher level of subsistence and more knowledgeable in his trade (Robertson
1997b:131).
This division of the working class into productive and unproductive, stable and
unstable, knowledgeable and unknowledgeable categories had long lasting effects in
Kenya. As we will see in the following sections, post-colonial administrations based
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their understanding of, and policies for, small-scale enterprises on the norms created by
colonial-era regulations.
Conclusion
As an instrument of colonial power, the juridical instrument in Kenya both strengthened
the power of the administration and supported the construction of normative discourses.
Discourses concerning racial superiority that fomented a social hierarchy became em-
bedded in society while regulations concerning spatial mobility and economic oppor-
tunity fostered an artificial dual labor market that supported the economic interests of
the colonial administration. The colonial administration needed to bolster its legitimacy
so badly during the Emergency that it manufactured discourse around the “inherent”
greater productivity of small enterprises than trade to create a loyalist contingent of a
“new class of entrepreneurs.” However, to maintain the economic hierarchy, the admin-
istration limited the real economic power of these enterprises through regulations such
as the Credit to Natives Ordinance. Thus, small African businesses were only allowed
to fill the bottom rung of an artificially created dual labor market. While marginally
better off than hawkers and traders, who faced deportation and repression at the hands
of the colonial regime, traders were severely limited in their economic mobility. The
constructed nature of the social position of small enterprises and traders is an essential
but historically neglected characteristic of occupational development in Kenya.
5.3 Post-Colonial Constructions of Informal Work
That the transfer of power that occurred in 1963 was little more than an exchange of
British elite for African elite had important consequences for Kenyan hawkers and
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traders (Leys 1975). Traders who had been restricted so heavily under the colonial ad-
ministration remained in the bottom tier of the economic hierarchy. African enterprises
had never really been given the chance to succeed with the artificial limitations imposed
by the colonists did not fare much better in the years after independence. Instead, most
of the policies adopted by the new government supported large industries that had been
given out as favors to political elites in the new-elected president’s circle.
The newly independent government in Kenya quickly implemented ISI and African-
ization policies that benefitted elite interests (Swainson 1978). They invested little en-
ergy into reforming colonial policies that disfavored local trade and micro-enterprises
(Himbara 1989). Under the new administration, traders and hawkers were still viewed
as undesirables. In 1964, the government instituted Operation Clean Up, purportedly
based on public health and urban aesthetic concerns (Robertson 1993). Whatever its
intent, the operation reaffirmed the elitist conceptualization of traders as deviants who
contributed to the moral and physical decay of the city, thereby justifying evictions and
protecting elite business interests (Setsabi and Leduka 2008). In 1968 a NCC (Nairobi
City Council) committee “recommended that the whole hawker issues be referred to the
Unemployment Sub-Committee” reinforcing the idea that small enterprises were not
considered gainful employment (Robertson 1997b:262). It was not until after the ILO’s
1972 Kenya Report was released that the government began to pay attention to informal
work.
5.3.1 Occupational Differentiation
As discussed earlier, small manufacturers had long been portrayed by the colonial ad-
ministration as less transitory, more homogeneous, more dynamic, and more willing
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to invest in permanent structures compared to traders (ignoring the history of policy
regarding trading and hawking in Nairobi that privileged this sub-sector over other sub-
sectors of informal work) (Robertson 1997b:265; Marris and Somerset 1971). The ILO
Report built on this popular notion, painting small manufactures as a perfect example of
entrepreneurial spirit and the innovation that occurs in a competitive environment (Leys
1975).11 According to the Report, it was these small manufacturers, who with a little
training, could act as the engines of growth for the country and progress to modern-
sector entrepreneurs (Macharia 1993).
President Moi recognized the growing influence of informal workers due to the mas-
sive demographic shifts and began instituting policies based on ILO recommendations
that helped his administration maintain power. Writing shortly after this period, Colin
Leys observed that, “Since the redistributive thrust of the proposals would entail sacri-
fices by the social classes actually in power in Kenya, it was not hard for observers at the
time . . . to conclude that the proposals would only be implemented insofar as they did not
conflict with the dominant interests represented by the Kenya government” (1979:330).
In fact, this is exactly what happened. Certain aspects of the ILO recommendations were
employed quickly while others were ignored. The ILO seemed to tolerate this partial
implementation, compromising more and more on the overall ideological bent of the
policy as it became less popular with other powerful states and institutions.
After an attempted coup in 1982, Moi became nearly obsessive in his attempts to
control the society in order to maintain power. At first, he constructed a discourse of
11Elyachar documents how the category “microentrepreneur” came into existence as a social group
“when the World Bank designated a new funding category, and set into motion new hybrid forms of
organizational power that stretched the bounds of the state, international organizations, and the NGO.
These young microentrepreneurs were to embody the new, vigorous market economy that would take
Egypt forward in the era of neoliberalism and the ITO. They were not, the speaker wanted to make clear,
the old-style craftsmen of Egypt who ”make a piece of something and that’s it.” Although they had been
born to rely on the state, they had reemerged from a chrysalis of debt and training to become entrepreneurs.
They would embody the free market” (Elyachar 2005:4).
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difference that ultimately served to prevent the unification over informal workers over
similar interests. In particular, Moi advocated for the use of the term jua kali to represent
the positive attributes of small-manufacturers including skill, hard-work, dedication,
growth, success, and ingenuity (Macharia 1993).12 In 1986, President Moi promised
sheds and land titles to small manufacturers around Kariobangi and Gikomba, pledging
over a million Kenyan shillings to the project. Moi’s personal appearance at Kamukunji
to dedicate the first shed signified to the nation a change in policy and priorities by the
government. Moi dedicated the structures as “Nyayo sheds” (footsteps; a nickname for
Moi because he followed in the footsteps of Kenyatta), thereby legitimizing this form of
informal work and creating consent for the new terminology by suggesting that workers
are following in his footsteps towards national development. One jua kali artisan present
in Kamukunji for the President’s visit described its impact: “I can now identify myself
as a ’Jua Kali’ worker without as much harassment as before. When I tell the policemen
that I do not have a work identification number because I work in Kamukunji as a metal
artisan, the immediate response these days is, “Oh, the President’s place, and I am left
free” (Macharia 1993:25). As documented by Macharia, artisans reported a concomitant
rise in trust from customers signifying a changed national perception of jua kali.
In both the popular press and government documents, jua kali workers were por-
trayed as a source of national pride and an engine of entrepreneurship, import-substitu-
tion, and modern sector development in Kenya (King 1996; Robertson 1997b).13 The
Kenya Times stated, “Once the sheds are completed, the mechanics would be properly
organized so that their skills could be harnessed to the mainstream of the country’s in-
12Officially, jua kali referred to metal artisans and small manufacturers who were almost entirely male.
This term did not carry over to produce traders or hawkers, who were mostly female. Through the identity
creation of jua kali, the government transformed the ILO’s call for more positive attitudes and policies
towards the informal sector into a gendered legitimization of male-dominated small-manufacturing enter-
prise. In later decades, other sub-sectors of informal work attempted to co-opt the terminology to apply
broadly to the whole informal sector, in order to reap the benefits of jua kali policies (Ferrara 2002:67).
13See Elyachar (2005) for a comparative analysis of this meta-narrative in Cairo.
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dustrial development” (20 November 1985 in King 1996:1). According to the popular
perception, small manufacturers intrinsically had the characteristics for successful con-
tribution to national development, they simply needed to be properly organized to realize
their potential. Workers were increasingly treated as an object of national development
and not a subject with their own agency. However, other sub-sectors of informal work
were not included in Moi’s positive conceptualization of jua kali, finding their work
continually repressed and denigrated by government police and the popular sentiment
alike. Thus, policies stemming from Moi’s administration had serious consequences for
the formation of a collective identity for informal workers.
Education Reform
Moi solidified the normative categories of productive and unproductive informal work
through institutional reform. In particular he used educational reform and assistance
programs to imbed this new social category into Kenyan culture. Along with the orga-
nizational restructuring of the system from 7-4-2-3 to 8-4-4,14 there was a fundamental
substantive shift towards emphasizing skill and attitude preparation for self-employment
(Haan 2001). Pre-vocational training in Art and Craft, Business Education, and Home
Science, entered the primary school curriculum in 1986 (Ministry of Education 1994).
Positive portrayals of self-employment were incorporated into optional and required
subject areas of primary education including English and Social Studies (King 1996;
Haan 2001). For example, a Standard Five Social Studies primer published in 2003
portrayed jua kali industries as a legitimate option for employment in Kenya. It empha-
sized the utility of small-scale manufacturing in making basic goods needed by other
14The previous education system was based on the British system and required seven years of primary
and junior secondary school, four years of middle secondary school, two years higher secondary schooling
and a minimum of three years in University. The current education system, adopted in 1985, requires eight
years of primary, four years of secondary and four years of university (Ministry of Education 1994).
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people, contributing to import substitution, keeping prices low, and clearing urban areas
of discarded metal.
The government encourages the establishment of Jua Kali industries due to
the following reasons: a) Jua Kali industries are seen as a good opportunity
for self-employment to thousands of school leavers who are not trained in
any skill. b) There is plenty of scrap metal mainly in the urban centres,
which would otherwise be useless. . . . d) In order to save the country from
spending a lot of foreign exchange importing various items, Jua Kali in-
dustries are encouraged to make some of these items locally. . . . Jua Kali
industries are established to make available goods that are cheap and can be
found in many parts of the country (Omwoyo and Oyaya 2003:132).
A Standard Eight English Primer dedicates an entire chapter to “The Jua Kali Ar-
tisan,” emphasizing positive attributes of artisans by portraying them as hardworking,
honest, wise, thrifty, polite, efficient, and successful (Jomo Kenyatta Foundation 1987).
King (1996) provides similar excerpts from primers in the 1990s.
Soon you will be leaving primary school. You will have to decide what
to do. There are many possibilities: 1. Self-employment . . . To be self-
employed, you need to have courage and skill. You need to work hard.
However, many people enjoy working for themselves, being their own boss.
. . . Find out what small businesses are needed in your area (Berluti 1985 in
King 1996:165).
All that one needs is to be organized either as an individual or as a group
and start a business. You do not need to stay idle in your father’s house sim-
ply because you have no job in which you are paid regularly. You should
actively keep yourself busy by engaging yourself in one of these activities.
In other words, when you finish school, the question should not be: WHO
WILL EMPLOY ME BUT HOW WILL I EMPLOY MYSELF? In many
cases, you will find that self-employment is more paying than being em-
ployed by another person (Gatama 1986:66 in King 1996:164).
Applied skills, including woodwork, metalwork, building construction, power me-
chanics, drawing and design, leatherwork, and motor mechanics were incorporated as
optional subjects for secondary students to improve their preparation for self-reliance
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enterprises or vocational training institutes (Haan 2001; Ministry of Education 1994;
King 1996). Training for entrepreneurship also increased at the post-secondary level
through a masters program at Jomo Kenyatta University of Appropriate Technology and
a higher diploma course at the Kenya Teachers Training College (Haan 2001).
Education reform helped to manufacture consent over the physical and normative
separation between traders/hawkers and the jua kali. The new discourse praising jua
kali workers was embedded in the revised textbooks and curriculum, making it easy to
accept the reformulated identity and social position as “natural.” Now the government
just had to make sure this new social category lived up to its new social identity and the
transition would be complete. The KANU government under Moi completed this task
by encouraging an increase in jua kali assistance programs.
Assistance Programs
Beginning in the 1980s, government funding for public goods was beginning to be
reigned in by fiscal reforms under adjustment policies instituted by the IMF and World
Bank. Thus, the private sector was encouraged to fill in the gap by training small-busi-
nessmen. In 1986, the Kenya Management Assistance Program (KMAP) was formed
to give top and middle managers one free day per month to provide advice to smaller
enterprises (Standard, 13 Dec. 1989 in Himbara 1989:229).
The massive expansion of the Institutes of Technology, Technical Training Institutes,
and Youth Polytechnics (YPs) in the 1980s represented public and private attempts at
small enterprise development (Haan 2001). Training centers under the control of the
National Youth Service, YMCA, and other NGOs or for-profit firms provided additional
opportunities to school leavers. In 2000, fees ranged from Ksh 4,000 to 10,000 per
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year for the YPs to Ksh 51,000 per year for the National Youth Service, despite par-
tial subsidization by the government (Khasiani 2000). These costs put this additional
training out of the reach of most poor people, which perhaps explains why the majority
of entrepreneurs in Kenya still used apprenticeships to small firms as their main form
of training (Haan 2001). YPs constituted the second most popular way to get practical
training. Originally run by the National Christian Council of Kenya, the YP program
was taken over by the government in 1971; however, the program was expected to be-
come self-sufficient and government funds for teachers were withdrawn. The program
faltered and over 75 percent of graduates did not become self-employed. A similar
fate befell nearly all other training programs, in part because training and policies on
informal work were not harmonized but instead scattered across different government
ministries and programs (Haan 2001; Khasiani 2000).
To help consolidate programs and address jua kali development, President Moi
formed the Ministry of Technical Training and Applied Technology (MTTAT) in 1988.
It was tasked with supervising the Jua Kali Development Programme and for developing
the Jua Kali Artisan Identification card. Ultimately, this card established the artisans’
work as legitimate and provided them with a base from which they could obtain future
rights such as tenure, land, sheds, title deeds, or loans (King 1996:24).
In the 1990s, the World Bank funded the Small Enterprise Training and Technology
Project (MSETTP) to construct a private market for training through a voucher sys-
tem. Built on a previous model launched in Paraguay and Peru, this World Bank project
targeted small-manufacturers (SSEs) with “the expectation that they potentially have a
larger role to play in future employment and economic growth than enterprises in re-
tail/commerce . . . their demonstrated sustainability and potential for expansion makes
them the ideal beneficiary group if the objective is to get the most ”bang for the buck”
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in terms of sustainable employment and income growth (Riley and Steel 2000). Ignor-
ing the fact that this “productive” sub-sector of informal work had been created through
a historical confluence of government favors and direct interference, the World Bank
supported the notion that small-manufacturers were inherently more productive than
traders. The World Bank did also support a few women’s small enterprises as a form of
poverty-reduction; however, the prerequisites to enter the project, including filling out
an eight-page application and obtaining fixed business premises, were certainly not fea-
sible for a large number of low-income entrepreneurs (Riley and Steel 2000; Goldmark
2000). Moreover, the prerequisites did not acknowledge that the government routinely
destroyed the business premises of traders, precluding their ability to construct perma-
nent structures.
Thus, the transition was complete; small manufacturers were moved from the pe-
riphery to the center of national development by the propagation of discourse rooted in
modernist dualistic conceptualizations of labor markets. At the same time the jua kali
were receiving this support, hawkers and traders were facing increasingly repressive
measures to control their livelihoods, as will be discussed in the following section.
This section reviewed the history of trade and small enterprise in Kenya and dis-
cussed how colonial and post-colonial power, discourse creation, and regulations af-
fected the particular organization of work found in Nairobi. As evidenced in this sec-
tion, the informal sector was constructed through government intervention in the form of
various regulatory controls over labor and discourses to privilege the interests of those
in power. In the post-colonial period, the Kenyan state manufactured consent for their
policies by embedding new terms within education programs to make them seem “nat-
ural,” and by providing regulatory structures to support the physical needs of the new
social category of jua kali. The following section will discuss the coercive strategies
139
exerted by colonial and post-colonial administrations when consent-based policies were
not effective.
5.4 Physical Violence and Spatial Control
Government policies in Kenya have not simply created a dominant discourse about in-
formality, they have also initiated physical violence and battles for spatial control since
the 1920s. Property destruction inside and outside marketplaces was rampant and arbi-
trary through the 1990s. Gichira (1991) reports that all local authorities interviewed in
his study reported forcibly removing informal sector workers without providing an al-
ternative site for their livelihoods. Likewise, 47 percent of informal sector workers had
received serious fines between Ksh 500–3,000 and 15 percent had been imprisoned from
one to three months when they returned to the original site to reinstate their enterprise.
In short, the colonial and post-colonial governments in Kenya emphasized the need
to control traders, first through pass laws and later by forcing them into government-
established marketplaces. The most recent application of this latter policy came in
March 2008 when hawkers were evicted from the Central Business District (CBD) and
forced to move to Muthurwa Hawkers’ Market. The following section will trace the
history of physical repression and battles for spatial control in marketplaces and dis-
cuss different strategies informals have taken in response, including retaliatory violence,
protests, and forming associations.
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5.4.1 Effects of Colonial Repression
The first mass mobilization of African workers in Nairobi occurred in the 1920s in
reaction to an attempted wage reduction by European settlers affected by the global
decline in agricultural commodity prices. Protest meetings and strikes occurred that
helped to unite different ethnic groups to form the East African Association (EAA).
The colonial administration was quick to suppress the organization and in 1922 arrested
and exiled Harry Thuku, a young Kikuyu leader in the EAA. The popular reaction was
swift and within hours a general strike was initiated that quickly showed Europeans
how much they depended on African’s for social and government services.15 More
than 7,000 African men and women gathered around the police station where Thuku
was held, drawing a violent response from the encircled policemen (Wipper 1989:313).
Policemen fired at the protesters, killing about twenty people thereby breaking up the
demonstration and then enforced a curfew. African protesters withdrew to Pangani,
while administration police surrounded the settlement. The EAA was banned and later
Pangani was destroyed as a hideout for rebels, criminals, and spivs. In 1937, a large
number of unemployed persons (many of these itinerant hawkers without licenses) were
removed from Nairobi and sent to Native Reserves as part of the administration’s policy
to “clean-up” and control the city (Furedi 1973:278–280).
From the 1940s onward, marketplaces in Nairobi became sites not only of mate-
rial trade but also of political and social protest for informal workers. Early on, traders
formed small associations based on commodities such as cobblers’ and banana sellers’
guilds. Shortly thereafter, the first large-scale organization, the 4,000 member United
African Traders Association formed to advocate for the interests of traders, especially
against competition from encroaching hawkers. This all-male group protested against
15See Wipper (1989) for an extended discussion of the role of women in the protests against Thuku’s
detainment.
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unfavorable by-laws, decried the increasing use of licensing to control movement and
commodities, and complained about competition from hawkers to the Nairobi Acting
Town Clerk.16 The African Workers’ Federation was founded in 1947 as a radical com-
bination of nationalist politics and trade union agitation but was quickly disbanded when
its leader was exiled and police violence was threatened if the workers were to strike
(Furedi 1973).
The repressive measures increased in the late 1940s and into the 1950s as the Land
and Freedom Army’s (LFA) urban front took refuge in the crowded and confusing cor-
ridors of the marketplaces whose names bring to mind the loss of lives in World War I
and World War II for the British empire with little benefit for Africans.17 In particular,
the group Anake wa 40 (The Forty Group) formed a populist opposition movement com-
posed primarily of young male Kikuyu in Nairobi.18 The Anake wa 40, the urban arm
of the LFA, supported violent measures to support their nationalist goals, used oathing
and intimidation to maintain loyalty, and found protection from the police within mar-
ketplaces and African settlements. In 1947, policemen who were part of an operation to
“mop up spivs” were attacked by stone-throwing traders in Shauri Moyo Market. When
the police attempted to arrest these stone-throwers, a crowd of enraged Africans rescued
16Partly because of these actions, male traders received the majority of trade licenses, leaving women
to face harassment for their illegal activities.
17Two of Nairobi’s oldest African markets Kariokor and Burma both provide insight into the relation-
ships between the colonial draft, land dispossession, and the rise of marketplaces. Kariokor was named
after the World War I veterans who served in the Carrier Corps — a unit under the British flag that carried
goods but not guns in the campaign in German East Africa. Many veterans were Kikuyu who returned
home to find themselves without land. They were given housing in dormitories near the current-day mar-
ketplace and many began their own small enterprises in the vicinity, eventually forming Kariokor market,
which still exists today (Hay and Harris 2007). Burma market was named for the African soldiers in the
King’s African Rifles that fought the Japanese in the Burma Campaign of World War II (King 1996).
18Anake is literally translated as “warrior” in Gikuyu, however more common interpretations of Anake
wa 40 are The Men of Forty or The Forty Group. Forty was a reference to 1940 when a significant
number of males (particularly Kikuyu) were drafted to fight for the British empire. The resentment for
being pressed into service and losing their traditional land to fight for ideals not their own was a strong
motivation for this militant group. Oathing was a traditional part of Kikuyu culture, radicalized in the
1940s by encouraging men and women to show solidarity for the nationalist cause by reciting an oath of
allegiance and sometimes drinking/licking goat blood. Used both by Anake wa 40 and the LFA.
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the assailants and attacked the police. In retaliation, the colonial administration imple-
mented new laws in 1949 to further limit trade and control its spatial distribution. The
Voluntary Unemployed Persons Ordinance was passed in an attempt to eradicate “spivs”
from Nairobi. Hawkers were forced to find space in the legal marketplaces or face de-
portation. Many of the associations that had been formed during the relative calm of
the 1940s disbanded when their members either were deported or forced underground
(Furedi 1973; Robertson 1997b, 1993).
The colonial government continued to exert its power in coercive ways. Cracking
down on working class opposition, the colonial police arrested two leaders to the East
African Trade Union Council in 1950. Africans, particularly those affiliated with the
Anake wa 40 in Nairobi were outraged and instituted a general strike that lasted for
several days. To end the strike, the administration police used a brutal display of force
against Kikuyu traders, hawkers, and the squatters. This crackdown, paired with an
alliance formed between the colonial government and Luo loyalists (many of whom
were government workers) who refused to join or support the strike, increased ethnic
tensions in Nairobi. The government also tried more subtle measures of placating the
populace through wage increases and other small concessions. However, the movement
had already begun and the British soon had a violent independence movement on their
hands.
The catalyst for the declaration of a state of emergency came in 1952 with the ratch-
eting up of violent subversive activity by the Anake wa 40 in allegiance with the Land
and Freedom Army (LFA) movement in the Central Highlands. Nairobi African Advi-
sory Council member, Tom Mbotela, who was widely viewed as a loyalist collaborator,
was fatally attacked near Burma marketplace by members of the Anake wa 40. These
urban freedom-fighters disappeared into the marketplace for protection (Furedi 1973).
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Shortly thereafter, a state of emergency was declared in Nairobi, traders detained, and
Burma was burnt to the ground.
Figure 5.3: African Housing in Nairobi during the Emergency
Source: White (1990b:137)
As the colonial administration began to feel its hegemonic power challenged, they
increasingly turned to violence to maintain control and root out “dangerous” elements
of society. In 1953, 600 market stalls at Kariokor Market were destroyed by police,
who suspected the market to be “a black spot and a gathering place for spivs [Suspected
Persons and Itinerant Vagrants] and thugs” (Robertson 1997b:124).19 Later that year,
more stalls were destroyed at nearby Shauri Moyo market and houses in the African
settlement of Mathare Valley were razed, making some 7,000 Africans homeless. The
African population fought back against the brutal demolitions leading the District Com-
missioner of Nairobi to report in 1954 that,
19Hawkers and itinerant trades were increasingly referred to by the derogatory term spivs, which
showed they were popularly understood as being unemployed, poor, dangerous vagrants.
144
Large scale operations proved ineffective against the weight of numbers and
the city was permeated by gangsters and other undesirables supposedly in
unemployment. . . . Though extra troops were drafted into the city, crimes
of violence persisted and it was clear that even more drastic measures were
imperative if the Kikuyu preponderance and virtual control of the African
and much of the Asian areas were to be combated (Furedi 1973:285).
In response to the DC’s call for more drastic measures, the colonial government
launched Operation Anvil, a massive military operation aimed primarily at removing
Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru (KEM) from Nairobi. In April 1954 alone, 24,000 KEM were
forcibly removed from Nairobi and interned in the “Reserves.” African housing was
reorganized by tribal affiliation (as recorded in the pass books) to physically separate
loyalists from the locations where dangerous LFA philosophies were disseminated and
to more closely monitor the remaining KEM (Furedi 1973). The only legal African
marketplaces in Nairobi were closed several times throughout 1954, while Duke Street
Market was burned to the ground and never rebuilt. Virtually the entire marketplace at
Kawangware, nearly all Kikuyu businesses, were closed, many of them permanently.
Urban non-loyalist African’s protested the Emergency restrictions by successfully
boycotting European beer, the municipal bus service, and loyalist businesses. Kenyatta
and the Kenya African Union (KAU) favored non-violent methods while the Anake wa
40 members did not hesitate to react violently (Furedi 1973).20 In 1955, two Home-
guards were assassinated at Kariokor and all KEM shops were forced closed for three
months in retaliation. While the number of traders in the marketplaces was steadily de-
creasing, government revenue was increasing, indicating a significantly higher taxation
rate that was being enacted as a control measure (Robertson 1997b).
20The KAU was formed in 1944 by a group of young, educated, elite Africans (primarily Kikuyu) who
wanted independence to be granted through constitutional reform - a much slower process than violent
revolution. The Anake wa 40 was much more populist and revolutionary; its base of support came from
the marketplace and the underclass and they did not hesitate to use violence to fight for an improved
quality of living for the dispossessed. Ultimately, the elitist KAU, transformed in the Kenya African
National Union, (KANU) became the ruling party at Independence (Furedi 1973).
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When the Emergency ended and the LFA (Mau Mau) had been routed, previously
expelled Kikuyu traders flooded back to Nairobi and immediately rallied against the
already weakened colonial administration. In 1960, the First Hawker War erupted
as hawkers retaliated against the forceful destruction of their enterprises and attempts
to control their movement, by throwing stones at police officers and resisting arrest
(Robertson 1996). Hawker collective identity was beginning to form and around this
time, three major hawkers’ organizations were formed — the most powerful of which
was the Nairobi Hawkers and Traders Association. The association wrote petitions, held
protest marches, engaged in physical altercations with authorities, and boycotted des-
ignated markets in order to publicize their demands for secure selling space on their
terms, an increased availability of licenses, the elimination of police brutality, and the
reduction of bureaucratic barriers to small businesses.
According to the Crime and Incident Reports from the 1960s, police conducted
widespread arrests, but their violent tactics often drew the ire of the surrounding traders
and hawkers, who then attacked the police. Women’s involvement in these protests
seemed to either be lacking or unreported since none of the protest letters was signed
by a woman, and no women were included in arrest reports from this era (Robertson
1997b). However, Rosberg and Nottingham (1966:55) suggest that Kikuyu women dur-
ing this era were active in protecting their interests when necessary. United against a
superordinate structure by formal associations, hawkers and traders were able to fight
for their livelihoods. Ultimately, they formed an essential component of the Indepen-
dence movement by inciting ire in the general population at the colonial administration’s
continued use of brutal force.
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5.4.2 Reactions to Post-Colonial Repression
The joy of independence was short-lived for traders who saw few improvements in their
lives. Informals attending “The Nairobi Hawkers and Traders Association meeting on
January 12, 1964, objected to new regulations requiring them to move to newly desig-
nated open air markets where they would have to pay a daily fee of seventy-five cents
and would be allowed no permanent infrastructure” (Robertson 1993:19). Traders re-
belled against the forced spatial consolidation, threatening to stage a sit-in at the Police
Commissioner’s office if their demand for more licenses and freedom of spatial loca-
tion were not met. These associations became politicized as the government sought to
secure support through patronage. Licenses were distributed preferentially, most go-
ing to the exclusively male leadership of these associations, perpetuating the gendered
Colonial understanding of female informal work as illegal, petty, often immoral, and
survival-oriented (Robertson 1997b:143).
During this time, the new administration strongly supported the demolition of squat-
ter settlements and kiosks erected by informal workers. Obudho and Aduwo (1989)
report that nearly 39,000 squatters were evicted from Eastleigh and subsequently the
City Council destroyed 6,733 structures in 1970. Soon after, more property, most of
which belonged to informal traders, was destroyed along the Nairobi River. Not only
did the City Council impoverish ordinary Kenyans trying to make a living, they also
created a class of bitter and angry people with very little to lose. Ultimately, the fear
of class mobilization paired with increasing external pressure from the World Bank,
USAID, and the ILO, led the government to adopt less violent measures to “control”
informals (Obudho and Aduwo 1989).
In the 1970s, the government shifted its attention away from hawkers and traders,
leaving them in relative peace. Although the Nairobi City Council’s (NCC) discrimi-
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natory by-laws remained and hawkers were confined to government-run open-air mar-
kets, less physical violence was directed at traders. New open-air marketplaces were
constructed, offering more traders a more secure place from which to operate; however,
recommendations to allow traders to build their own permanent premises over time were
rejected. The Hawkers and Licensing Sub-Committee of the NCC began reviewing the
by-laws and making a few concessions. Female hawkers were not to be harassed and
the number of licenses was increased to 5,000.21 As a result of the more compassionate
approach by NCC, the associations that had made so much headway in the 1950s and
1960s began to deteriorate.
This softer touch evaporated in the 1980s, when President Moi faced a coup attempt
and policies privileging the small-manufacturing sub-sector were subsequently enacted.
Due to the government’s enthusiasm about jua kali and the ILO’s report encouraging
the registration of small-enterprise associations, numerous new jua kali organizations
sprouted. In addition to marketplace-based organizations, such as the Gikomba Jua Kali
Society and the Kamukunji Jua Kali Association, national-based associations such as
the Kenya National Jua Kali Federation,22 Kenya National Jua Kali Organization, and
the Jua Kali and Kazi Cooperative Union (Kenya) Limited, were registered (King 1996;
McCormick 1998). Despite this rise in the number of associations, Britain’s aid office,
the Overseas Development Administration, commented that along with being weak and
politically motivated, “some jua kali associations may not be equipped to engage in
effective advocacy or to represent the interests of their members” (ODA 1994b:73 in
King 1996:41). While the small-manufacturing subsector saw a reduction in harassment
during this time, small-scale traders were beginning to face significant but arbitrary
police harassment. This was driven in part by macro-economic policy reforms that
21This allocation would remain until 1987, when it was again increased. However only a small percent
of licenses (18.7 at City Market) was allocated to women at this time (Robertson 1993).
22For an excellent discussion of the history of jua kali organizations, and their relationships with the
government through MTTAT and the World Bank through the Voucher Program see King (1996:34–38).
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reduced wages, free social services, and the size of the civil service, making bribes and
confiscation an essential component of police wages.
During the 1980s, widespread oppression occurred in Nairobi to stem the tide of
dissent with Moi’s dictatorship. State-sponsored violence was directed toward any per-
ceived opposition, including the Daily Nation newspaper, the Financial Review maga-
zine, MPs who disagreed with Moi, the National Council of Women of Kenya (NCWK),
traders selling “subversive” music, and poor people who were likely to create uprisings
in the capital (Reuters 1990; Ozanne and Holman 1990; Ress 1989; Henry 1989). These
crackdowns extended to marketplaces, which were seen to be havens of crime and op-
position organizers.
In 1988, a group of female dried staples traders, tired of having their premises
and goods destroyed by police, asked the District Officer and local chief if they could
construct more permanent facilities. Permission was granted and they quickly erected
wooden kiosks with mabati (tin) roofs. Within a month, the NCC police razed the
premises, making sure to perforate the mabati sheets to render them useless in the future
(Robertson 1996:265). After this betrayal and coming after the hundreds of other arbi-
trary raids just like it, 300 women marched to the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner’s
Office in protest of the harassment and destruction of property they faced at the hands
of NCC police. Although their demands were not met that day, this event provides ev-
idence of a rising militant female underclass that was missing from the First Hawker
War.
In July 1990, the marketplaces again became the site of political demonstrations.
After Saba Saba (7th of July), a pro multi-party government rally in Kamukunji (near
Gikomba and Shauri Moyo) that was violently shut down by government police with
tear gas and firearms, hawkers and traders joined in rioting for a multiparty political
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system. They believed only this step could reduce the random violence they were facing
and make the government accountable to its citizens. The police were instructed by
the government to “use whatever force was necessary” to quell anti government riots
(The Globe and Mail 1990). Hundreds of people were detained, including international
journalists, while “riot police used clubs and firearms to clear open-air markets, where
rioters burned vehicles and used boulders and burning tires to build roadblocks” (The
Globe and Mail 1990).
To this end, brutal destructions of marketplaces and informal housing sites occurred
through the remainder of 1990. In October, all marketplaces in the city center were
destroyed, including Gikomba, no more than a few months after the Minister of Local
Government had prohibited the demolition of squatter and trader premises (Robertson
1997b:267). Riots broke out in the streets and traders and hawkers resisted the NCC
police by throwing stones, constructing barricades, lighting bonfires, and fighting hand-
to hand. King (1996:33) describes the harsh treatment and forced destitution of over
50,000 people as follows, ”The authorities feared the danger posed by the hawkers and
slum dwellers and responded, in the last quarter of 1990, with the most brutal demoli-
tion of slum areas and informal sector business ever witnessed in the country. . . . For
many, the magnitude of the brutality and the style of demolition discredited the declared
government policy of making the informal sector play an enhanced role in the economy
(Ikiara91a:316).” The government purposefully targeted hawkers and traders, treating
them as invaders of public space, criminals, and deviants. Moreover, they subjected
them to the uncertainty and fear of losing their goods and premises at any moment for
any arbitrary reason.
The government was beginning to realize the potential of class-consciousness among
a poor, disenfranchised, spatially unified group, and resorted to extreme methods of
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Figure 5.4: Kiosk Demolition
Source: Daily Nation (2007a)
control, using violence and force in the months following Saba Saba. But the militancy
of the traders united with other oppressed groups unsettled the government. To reduce
the class-consciousness that was developing among the poor and moderately wealthy
in Nairobi, President Moi took the opportunity to favor the traders by dedicating a new
marketplace — City Park Hawkers’ Market. This appeased the trader/hawker contingent
that was violently forced out of the CBD and other marketplaces only months earlier.
The government recognized that these were only stop-gap measures to the problem. For
one thing, the capacity of official marketplaces only reached 7,000 traders, far short of
the estimated 105,000 that operated in Nairobi (Akoten 2007). The government realized
they needed to implement other strategies (e.g., fomenting ethnic divisions) to keep a
working class from forming, uniting upon their interests, and overthrowing the elite.
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Figure 5.5: The Construction of Muthurwa Hawkers’ Market
Source: Daily Nation (2007f)
Trader and hawker issues have remained at the core of urban politics. Shortly be-
fore the December 2007 election, hawkers were suddenly targeted for eviction from the
CBD. The government used force to drive the hawkers out, inflicting the most damage
upon handicapped hawkers who could not move fast enough to escape the violence (In-
ter Press Service News Agency 2008). Hawkers protested the move and the structure of
the new market, arguing that in 2003 they were given permits that allowed them to hawk
in CBD alleyways. The hawkers rioted and the government relaxed the eviction in hopes
of keeping the votes of this constituency (Orlale and Mathenge 2008). In addition, the
government stepped up the construction of a new marketplace on the edge of the CBD
to placate hawkers and assure their vote. In March 2008, all hawkers in Nairobi were
forced into the spatially controlled and NCC monitored market of Muthurwa.
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Figure 5.6: Hawker Demonstrations over Forced Evictions from the CBD
Source: Daily Nation (2009a)
The forced movement of hawkers in March led to more riots among those who could
not find a spot at the over-crowded Muthurwa or preferred to remain in the CBD (Or-
lale and Mathenge 2008). The police used tear-gas and batons to prevent hawkers from
marching to protest the move in front of the office of Uhuru Kenyatta, the Local Govern-
ment Minister. This time the government did not relent and all hawkers and traders were
physically expelled from the CBD. However, by mid-2009, many of the most resilient
hawkers had returned to the back alleyways of downtown, reopening their shops to cater
to businessmen and tourists in the CBD. The local government conducted a sweep of
hawkers in the CBD in June of 2009, using physical force to coerce them into relocating
their business elsewhere. Hawkers demonstrated in the streets, setting tires on fire and
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violently confronting baton-wielding police. This pattern of violence and forced reloca-
tions punctuated by periods of concessionary policies are expected to continue until the
government recognizes the spatial needs and legitimacy of traders. Non-violent contes-
tations and the recent mobilization of hawkers and traders to create alliances that build
awareness and lobby for their political rights will be discussed in the following chapter.
5.5 Conclusion
Gramsci emphasized the complex negotiation States must endure to simultaneously
maintain the base as a source of power and fracture it to prevent it from uniting and
overthrowing the current regime. In this way, colonial and post-colonial regimes in
Kenya paired mechanisms of consent and coercion to “maintain the acquiescence of
the subordinate” and divert attention away from class interests or mobilization (Gram-
sci 1971:263). While hawkers and traders rioted, formed small associations, and wrote
petitions to oppose unfavorable government policies, they were often pacified by small
government concessions that maintained the status quo. As a result of the successful
negotiations by the administration, traders were too fractured to resort to anything more
than spontaneous expressions of discontent with government policies.
Gramsci’s idea of resistance as a grand moment of revolution where mechanisms of
power are used against the ruling class seems unlikely in the authoritarian State form
present in Kenya. Traders have resorted to violent and non-violent measures with little
lasting impact. Instead, Foucault’s musings about resistance that occurs in everyday
relations speaks loudly to the case of informal workers in Kenya. Some rejected the
external struggle for recognition, while others contested the underlying attitudes and
perceptions in diverse and creative ways that will be explored in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
INFORMAL CONTESTATIONS OF POWER
The previous chapter applied Gramsci’s mechanisms of manufacturing consent and ex-
erting coercion to gain and maintain power to the case study of Kenya. Informal workers
were not singled out for domination by the various administrations in power. Instead,
the control of informal work, as one of the larger labor market strata, formed part of the
administrations’ overall multifaceted strategy of maintaining power. Building on this
discussion, this chapter explores the effects of power on retailers in Kenya. In particular
it looks at local understandings of informal work that are in opposition to externally
created notions. The second part of the chapter analyzes whether attempts to manage
the identity formation of informals combined with the use of force to control the spatial
dimension of informality as delineated in previous chapters, have affected the ability of
workers to see themselves as a united social class or category. Finally, this chapter ex-
plores whether the forms of contested identity presented in the first section can create a
base for the social mobilization of informal workers, the indicators of which are derived
from a case study of the women’s movement.
6.1 Perceptions and Contestations
A discourse analysis of Durban newspapers revealed that traders know that they are
seen as the “other,” criminals, a cause of pollution, and a barrier to economic growth
(Popke and Ballard 2004). Street traders in Mumbai show an awareness of how they
are perceived as outsiders, nuisances, and unsanitary (Anjaria 2006). Although there is
scant research on traders self-perception, these examples suggest that traders are aware
of how they are perceived by society.
155
As highlighted in the previous chapters, retailers in Kenya traditionally have been
viewed as unproductive, subsistence laborers, and urban scourges. Yet, many retailers
reject these stereotypes, asserting that their work is legitimate and more moral, success-
ful, stable, and organized than commonly perceived. Retailers are especially concerned
that others realize that they are working hard to improve their lot in an honest man-
ner. This section will explore retailers’ contestations of popular perceptions of informal
work.
6.1.1 Illegitimate or Illegal Work
The history of early trade in Nairobi presented in the last chapter highlighted the deroga-
tory view of traders and hawkers (with the exception of those who provided cheap food
to laborers). Under the Vagrancy Act of 1922, traders and hawkers were labeled spivs
and removed from the town. During the Emergency, the colonial view of traders wors-
ened as they were considered dangerous and potential accomplices of the LFA. The
government tried to “obliterate the hawker population . . . [based on] the presumed un-
sanitary methods of operation for cooked foods, general dirtiness, traffic congestion, the
nuisance of traders’ importunities to European housewives, and their assumed involve-
ment in crime more serious than the elementary one of illegal hawking” (Robertson
1993:16–17). In the 1970s, a Kenyan researcher described the popular image of traders
as “the poor [who] are thought of as potential trouble-makers, carriers of disease and
social pariahs” (Mukui 1978:134 in Robertson 1993:23). Recently, the popular press
equated traders and hawkers with the scourges of a pre-modern city: pollution, traffic
jams, and noise (Munene 2007). City Council employees can often be seen demolishing
kiosks with the justification that they are hideouts for criminals (Daily Nation 2007a).
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Traders whom I interviewed resented such portrayals. In all marketplaces, retailers
considered themselves mufanya biashara (a business-person) not hawkers, who were
viewed by traders, especially those in Gikomba who had never hawked, as illegal, living
at a subsistence level, and marginal. Several retailers I interviewed directly addressed
popular perceptions of their work. Rebecca, a seller at Gikomba, said, “I’m not just
simple the way you see me. . . . I used to work in town but became tired of the work
and the hours. This job is better for me and my family” (Gikomba 6.26.07). Naomi
said, “This is a real job, not like making tea in an office. But people don’t recognize
us as legitimate businessmen. They can think that these people don’t dress nicely or
have any money when actually they are making more than them. They do see us as
if we are nothing” (Gikomba 7.3.07). Retailers in marketplaces were also more likely
to have licenses than itinerant hawkers (although only a small percent could actually
obtain them due to bureaucratic issues). They felt this additional expense and hassle
should legitimate their work in the eyes of others.
Figure 6.1: Itinerant Hawker in Nairobi
157
In interviews, retailers heralded the power of business to eliminate dependency and
encourage self-reliance. They were proud of their business, while simultaneously rec-
ognizing that society did not value their work in the same way. Many would even en-
courage their children to follow in their footsteps and start a business:
It is better that [my children] choose business because business is self-
reliant. Even if they are educated they can miss a job but business skills
are everlasting (Interview 7).
I want them to choose business because it expands peoples’ minds (Inter-
view 173).
You can only be rich if you’re in business but not in a white-collar job. [My
children] should become independent. I love business. I cannot change
from it; this is who I am (Interview 204).
I want all of [my children] in business; business gives independence. You
can take care of yourself (Interview 129).
Traders were not romanticizing their position. They recognized the challenges of
conducting such business, especially given their illegitimate and often illegal status un-
der city council by-laws. However, given the drawbacks of formal employment such
as arbitrary and sudden retrenchment, many emphasized the benefits of business for
expanding horizons and fostering entrepreneurial independence. Far from relying on
government hand-outs, small businesses were paving their own way to success in the
city.
6.1.2 Immoral Work
As discussed in the previous chapter, urban trade was linked with prostitution in pre-
colonial Nairobi because both jobs required the woman to leave her family and spend
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considerable amounts of time alone in the city. Kikuyu men in particular resented this
loss of control over their women and equated all female migrant labor with the im-
morality of prostitution (Robertson 1997b). With no opportunities for waged employ-
ment, women had to choose from the available options of trading, domestic service,
beer brewing, prepared-food selling, and prostitution. Often women would engage in
prostitution for its lucrative profits, switching to trade or other activities as they grew
older and more established (Bujra 1975).
Nevertheless, the conflation of prostitution and trade has declined over the years as
entire family units have migrated to Nairobi and trade by women became more legit-
imate when they could no longer remain housewives due to social service cuts in the
1990s. However, some female retailers still feel a negative moral stigma attached to
their work. Esther stated “If a woman entered business in the past it was as if she was
not a good woman. Men think women in business will start moving with men.” She con-
tinued, contesting this image of immorality, “Women come here to do their business, not
to fool around. There are high stakes today, we must educate our children. Nowadays if
you see a man with a housewife he is not using his head” (Gikomba 7.3.07). Especially
since many of the female retailers are deeply religious (most are Christians, Muslims or
syncretistic), they strongly reject the identification of trade with immorality.
Other associations with immorality beyond prostitution plagued early traders in
Nairobi. According the Minister of Health of the colonial administration, in 1902
Nairobi was a town that “attracted the Native in numbers who quickly acquired all the
vices and immorality his Eastern superiors could teach him, which he practiced with
such terrible results to himself and the community at large” (Ministry of Health quoted
in Robertson 1997b:12–13). Asians were considered immoral for their non-Christian
beliefs and activities, including their “inherent love of filth, darkness and overcrowd-
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ing” - characteristics that were passed on to Africans employed in their workshops. To
some degree, this perception of African artisans engaged in the vices of the city, such
as drugs alcohol, and petty crime, still remains. In general, open-air marketplaces are
considered havens for criminals, drug runners, gun smugglers, and money launderers
(Daily Nation 2008). While perhaps these activities do occur in marketplaces, retailers
interviewed argued that the majority of people there seek an honest living. Although
Mama Ken keeps a close eye on hawkers buying her goods, she admits that, “they are
good people and hardworking young men who are making a living in a good way. They
are not bad people and many are quite funny” (Gikomba 6.20.07).
6.1.3 Unproductive, Subsistence Work
Up to the 1970s, all informal labor had been considered unproductive and characterized
by low incomes. The development of labor market theory in response to the ILO Report
of 1972 crystallized support for a two-sector model for the “informal sector,” where in
the unproductive and low-wage tier, “many people face such severely constrained op-
tions that the informal sector involvement can only be seen as their making the best of
a bad situation” (Fields 1990:67). Traders are typically considered part of this subsis-
tence sector and while there are retailers who struggle at a subsistence level, many I
interviewed could point to tangible benefits that trading had brought them above and
beyond a subsistence level.1
1The majority of retailers interviewed who were struggling with their businesses had faced an extended
calamity in life outside of business. Often such stories included an accrual of large hospital bills over a
period of years. In the beginning Harambees were used to generate funds, but later on all business profits
were subsumed by such costs, making the refreshing of stock difficult. Likewise, many of the young
retailers who had low educational attainment grew up in difficult family situations such as being orphaned
or raised in a very large family without resources. It is important to note that it was the extended period
of shock that seemed to be difficult to recover from.
160
Measured by income, the majority of retailers interviewed made more than the min-
imum wage of similar formal sector work (UN-HABITAT 2006). Onesmus, a food
retailer, pocketed between Ksh 1,000–2,0002 per day after paying expenses such as re-
stocking, rent, and water fees. Grace makes between Ksh 800 to 3000 per day, enough
to send her five children to University (Gikomba 6.29.07). Naomi regularly sells enough
mitumba (used clothing) to profit Ksh 2,000 — 3,000 per day (Gikomba 6.20.07). Other
sources report similar findings. A hawker interviewed by the Daily Nation reported mak-
ing between Ksh 2,000 and 5,000 per day — enough to allow him to buy a car and land;
while another reported that he made 40 percent profit on his bale of jeans he purchased
for Ksh 12,000 (Inter Press Service News Agency 2008; O’Callaghan and Juma 2009).
The official government website about informal work highlights the story of a man who
was working formally but making a low wage as an insurance salesman. He switched to
selling eggs in Wakulima market reporting he would stick with this ’informal job’ for “a
long, long time. . . . Even if I was making a profit of a shilling an egg a day, I’d be mak-
ing Kshs 3000 a day — Kshs 90,000 a month. It’s certainly more than even the most
brilliant of my former classmates make now . . . and I make more than that” (Kimutai
2008).
Gichira reported that, “66% of informal sector operators are earning an income (i.e.
net profit after all expenses) that places them in the average and above-average [wage]
categories especially if compared with workers in the wage or salaried sectors. Only
13% of the respondents could be placed in the low-income categories. But when this
group is compared with the urban poor, it illustrates that the informal sector operators
are in fact among the ‘better-off”’ (Gichira 1991:49). Akoten likewise reported that 75
percent of traders were non-poor and operated above the minimum wage of casual labor-
ers (Ksh 3,905). He argued that ”in terms of economic activity, retailers of secondhand
2At the time of the interview the currency exchange was approximately Ksh 72 to 1 USD.
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garments and of shoes and leather goods were associated with higher earnings than the
retail of agricultural produce, which performed better than beer brewing, other manu-
facturing, repair of shoes and retail of fuel and charcoal” (Akoten 2007:8). According to
a recent study conducted by the Nairobi Central Business District Association, the av-
erage minimum wage of street traders is higher than minimum wage and traders in the
CBD hold a combined daily capital stock worth almost USD 1 million (UN-HABITAT
2006).
Whereas most studies look at the average monthly profits of business owners, mea-
sures of success must include the assets retailers have accumulated during good months,
and the capital reserves in associations they have joined in lean months. According to
multilateral policy in the 1990s, success in the informal sector is measured by “gradua-
tion” into the formal sector (Malick 2004; Becker 2004; Republic of Kenya 1992; Riley
and Steel 2000). Yet, few traders interviewed reported considering this as a measure
of success. Instead, they focused on indicators such as educating their immediate or
extended family, improving their diet, buying land or livestock upcountry, buying a car,
building a rural home, or finding a good house in Nairobi. The majority of retailers I
interviewed who appreciated the business for the success it had brought them mentioned
such indicators.
I started this business because I was just motivated by the success of other
business ladies near where I stay. They were dressing well, eating well, and
challenged me to change my life. I don’t regret the decision (Interview 125).
This is my future; through it I have educated my child and taken care of my
parents (Interview 41).
I have educated myself with this business of cereals and am also educating
my two children through this business (Interview 42).
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I started without money and can see I have been able to do a few things at
home. The small business has enabled me to buy a plot (Interview 126).
My life has changed because of this business. At home we have bought
cattle from the profits (Interview 138).
Our generation is better — what I can do today parents could not; we are
very far. Today I can afford to buy even a plot or a vehicle but it was very
different for them. Even food has changed — before we couldn’t eat meat
but today we buy meat daily (Interview 171).
Through in-depth interviews with key informants I learned that Mama Jackie ed-
ucated her four girls through university and sent her youngest daughter to boarding
school. From her income, she was also able to educate several girls in her husband’s
family and buy a car for her husband to operate as a taxi (Gikomba 7.10.07). Eric
moved his way up from an itinerant mitumba hawker to a seller in the high-profit “Ex-
positions” in the CBD. He sells to wealthy customers, earning Ksh 1,500 to 2,500 for a
suit originally purchased at Gikomba for less than Ksh 500. These profit margins have
been enough to offset the costs of monthly rent at Ksh 20,000 and the annual license at
Ksh 5,200 and allow him to save for bigger purchases (Gikomba 6.20.07). John com-
mutes to City Park everyday from Kiambu, costing him Ksh 100 per day (3,000 per
month). His stall rent amounts to Ksh 2,000 per month plus Ksh 25 per day for the City
Council taxes. Not including restocking prices, his fees amount to nearly Ksh 6,000 per
month. Yet, he finds the business profitable, so much so that he has bought a shamba in
his home area and has sent all five of his children to school (City Park 6.19.07). It is no
wonder that one retailer exclaimed, “With this business you can become a millionaire
with time!” (Interview 53).
Photo-novella with retailers revealed that they did not consider their lives to be at a
subsistence level. Life at a subsistence level is consumed with making enough money to
eat and saving every penny for life expenses. Through pictures of their lives taken when
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I was not around, retailers showed me that they valued activities outside of employment.
They also saw their identity as not solely defined or determined by their current occupa-
tion. Even those who wished to remain in the marketplace valued activities not related
to their occupation. Kariuki occupied a prime location at Kawangware, making a sig-
nificant profit. The business was passed down to him by his mother, one of the original
sellers outside the market, and he intended to maintain the business until he could pass
it to his children. However, he also saw himself as a body builder, and used part of his
profits and non-working hours to work out at a local gym. When asked to take pictures
of things he valued in life, he took pictures of himself working hard at the gym and at
his business (Kawangware 8.12.08).
Figure 6.2: Kariuki at the Gym
Damasen was a shoe retailer at Gikomba who was studying for his Certified Public
Accountant exams. Although both he and his mother were long-term retailers in the
marketplace, he was careful to construct his identity not only as a retailer but also as a
student and a young, trendy person. Through several interviews he clearly stated that he
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was not embarrassed about selling in the marketplace because he (and earlier his mother)
earned enough in this occupation to pay for his high level of education. In addition, he
had made good friends in the market and was happy working there. However, retailing
used shoes was simply his job, not his life and he asked me to photograph him in his
shoe-stall with a book to show his dual personality as a student and retailer. When asked
to take pictures of things he valued in life, he took pictures of himself looking suave at
Uhuru Park, several miles from Gikomba. Although his job and housing were located
in Gikomba, he clearly did not see himself singularly defined by locality.
Figure 6.3: Damasen at Shoe Stall and in Uhuru Park
Other retailers, such as Mama Carol, emphasized the importance of social groups
inside and outside of the marketplace and the value of these relationships. Mama Carol
found support for her enterprise within the marketplace through personal and business
friendships and association memberships. However, she also relied on external organi-
zations, in particular religious institutions, for emotional and spiritual support. These
external institutions also did a better job of incorporating her entire family who were a
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significant component of her understanding of self. However, it is interesting to note that
other retailers also recognized her primary identity as a mother, even if her family had
never come to the marketplace. The second time I came to Gikomba to interview her, I
became lost and asked a neighbor if she knew where “Ruth’s stall” was. The neighbor
did not immediately recognize her given name and only when I used her “relational”
name of Mama Carol, could she identify her neighbor. Like Damasen, Mama Carol saw
her work in Gikomba as an occupation, not her entire life, that paid enough for her to
care for and educate her children.
Historically, small-manufacturing was considered more growth-oriented because of
the investment possibilities. For example, the1987 IDS Consultancy Report argued that
small-manufacturers have a less transitory stake in the informal sector than retailers ”be-
cause they invest in permanent structures.” As discussed previously, the arbitrary demo-
litions that occur in marketplaces discourage traders’ willingness to invest in structures.
Despite this fact, structures in these marketplaces can accrue a significant amount of
value. Robertson reported that during the 1990 demolition of Gikomba, the Daily Na-
tion printed a picture of a women sobbing over her destroyed stall, for which she had
just paid the council Ksh 10,000. Prices have only increased since then. Mama Wambui
estimated that her stall space in Gikomba would sell for at least Ksh 250,000 today
(Gikomba 6.4.08). Likewise, original owners of the allocated stalls in City Park often
rented out their spaces to the tune of Ksh 8,000 a month. When a new market opened
on the edge of the CBD two years ago, a complicated black market ensued with “gangs
of outsiders” trying to secure blocks of stalls that they could then sublet surreptitiously
to other traders (Wakulima 6.6.08).3 From time to time, the government threatens to
3One trader believed these outsiders to be part of the “Mungiki” gang. With more displaced hawkers
than available stalls, the outsiders would sublet the stalls at a higher price then that collected by NCC
(Ksh 100 per space). At first, they tried to keep their activities secret, but the hawkers could tell they
were outsiders. The NCC askaris seemed to do little about the black-market, perhaps because they were
getting significant kickbacks from the “landlords” (Muthurwa 6.08).
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bulldoze Gikomba to build a high-rise office tower or an up-scale apartment complex,
but that has yet to come to fruition (Robertson 1993). Clearly, the real-estate of traders
is highly valued by multiple parties.
6.1.4 Unstable Work
In many ways, informal labor is the epitome of unstable work. Workers receive no
guaranteed minimum wage, no benefits such as health care or pensions, and have no
title deed to land or premises. Promoting the obtainment of these and other securities has
become a central component to the ILO’s Decent Work campaign (ILO 2002). However,
traders also claim that their instability allows them to be flexible enough to adapt to the
changing global and local economy and thus offers them a measure of stability. At the
same time, retailers rejected the notion that this instability was an intrinsic characteristic
of their enterprises, arguing instead that it a historically constituted reality.
Traders interviewed recognized the significant instability caused by arbitrary po-
lice raids, harassment, and the difficulty of getting licenses. Many commented that
their business would be more successful without such events. In particular, retailers are
frequently harassed based on the stereotype that they are unproductive, unclean and a
nuisance. Municipal policy still refers to retailers as hawkers despite their increased sta-
bility and municipal police still treat traders as vagrants, transgressors, and criminals by
confiscating their goods, demanding bribes, beating them, destroying stalls, and refusing
to provide licenses.
Even after traders moved from the street to the marketplace, the NCC still referred
to them as hawkers and refused to give them licenses due to their lack of permanence.
These traders experienced more harassment and a higher likelihood of arbitrary destruc-
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tion than traders who could obtain licenses. Traders were frustrated that the government
did not recognize that many of them had been selling in the same place for years, differ-
entiating themselves from the itinerant hawker. The following interviews conducted in
2007 and 2008 highlight these grievances that strike at the core of retailer identity.
NCC is not eager to license us because we are considered as hawkers (In-
terview 17b).4
The annual license is for those with permanent structures - we are treated as
hawkers so they won’t license us (Interview 46b).
They can’t give us annual licenses because we’re considered as hawkers so
we must pay the more expensive weekly payments (Interview 78b).
We pay daily taxes because the government stopped giving us annual li-
censes. It was better then because we could struggle and get a lump sum
and stay for a whole year without being harassed (Interview 45b).
City Council is a menace here (Interview 138).
Retailers, such as Moses — a used shoe seller in Gikomba, argued that he would
have erected a more permanent structure if he had been permitted by the NCC and guar-
anteed that these structures would not be destroyed by the council (Gikomba 6.20.07).
Another respondent stated, “Before, everyone had their own space to put up their goods
but now we have to keep on running away because of harassment from the city council”
(Interview 56). A number of retailers also dreamed of expanding their businesses or
opening additional locations but feared to take out a loan because of the potential for
arbitrary destruction by the council. A respondent in City Park lamented, “My biggest
limitation to expanding this business is that the City Council guards kick us around;
it is very tiring” (Interview 133). Indeed, it must be tiring to constantly receive social
4Interviews denoted with a ‘b’ following the interview number are from the 2008 survey. All other
interviews occurred in 2007.
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indicators that tell you that your status in society does not deserve respect or recog-
nition. Without recognition by the government and society in general of the stability
and contribution of these enterprises, traders faced discrimination in finding loans, were
limited in expansion, forced to pay the more expensive daily tax, and subjected to more
harassment by virtue of their inability to obtain a yearly license.
Despite these challenges, over half (60 percent) of the survey respondents stated that
they would prefer to remain in the informal sector. James, a fruit seller at Kawangware,
told me, ”It is like lions and goats. The goats will graze on land but when the lion comes,
they will run. As soon as the lion leaves, the goats will return to the same land! It is the
same with hawkers. They may be chased by the City Council but they will return when
the askaris leave” (Kawangware 6.25.07). Informal work is valuable and despite the
interruptions from City Council, traders will return to their same spots. This informal
land tenure adds another layer of stability to informal work.
Many retailers interviewed openly stated that they would prefer to expand their en-
terprise over entering wage employment because of its consistent profits and ability to
adapt to the economic and physical climate. Lucy, a retailer in Kawangware responded
to my question about why she sold fresh vegetables, “People must eat. There’s always
a market for food. Shoes and clothes? You can even make them last another month”
(Kawangware 7.9.07). David, a mitumba in Kawangware changes his clothing selection
depending on the season to meet the needs of his customers. Another retailer explained
to me that his “business brings quick returns. I would like to expand this business into
another market but not switch to formal employment” (Kawangware 7.9.07). Other re-
tailers suggested that they liked working in the market but would switch to other goods,
such as Chinese goods from Dubai, if the prices of mitumba bales continued to rise
(Gikomba 07.01.08).
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Another retailer in Gikomba emphasized the importance of ownership and personal
freedom, “I would like to continue selling here because I love what I do. I make good
money just like someone in an office. . . . and I have control over my business” (Gikomba
6.20.07). In part, this notion of self-employment is linked to the history of race relations
in Kenya, where working in the “formal sector” often means working for a European
or Asian. Indians are widely viewed as extremely harsh managers, and few Kenyan’s
expressed an interest working in their factories. Another component of this response
appears to be the increased instability in the formal sector caused by liberalization. As
discussed previously, several key labor market reforms were implemented in the 1990s
in Kenya, including a restriction of unionization, the introduction of retrenchment, and
the removal of minimum wages. Although minimum wage laws have been reintroduced,
retrenchment remains embedded in wage employment. Several interviews revealed the
instability caused by retrenchment.
I used to have poor earnings and get retrenched frequently. Now in my busi-
ness I’m the boss. . . . I have no problems here (Interview 160).
I was retrenched in 2003 with no benefits. I started working here in 2004
and now have no fear of losing work. I can provide for my family this way
(Interview 179).
Several other examples add to our understanding of the retailer’s perspective of the
relative stability of informal work in an unstable national work environment. In 2008,
riots broke out in Nairobi’s slums, affecting the ability of retailers to conduct their trade.
Several markets were burned down, others were closed for a few weeks, and nearly all
traders saw a reduction in the number of customers and profits. However, the majority
of retailers I interviewed after the violence had abated assured me that they would return
to trade. If they could weather the short-term effects of instability, they were confident
that in the long-term their business would continue forward (Toi 6.28.08).
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Another measure of stability is the length of time people owned the same enterprise
in the same marketplace. Although the majority of enterprises were five or less years
old, a significant portion (about 35 percent) of the sample had been working in the same
marketplace for 6 years or more. Some had worked in the same place for nearly 20
years! Ruth, a retailer at Gikomba, told me that she had a customer who had been
buying from her for 15 years (Gikomba 6.20.07). A few had received their stalls from
their parents who were some of the earliest traders in the marketplace. Others planned
to pass the business down to their children. A retailer in City Park explained, “This shop
is like my thingira, (Kikuyu; a house built by parents, passed on to males when they
become adults). You own that house your entire life and don’t sell it. You pass it on to
future generations. So this stall is my thingira to pass on to my son here. (Looks at son
working in stall.) But it is up to him whether he wants to continue it. I will not treat it
as a curse if he doesn’t pass it on” (City Park 7.22.07).
Given the current macroeconomic environment in Kenya, many traders are finding
that informal work is more flexible, adaptable, and stable than formal work. Recently,
with the legalization of the mitumba (used clothing) trade and the subsequent drop in
profits, many traders have adapted by sourcing new (Chinese) goods from Dubai. This
flexibility allows for quick responses to changing market conditions that helps retailers
maximize profits. In addition, since arbitrary demolitions have decreased as a result of
external pressure from NGOs and multilaterals, traders are able to see their business as
an investment to pass on to their children.
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6.1.5 Unorganized Work
Since the 1970s, the terms “unorganized” or “irregular” sector have frequently been sub-
stituted for “informal” sector in scholarly and policy documents (Bhalla 2003; Sakthivel
and Joddar 2006; Moser 1978). However, as chaotic and unorganized as marketplaces
may seem to the outsider, internally they have a complex system of organizations, gov-
ernance, spatial use, and social hierarchy.
Organizationally, most marketplaces have a chairman who represents marketplace
interests (to the NCC or area chiefs) and can notify vendors of any future changes. In
some cases, the chairman can help mobilize retailers to repel outside threats such as
NCC police, as was the case in Kawangware (Kawangware 6.5.08). The chairman, who
is usually elected by market vendors, also oversees the distribution of market stalls.
The treasurer handles the collection of fees and rents while the secretary documents
transactions and meeting minutes.
Although marketplaces seem to be a hodge-podge of petty-traders, a complex com-
modity chain tied to social positioning exists. The most complex commodity chains
and social hierarchies can be found in the central distribution markets such as Gikomba.
At the top of the mitumba hierarchy at Gikomba are the importers who have developed
international rapport and saved enough capital to import containers of mitumba. Nu-
merically, there are few of these at Gikomba — most remain in Mombasa to oversee the
unloading and transportation of the containers. The ones that do work in Gikomba have
heavy security and drive armored vehicles.
I interviewed one such importer at her headquarters. I had to go through two levels of
security to reach the “cage” she was working in, and then was escorted in to speak with
her by armed guards. She dressed very smartly and was bedecked in gold jewelry, very
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Figure 6.4: Buying a Bale
different from the retailers I worked with in another part of the marketplace. She sourced
her used clothing from England, traveling there every couple of months to inspect the
merchandise and renew her ties with the sellers.5 It used to take three weeks to receive
a shipment of goods but now it can take upwards of six because the container ships stop
in Dubai to load and unload goods (Gikomba 6.20.07).6
Wholesalers in Gikomba buy shares in the containers and have them transported by
large lorries to Nairobi to be stored in either existing stone buildings or tin storage sheds
in Gikomba. Retailers negotiate a price per bale with the wholesalers and then hire a
bale carrier to bring the bale to another storage area. These secondary storage areas are
5Others import from the U.S., Scotland, Belgium and Canada. See Salaula (Hansen 2000) for an
excellent description of the international commodity chain for used clothing.
6Cheap Chinese goods are flooding the market in Kenya, creating significant competition for the used
clothing market. The majority of these goods come through Dubai — as a Daily Nation reporter quipped,
“[Dubai] is just a giant Gikomba market for goods produced elsewhere” (Gikomba 04.26.10). A part of
Eastleigh market has been dubbed “Little Dubai” for its preponderance of goods, especially gold, from
Dubai. These goods are frequently sold by Somalis, which adds an economic dimension to the existing
political and religious tension between Kenyans and Somalis.
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opened very early in the morning so retailers can have their bales opened between 6:00
and 6:30 a.m. Bale-carrying is considered an extremely low-class job. It pays poorly
and is extremely hard work since bales can range from 50 to 100 kilograms (Gikomba
6.22.07).
Figure 6.5: Bale Storage Area
Different commodities are located in different sections of the market. If you want
purses, you go to one section, men’s suits another area, and vegetables have their own
section. Each of these commodities has different selling schedules. Ladies pants are
opened very early in the morning. Bale cutters will come and snip the metal ties encasing
the bale, collecting these to recycle later. Many bale cutters also double as hawkers,
since bale cutting alone is not a very lucrative industry. There is a sliding scale for
clothes fresh from the bales. Prices are the highest when the bale is cut and decrease
throughout the day. For example, Mama Carol sold ladies trousers for Ksh 100 right out
of the bale with prices decreasing to Ksh 16 by the end of the day (Gikomba 6.22.07).
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Figure 6.6: “Camera” at Gikomba
Some retailers sell clothes individually for a few hours and then sell the remaining
unsold clothes at a bulk price to young men who come later in the day. These young
men will whistle loudly or call “camera, camera” or “wanga, wanga” (Sheng; new
clothes) to attract hawkers to these bales. Retailers selling higher-end clothes (suits,
ladies jackets, jeans) may remain at their stall all day and then retain the left-over stock
for the next day, only opening a bale every two to three days. Hawkers who buy mitumba
(used clothing) or shoes have various strategies to add value to their purchases, including
ironing, washing, mending, and repurposing. All of these services can be found within
the marketplaces. With so many people clustered into one location, a number of human
services can also be found, from ambulatory tea, sausage, biscuit, and fruit sellers to
“hotels” selling githeri (a traditional Kikuyu bean dish) and chaptis (similar to Indian
flat bread). A number of beer pubs and pool halls also exist to entertain young men
while hair salons serve the women. In addition, sanitation services like private latrines
and water spigots are also present. Esther jokes with me as we weave our way to find a
lunch spot, “It is like a city here! You can find anything in Gikomba” (Gikomba 7.2.07)
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Figure 6.7: Variety of Non-Retail Marketplace Jobs
Retailers recognized that society viewed them as low-class; they are useful some-
times for providing services to the low-class, but are always engaged in subsistence level
activities that are often view as illegitimate, illegal, immoral, and unorganized. Retailers
contested this social identity, providing examples instead of how their highly organized
work not only contributes to society in positive ways but also helps them lead a life they
have reason to value. This form of contestation is often a much quieter reaction than
that given when retailers face physical harassment and violence.
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6.1.6 Conclusion
This section explored the localized effect of power on retailers in Kenya and how retail-
ers contest externally constructed notions of informality. While contesting their exter-
nally created identity in several key aspects, retailers also accepted external categories
of knowledge. For example, retailers considered themselves, mufanya biashara, or busi-
nesspeople as an acceptance of the revisionary social categories applied by the IMF and
World Bank. We now turn to a discussion of whether these individual contestations can
influence collective mobilizations of informal workers, and whether these mobilizations
can effect long-lasting change to the betterment of informals.
6.2 The Potential for Social Mobilization of Informal Workers
While the previous section discussed the individual ways retailers contest the dominant
discourse of informality, the following section analyzes the collective ways informal
workers have been able to express contestation or consent. In particular, this section
explores the potential for social movements among informal workers in Kenya. First,
social movement literature is reviewed in relation to the views presented in this chapter.
Then, I briefly discuss the women’s movement in Kenya, highlighting mobilizing factors
and forms that may be applicable to an informal workers’ movement, before turning my
attention to potential indicators of informal mobilization. As revealed throughout this
chapter, the women’s movement and the nascent workers’ movement have surprising
similarities that increase the value and relevance of the following case-study.
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6.2.1 Theoretical Perspective
Social movements have been defined by Tarrow (1996:874) as “sustained challenges to
powerholders in the name of a disadvantaged population living under the jurisdiction of
influence of those powerholders.” Social movement literature has evolved from a struc-
tural focus in the 1960s to an emphasis on personal gratification or self-improvement in
the 2000s. This section will briefly review the key trends of social movement theory as
produced by Northern scholars, before locating the perspectives of this thesis.
Smelser’s (1963) “structural strain” model viewed social movements as a symptom
of social structure collapse. Tilly (1978) found this conceptualization too limited in its
structuralist perspective and argued that social movements occurred because actors faced
a lack of resources to address their grievances within the current political system. These
ideas were consolidated in the resource mobilization theory that proposed that when the
powerless and marginalized have no other options for gaining political representation or
the resources to obtain representation in the face of state oppression, they at last resort
turn to social movements (Kurtz 2002).
Political process theory focused on broader social and political processes that influ-
enced the likelihood of the formation and success of a social movement. In particular,
this theory argued that social movements were more likely to form and be successful
under open rather than repressive political environments. Actors had greater political
leverage under conditions of “urbanization, . . . splits among political and economic elite,
changes in level of repression, changes in judicial or regulatory climate, changes in in-
ternational pressures” that could make it easier to realize shared grievances, mobilize
resources, and hold protests (Kurtz 2002:69). However, critics argued that political pro-
cess theory did not so much explain why social movements formed as tell why some
movements had easier paths to mobilization than others.
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Most recently, a new theory of social movements rejects class-based and structuralist
understandings of social mobilization. Giddens et al. (2005:400) argues that new social
movements are a “unique product of late modern society [that is] profoundly different
in their methods, motivations, and orientations from forms of collective action in earlier
times.” New social movement theory proposes that the very organization of “modern”
society has created radically divergent social movements that focus individualistically
on personal transformation and creating/affirming identity (Kurtz 2002:70). “Modern”
is a value-laden term and this discussion rejects the simplistic and historically inaccurate
dichotomy presented here between “traditional/material” and “modern/cerebral” social
movement structures. Rarely do social movements seek only material/political or iden-
tity/cultural objectives (Kurtz 2002:70–71).
While this discussion respects existing theories of social movements as helping to
uncover potentially important elements of social mobilization, it moves away from grand
theorization and pre-determined stages of mobilization. Instead, it identifies organiza-
tional forms and precursors of mobilization in social movements within the same culture
and looks for these signals in the focal group. In other words, instead of delineating
stages or processes movements must go through to become successful based on theo-
ries developed outside of the local context of Kenya, this discussion draws from an case
of a social movement in Kenya’s history to identify potentially important forms and
processes of mobilization in this locale.
6.2.2 A Case Study of the Women’s Movement
In the 1950s, a small group of upper-class colonial women established a group Maen-
deleo ya Wanawake (“Progress for Women”) to promote “the advancement of African
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women,” especially in Kikuyu in rural areas, through the mechanisms of self-help (Wip-
per 1975:99). MYW instructed women according to traditional Northern gender roles,
offering training in homemaking, traditional handicrafts, health and hygiene, cook-
ing, agriculture, and even hosting tea parties and chatting about current affairs (Wip-
per 1975:100). After a state of emergency was declared in 1952 and many Kikuyu
were either imprisoned or interned in labor camps, the MYW groups became a mech-
anism for the “rehabilitation” of women and the monitoring of the Land and Freedom
(Mau Mau) Movement, through the incentive of exemption from forced labor (Udvardy
1998:1750). The Commissioner for Community Development during this time stated,
“African women’s clubs . . . are doing a considerable amount to overcome the influence
of Mau Mau” and from that point on would be provided financial assistance by the
colonial government (Aubrey 1997:48).
The initial leadership of MYW was composed almost entirely of the wives of well-
to-do colonial administrators who espoused Northern values and biases as expressed in
the following East African Women’s League address from 1955,
We are building on the sound foundations that these early adventurers put
in for us. They did not build on the sand of lack of faith in their own race, in
their way of life, in their religion, they built on the granite of the best char-
acteristics of the English race, self-reliance, work, endurance, care for the
backward people amongst whom they lived, and a wonderful gift for friend-
liness and hospitality . . . Care for the backward people is still an outstanding
feature of our lives and work (Wipper 1975:100).
In 1959, UNICEF offered a grant for the expanded establishment of training cen-
ters in rural areas. Reflecting the wifely role of their leadership, African women were
encouraged to be behind-the-scenes political supporters rather than leaders. However,
MYW also encouraged the development of small associations of women to practice
their newly learned skills, ultimately building the base for women’s mobilization farther
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down the road. Moreover, African women were trained in organizational leadership,
such that by Independence in 1963, the majority of leadership was African, supported
by the former colonist leaders.
In 1964, the National Council of Women of Kenya (NCWK) was formed as an um-
brella organization to unify all the smaller women’s organizations that had cropped up in
recent years, including MYW. MYW alone brought in approximately 43,000 members
in 1,120 clubs (Wipper 1975:102). The NCWK came to define the women’s move-
ment in later years; however, it was born out of the membership of many small rural
and urban women’s groups (Maathai 2007; Tripp 1996). During the 1980s and 1990s,
the presence of small women’s associations grew quickly in reaction to increasing eco-
nomic pressures, civil service cuts, the new policy of retrenchment, and the decline of
government-provided social services.
Over time, the larger women’s organizations faced more serious threats of politi-
cization. Male politicians in the ruling party (KANU) used their power to install their
female relatives in MYW leadership positions in an attempt to guarantee the female
vote in elections (Aubrey 1997:74–77). Indeed, as Tripp (1996:290) reports, “Interfer-
ence [with MYW] reached the point where President Moi became personally involved
in changing the rules of voter eligibility for the organization.” The NCWK leadership
became increasingly concerned with these and other political tactics, including the pur-
poseful stirring up of divisiveness based on ethnicity, race, class, and gender, commonly
used by political parties to manipulate the populace.
Under pressure from KANU, MYW initiated a nasty split from the NCWK that
nearly bankrupted the movement. MYW had never been a militant women’s organiza-
tion, but their role in the women’s movement decline precipitously when they became
affiliated as the women’s arm of KANU in 1983. The NCWK had to rebuild momentum
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and financial support by redefining its base and seeking to unite diverse interests and
backgrounds of women’s groups across the country (Tripp 1996; Maathai 2007). With
such steep barriers to women’s empowerment already existing in Kenya, the NCWK
leaders, particularly future Nobel Prize winner Wangari Maathai, believed they could
not afford to allow politicians to divide their organizational power along political or eth-
nic lines and vowed to remain politically independent to avoid the pitfalls of political
patronage and co-optation.7
Coming after Maathai’s bold resistance to President Moi’s blatant disregard for the
environmental protections the government had promised, a protest over the rights of
political prisoners in 1992, where women went on a hunger strike and stripped in the face
of police violence, drew widespread attention and support for the women’s movement
(Maathai 2007; Perlez 1989; Tibbetts 1994).8 The ambitious plans implemented by
NCWK to address all manner of human rights abuses while remaining unified showed
a strength and determination that the government began to take more seriously (Tripp
1996). As a sign of the women’s movement taking hold in Kenya, a number of new
women’s organizations were founded in the late 1980s and early 1990s including the
Education Centre for Women in Democracy, Forum for African Women Educationalists,
Women Educational Researchers of Kenya, and The African Women’s Development and
Communication Network (FEMNET).
7Empowerment is defined by Longwe (1987) as a multilevel process. “At the family level, it means
equal control with men in such matters as the sexual division of labour and the use and distribution of the
family income. At the personal level, it means the women’s control in such matters as choice of husband,
use of her own labour and whether or not to bear children. Above all, this dimension is concerned with
women’s power to control their own lives and become independent and self reliance, both individually
and collectively on equal terms with men. Equality in control is the ultimate objective of the process of
empowerment” (Kabira and Nzioki 1993:99).
8See Udvardy (1998:1754–1758) for a discussion of the social significance of the exclusively female
cultural practice of shaming by baring private parts and its contemporary use in the women’s movement
as a form of extreme protest. Wipper (1989:318–322) provides an example of its use in riots over Henry
Thuku’s 1922 arrest.
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Many gains have been made in the area of women’s rights. The 2006 Political Parties
Bill provides government funding for political parties, evening the playing field for the
poor and women who are not economically empowered, while changes to the Employ-
ment Act increased maternity leave from two weeks to three months (FIDA 2008:10).
In addition, the current constitutional overhaul was lauded for involving women in its
construction, including language calling for gender equity and guaranteeing more repre-
sentation of women in parliament and the senate; however, given the history of marginal-
izing women in politics, it is questionable that this draft version will pass with women’s
rights guarantees intact (Daily Nation 2009c). In 2007, 261 women were nominated for
parliamentary seats compared to 44 in 2002. Kenyan women saw an increase from two
women members of parliament in 1987 to twenty-one members of parliament in 2007
suggesting significant gains in representation (FIDA 2008:9; Stamp 1991:828).
Despite these gains, Parliament remains overwhelmingly (92 percent) male, high-
lighting how much the women’s movement has yet accomplish. Parliament failed to
pass a 2007 constitutional amendment that guaranteed 50 seats for women in the Na-
tional Assembly, further continuing policies of political marginalization. Some have
viewed the modest changes as token measures that do not go far enough to guarantee
women’s equality, but they are no small victory for the hard-fought battle by women’s
groups in Kenya (Daily Nation 2010).
The women’s movement in Kenya drew its power from identifying broad-based
grievances and goals and making them visible through non-violent public displays of
protest. This operational strategy was supported by internationally recognized, outspo-
ken advocates for women’s rights, who mobilized members (and even bystanders) to
act when the government provided an opportunity to protest. Although the movement
was composed primarily of small self-help groups across a diversity of social categories
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often used by politicians to divide, Maathai united its membership by appealing to the
near-universal anger at human rights abuses at the hands of the government. Ultimately,
the issues that unified the women’s movement were criticisms of the Moi administration
over failed environmental promises and oppressive measures to maintain one-party rule
such as illegally detaining prisoners, rather than a demand for women’s empowerment
per se (Maathai 2007; Perlez 1989). However necessary it was to appeal to generic
grievances to build a membership base, this willingness to fight for a diversity of causes
may have ultimately undermined the ability of the movement to generate a more visible
collective identity unique to “womanhood” that could have significantly strengthened
the movement beyond Maathai’s leadership. Yet, to Maathai’s credit, the decision to
remain autonomous from a political party, instead advocating for broad human rights
reforms, likely saved the movement from obsolescence. Using the women’s movement
as a guide, the following section will look for evidence of a social movement of informal
workers.
6.2.3 Characteristics of a Social Movement: Organizational Struc-
tures
The following section expands on the the brief history of the women’s movement pro-
vided above to locate characteristics of its mobilization, such as organizational struc-
tures, leadership, scope, and structural conditions, that might help us identify a nascent
informal workers’ movement. Then, the existing evidence on informal workers will be
explored to see if these characteristics are evident. This first section examines the or-
ganizational structure of the women’s movement, in particular the role small and large
associations played in its growth.
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Small Associations
The Women’s Movement
Kenyan women have been forming female collectives long before the colonial appara-
tus entered the picture. Traditionally, women’s groups met both economic and social
needs in the community. Small village associations facilitated the female labor system
by assisting neighbors to harvest labor-intensive crops such as finger millet. Women’s
groups also embodied traditional female social roles by providing care for women af-
ter child-birth and for supervising and instructing the children of the community. In
addition, women’s collectives played an important role in organizing ceremonies and
rituals that preserved the norms and cultural traditions of the group. However, as maize
production, encouraged by the colonial cash crop economy, superseded labor-intensive
subsistence production, the communal labor element of women’s social organizations
declined (Sorensen 1992; Udvardy 1998).
As independence neared, the wives of colonial officers began to get involved in
“women’s development,” establishing “women’s clubs” under the name Maendeleo ya
Wanawake (MYW) to encourage communal labor-sharing among rural women. MYW
established a new organizational form that introduced a hierarchical structure antithet-
ical to the original practice of communal labor. Although on one hand, the colonial
leadership of MYW was unknowingly encouraging a return to traditional forms of fe-
male organization in existence prior to colonial intervention, on the other, the leadership
made no attempt to acknowledge that these indigenous forms were made redundant by
their own regime (Wipper 1975). Thus, these associations were an externally driven
response to the externally perceived needs or deficiencies of Kenyan women based on
the assumption that without intervention women were unable or incapable of forming or
conceiving the benefit of collectives.
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Yet, membership in these women’s clubs grew rapidly, in part because of the in-
centives offered by the British system. As Independence neared, MYW separated itself
from the auspices of the colonial wives and supported African rule. Despite Kenyatta’s
promises to support MYW when the women visited him in prison, the first decade after
independence saw a decline in the level of support given to women’s groups from the
colonial era. In the 1970s, a change in MYW leadership brought in new funds and a
concurrent growth in membership from 2,085 in 1971 to approximately 6,000 groups
in 1983 (Aubrey 1997:57). While MYW’s contribution to the women’s movement was
later curtailed by government intervention, it did play an important role initially in or-
ganizing and mobilizing rural women and calling for gender equality.
Small women’s associations also formed the basis of membership of the National
Council of Women of Kenya (NCWK), founded in 1964, and its affiliate the Green Belt
Movement (GBM), founded in 1977. Directed by Nobel Prize winner Wangari Maathai,
GBM initially rooted its tree-planting initiative in rural development groups primarily
composed of women (Maathai 2006). Both NCWK and GBM played significant and
progressive roles in the women’s movement in response to the challenges they witnessed
among rural associations. The plight of women’s groups forced them to pay attention to
gender equity and women’s rights in the context of Kenya.
Small associational forms were fundamental to the start of the women’s movement
and gave legitimacy to the foundation of larger organizations expressly advocating for
the interests of women. Although the degree to which these smaller organizations chal-
lenged traditional gender relations in Kenya is source of much debate, they were the
catalyst for women’s social mobilization. We might now ask whether there is a similar
role for small associations among informal workers.
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The Informal Workers’ Movement
While large, male-dominated organizations based on hawker, trader, or jua kali occu-
pational status have been forming and dissolving in Nairobi since the 1920s, these
organizations were not able to build a cohesive, effective, and long-standing informal
workers movement in Kenya. The power of these large organizations declined signif-
icantly after the First Hawker War in 1960, and in their place, small, self-help groups
arose, influenced by the new associational form introduced by MYW and other colo-
nial era organizations. Traders retreated from collective attack on the political sphere
and began forming associations inside and outside the market based on health, welfare,
and business development. These associations became essential to survival through the
economic downturn of the SAP years, and members simply sought to improve their ev-
eryday life situations rather than transform the existing political structure (Murray and
Myers 2006; Brown and Lyons 2010).
What exists today is a plethora of small informal associations. The organizational
structure of small trader’s associations is indebted to the shift away from communal
labor sharing toward resource pooling (while maintaining the focus on social welfare)
that occurred during the colonial era. Indeed, research conducted in 2007 and 2008
revealed that small informal associations within the marketplaces were organized around
two primary concerns: health-and-welfare and business loans.9 Since, the majority of
associations were independent and stand-alone groups and consisted of less than ten
members, many times from the same ethnic group and gender, this is a prime example
of the prevalence of small associational forms within the informal social network and
evidence of the lack of any sustained large association influence.
Given the history of gender roles in small associational forms, I expected to find a
significant concentration of women in small informal groups. Especially in health-and-
9Abraham et al. (1998) reported similar associational forms (Ferrara 2002).
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welfare merry-go-rounds, where members contributed a small amount of their income
to a kitty, membership was predominantly female. Welfare associations cater to tradi-
tionally female gender roles by providing access to money to cover hospital fees, funeral
expense, and celebrations such as a wedding, graduation, or birth.
In the business-oriented associations, members were either given monthly sums of
money or could take out a loan based on the amount they had invested up to that point.
Loans were paid back at an interest rate lower than that offered by banks or micro-
lending institutions (but still usually exceeding 10 percent).10 Additional fees were
charged for late loan repayments. The gender representation for business associations
was more diverse than for health-and-welfare associations, with an overwhelming ma-
jority of leadership positions occupied by males. Similar to health-and-welfare associ-
ations, business associations were constructed out of close ties, often, but not always,
ethnically based. However, unlike health-and-welfare associations, translocal associa-
tions were non-existent. I did not find a single case of a member of a rural business
association working in an urban marketplace, nor did I find evidence of labor pooling.
For both welfare and business forms of associations, it was essential that the mem-
bers knew both the other members and their families/sponsors well in order to be able to
invest with confidence in the organization. If a new member wanted to join the group,
10Within the past few years, banks in Kenya have become more open to lending to small businesses
or groups of poor clients; indeed a few banks such as Cooperative Bank and Equity Bank have opened
branches near Gikomba. However, most banks still require a significant number of conditions to be met
before the loan is granted, including maintaining a savings account with a minimum balance for a certain
period of time, have earning levels over Ksh 10–30,000, address confirmation documents, a letter of
introduction from employer, pay stubs, bank statements, and one or two sponsors with current account
at the institution to vouch for the new client. If these restrictive conditions are met, which is unlikely
for small informal enterprises, small loans can be taken out at not less than 14 percent interest often on
top of ledger fees, service charges, or ATM fees (Interview with George Owuor, Equity Bank 7.2.07). In
1993, Cooperative Bank of Kenya, one of the more small-holder friendly banks offered an interest rate on
loans at 20 percent (Alila and Ikiara 1993:79). Interest rates today range from 14 percent to 21 percent for
unsecured loans. The Central Bank of Kenya has called for a reduction in interest rates but national banks
have widely rejected that call. Lower interest rates can be found in non-banking financial institutions.
Such as micro-finance institutions or the women’s or youth fund.
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they needed a sponsor who could identify their family lineage and homeplace.11 This
spatial groundedness acted as an informal social and economic deterrent, since if a per-
son defaulted on a loan or absconded with the group’s savings, the association could
turn to the family or ostracize the individual from their “home” community (Kawang-
ware 6.25). Such deterrents are not as strong in urban areas because individuals are
disjoined from communal ties and responsibilities, and it is simply too easy to disap-
pear into another marketplace to start again. With such horror stories rampant in the
marketplaces, a number of retailers exhibited extreme caution when considering join-
ing associations. High levels of social trust were necessary for this form of association,
and typically only well-established, committed retailers were willing to take this risk.
As a result small organizations tended to be composed of members of the same ethnic
groups, gender categories, and age cohorts (often older generations with accumulated
wealth due to the need to be well-established to be willing to take risk).12
One of my key informants in Gikomba, a 46 year-old mother of four, was involved
in five associations, only one of which was based in the marketplace. The marketplace
group consisted of ten women, all well-established Akamba sellers at Gikomba. Every
month they contributed Ksh 200, and one member received Ksh 2,000 to improve her
business. This was not a loan but a way of topping off an existing loan or investment
to make a big purchase approximately once a year. Some sellers used the lump sum to
buy their licenses or new stock while others used the money for their children’s school
supplies (Gikomba 6.29.07).
11These observations are supported by La Ferrara (2002:63) who similarly reported, ”The most im-
portant factor to gain access to such loans seems to be speaking the same language as the chairperson
. . . members of the same ethnic group as the chairperson are 20-25 percentage points more likely to bor-
row from the group or from other members.”
12These findings are also supported by La Ferrara (2002:61) who finds that in East Africa ”Sex, age and
ethnic identity are among the most important determinants of . . . access to group loans” (Ferrara 2002:61).
Sorensen (1992:561) also reports finding that new women’s groups are disproportionately composed of
older and wealthier women who encouraged long-term income-generating activities (with opportunities
to reinvest profits) instead of short-term poverty alleviation measures.
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My key informant’s second association, Ndeytha Group (Akamba: self-help), was
business-oriented. Like the previous group, all eight members were both female and
Akamba, although they all neither came from the same area nor worked in the same
marketplace. The women became friends long before they considered starting an as-
sociation. Two were neighbors for seventeen years and watched each others’ children
grow; one’s husband was a wholesaler from whom the key informant bought her bales,
and another two were neighbors elsewhere previously. Knowing each others’ entire fam-
ily and homeplace helped to develop trust, along with the mutual bond they said came
from being women and mothers. Anne told me, “These women will stand up for you
like a sister; we are sisters in society. And our children are playmates and our husbands
are friends. It is not eight women in this group but eight families” (Umoja 7.8.07). They
also were not revisiting their rural home frequently enough to feel supported and ac-
cepted by that community. They began to have more common interests with friends in
Nairobi than with their age-mates in the village. Rose explains these complex feelings,
“When we go there, we have nothing to talk about. You find your home but you are
just alone. These village women aged fast and seem so old now. Your age mates are
grandmothers who have no teeth. They are educating their grandchildren and we are
educating our children.” Esther added, “Women from home don’t like us because we
stay in town and can’t help those in the village all the time. They think you are living a
good life in Nairobi and not working hard like on the shamba” (Umoja 7.8.07).
The group also had a health-and-welfare component that acted as an informal insur-
ance scheme. A woman could take out loan for business development or school fees.
These loans could not be used for health expenditures, because that can “eat the loan
and make it difficult to repay” (Umoja 7.8.07). Instead, grants were offered for such oc-
casions: Ksh 40,000 for a graduation ceremony, Ksh 16,000 for a wedding, Ksh 40,000
if admitted to the hospital, Ksh 24,000 to cover burial costs and so on. In addition, the
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group visited a member’s parents in their rural home every month, bringing something to
meet their needs. A chairwoman was in charge of running the monthly meetings, a trea-
surer collected loans and fees, and the secretary recorded attendance and fee payment.
Additional fines were levied if a member misses a meeting or is late.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this section shows that small associations with hierarchical or-
ganizational structures created an organized base for the women’s movement, providing
the engine for growth and mobilization. Likewise, evidence collected in marketplaces in
Nairobi suggests small associations play an equally important role in bringing together
informal workers to share resources and providing funds for social obligations. These
associations meet both economic and social needs of traders — helping them pool re-
sources as a form of insurance, gain access to credit for large purchases, and pay for
large cultural expenses such as weddings and funerals. These findings are supported by
McCormick et al. (2003:31) who specifically studied local level associations of infor-
mal workers. They found that only 15.7 percent of informal workers were members of
women’s groups (42.5 percent of women entrepreneurs), suggesting that although the
forms of local organization are similar between the two movements, the membership is
unique. Thus, we cannot conclude that informal workers’ associations are dependent on
women’s groups.
Despite the importance of small associations as a foundational organizational struc-
ture and a provider of resources, they have not exhibited the ability to improve the
political or legal climate or to transform norms surrounding marginalized Kenyans over
the long-term (Brown and Lyons 2010). In addition, they rarely produce leadership
that extends beyond their own small niche. In the case of the women’s movement,
larger organizations built around these smaller associations, arose as key mechanisms
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for widespread changes. The following section discusses the development of these
larger organizational forms, particularly the development of an umbrella organization,
and their potential in facilitating social mobilization of informal workers.
Large Organizations
The Women’s Movement
Starting in the 1950s with MYW, large organizational forms representing women’s inter-
ests sprouted rapidly. In particular, an umbrella organization called the National Council
of Women of Kenya (NCWK) formed in 1964 to coordinate the diverse interests of small
associations, women’s organizations, NGOs and CBOs that had emerged from the fight
for independence. According to Wangari Maathai,
NCWK . . . is the forum through which many women became part of the
women’s movement in Kenya. . . . At independence . . . various women’s or-
ganizations in the country decided to unite to forge a common front through
which common issues and objectives could be promoted, especially those
concerning women. NCWK became that common front (Maathai 2006:30).
The NCWK also played a key role in establishing the Green Belt Movement (GBM)
in 1977, which has become known as one of its most successful initiatives (Maathai
2007:155). Like the NCWK, women’s groups were the foundational members of GBM,
and only later when the Movement gained international recognition did membership
expand (Maathai 2006:39). Together with the NCWK, the GBM pushed women’s rights,
through more general appeals to human rights and environmental stewardship, into the
spotlight. Other organizations also played a role in the women’s movement including
the YWCA, Gender and Development Center and professional organizations such as the
Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya, Business and Professional Women, and Kenya
Association of University Women. Many other women’s organizations were founded
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in the 1990s, including another umbrella organization called the Federation of Women
Groups, following the path-breaking work of these first groups.
In 1971, the government of Kenya sponsored the Women’s Group Programme, but it
was not until the International Women’s Year in 1975 that the government really started
investing in women’s groups. In this year the Women’s Bureau was established un-
der the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. In 1977, the ILO released the report
Employment, Incomes and Equality, which was subsequently incorporated by the Gov-
ernment of Kenya into their Fourth Development Plan, bringing attention to the need
for income-generating opportunities and employment creation for women. Thereafter,
small self-help associations were seen as the best, if not only, mechanism for ensur-
ing the achievement of this component of the Plan. Funding was subsequently fun-
neled through women’s organizations, particularly MYW, to this end, generating an
even greater flurry of “association-making” and NGOs to organize these associations
(Feldman 1983:67–68).
Whether these small associations challenged existing gender norms and unequal
gender relations was a matter of debate (see Stamp 1986; Mwaniki 1986; Thomas 1988;
Sorensen 1992; Kabira and Nzioki 1993). Thomas (1988:418) argued, “Women do not
question existing structures of stratification and authority. Nowhere . . . did anyone sug-
gest that an association should join with others to achieve common objectives.” Small
associational forms have proven to be more organizational and concrete than transfor-
mative and abstract.
In Kenya, the umbrella organization, NCWK, and the large organization, GBM, have
pushed the women’s movement forward through their international exposure to solidar-
ity networks, broad-base of funding, opportunities for training, and ability to focus on
more widely-applicable social justice issues beyond the narrow interests of small as-
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sociations. Indeed, Udvardy claims, “Among the attributes that have been identified
as key to the success of Maathai’s movement is her ingenious organizational structure,
which combines a central, Nairobi-based office staff, with widespread participation at
the grassroots level. Women’s groups, usually already established, must apply for Green
Belt membership, and are constantly monitored by field extension staff” (1998:1757).
Centralized leadership, broad-based membership, and staff who work closely with mem-
bers in the field seem to be key to the success of GBM and the women’s movement more
broadly. Evidence from organizational forms within the women’s movement highlight
the importance of large organizations in raising awareness, pooling resources, and de-
veloping solidarity. The question now arises whether large-scale organizational forms
can play similar roles in the informal workers’ movement. To this we turn.
The Informal Workers’ Movement
While small informal associations helped traders meet their day-to-day needs, they
found such associations were incapable of negotiating with municipal authorities for
a better trading environment (Lyons and Snoxell 2005; Brown and Lyons 2010). Large,
formal workers’ organizations (such as Central Organization of Trade Unions, Kenya
Association of Manufacturers, and Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try) only recognized waged “formal” work as valuable and productive. In the past, large
organizations such as the African Workers Federation and the United African Traders
Associations (with 4,000 members at its peak) have developed in response to trader per-
secution but government coercion or co-optation reduced their potential power (Furedi
1973).
More recently, other national organizations such as Kenya Organisation of Small and
Medium Enterprises, Kenya Small Traders and Entrepreneurs Society (KSTES), Asso-
ciation of Makers of Gifts and Allied Articles (AMEGA), and Small and Medium Enter-
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prises Development Organisation and the Kenya National Federation of Jua Kali Asso-
ciations (KNFJKA) have emerged but are small in scope and most, with the exception of
KSTES and AMEGA, cater primarily to small manufacturers. The KNFJKA has been
the primary mechanisms for government involvement among the jua kali, and helped
to implement to World Bank’s Voucher Training Programme. Established in 1992 by
the Ministry of Technical Training and Applied Technology (MTTAT), KNFJKA was
undermined by divisive politics in its governing council and rendered dormant in 1996.
At its peak in 1995, it only had 360 members, which highlights its limited purview and
potential for mobilizing workers for change (McCormick et al. 2003:38). Large workers
organizations have developed in the past, but for various reasons none have been able to
transform their local interests into a broad-based platform for social change.
The recent development of the Kenya National Alliance of Street Vendors and Infor-
mal Traders (KENASVIT), a nascent umbrella organization of small associations that
defends the rights of traders and hawkers give a tentative hint that this may change. KE-
NASVIT seeks to unite hawker and trader interests in multiple municipalities in Kenya
and enables collective bargaining on their behalf (Mitullah 2004).
Researchers at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nai-
robi have been conducting research on hawkers and traders for decades, even before the
ILO hired IDS researchers to help produce its 1972 Kenya Report. The most recent
study contributing to this institutional body of research, conducted between 1998 and
2002, concluded that workers desired to improve their situation but were thwarted by
a lack of consistent, uncorrupted leadership and large-scale organizational structure to
train members in local and national-level advocacy (The Street Trader 2006; Mitullah
2007).13 In April 2005, KENASVIT was formed by IDS researchers as an umbrella
13With funding from StreetNet International, Women in Informal Employment Globalising and Organ-
ising and the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (Mitullah 2007; Mitullah and Kamau ND).
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group “to organise and empower street vendors and informal traders in order to improve
their businesses through training, and access to credit, dialogue with local authorities
and other relevant organizations on appropriate by-laws and policies that give recogni-
tion to, and bring to an end harassment and discrimination against these traders” (Mi-
tullah 2007). Drawing on a history of marketplace militancy and small associations,
KENASVIT is working to enable informal workers to lobby for their own rights and
participate in the development and implementation of relevant policy, such as the Micro
and Small Enterprise Bill (The Street Trader 2006; Mitullah 2007).
For organizational purposes, KENASVIT’s members are grouped into seven urban
alliances, composed of several small associations in the same geographic area. KE-
NASVIT models a modern hierarchical and centralized organizational structure but also
allows each urban alliance to structure its own guiding mission, principles, goals, and
leadership. Currently KENASVIT as a whole remains small and divided, with only
6,000 members in 175 small associations scattered across seven urban alliances (KE-
NASVIT 2009). However, KENASVIT has strengthened hawker and trader represen-
tation in Nairobi, particularly by training leaders and channeling their frustration into
reworking the proposed Micro and Small Enterprises Bill. Prior to the formation of KE-
NASVIT, hawkers and traders in Nairobi formed the Nairobi Hawkers Alliance. This
organization was undermined by serious leadership problems and was disbanding un-
til researchers at IDS helped it rebuild and ultimately redefine itself as NISCOF under
KENASVIT (The Street Trader 2006).
Despite the opposition the Nairobi urban alliance (NISCOF) has faced from the mu-
nicipal council, other urban alliances under KENASVIT have experienced moderate
success in their collective pursuit of issues that bridge associations. In Nakuru, the
mayor has agreed to meet with the local KENASVIT urban alliance members regularly
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and has begun the process of constructing of a new hawkers’ marketplace. In Kisumu,
a city on the Eastern edge of Kenya, the urban alliance has increased dialogue between
associations and the municipal authority and even taken the Municipal Council to court
(The Street Trader 2006; Mitullah 2007).
Even greater progress has been made at the national level, especially in advocacy,
awareness-generation, and networking. KENASVIT has demanded an active role in the
development of the proposed Micro and Small Enterprises Bill, organizing a workshop
to develop a position on the bill and submit recommendations to the Attorney Gen-
eral for improvements (The Street Trader 2007a:5). Successes have also been seen in
generating awareness for the plight of hawkers and their ability to get involved in the
movement. Urban alliances have held soccer matches, press conferences, forums, pan-
els, and rallies, while the executive council has published newsletters, started a blog and
website, and created a brochure. KENASVIT has also been proactive in networking,
connecting with numerous local NGOs and attending international conferences to de-
velop solidarity with other street trader organizations (Okello 2007a; The Street Trader
2007a:4, 12).
Conclusion
Since small associations have proven to be more organizational and concrete than trans-
formative and abstract, it is important to pool associations under umbrella organizations
(such as the NCWK and KENASVIT) that can unite and mobilize disparate groups to
maximize their power potential. McCormick et al. (2003:37) argue that umbrella or-
ganizations are important because they combine “the advantages of geographical and
sectoral associations.” The evidence presented above supports this finding and suggests
umbrella organizations offer an added measure of protection against co-optation since
they are composed of many smaller groups that can speak out independently.
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For informal workers, a national level alliance is a refreshing new opportunity to
move beyond the small associational and large organizational forms that have charac-
terized informal worker solidarity previously. Evidence provided in this section high-
lighted the weakness of small associations to effect change beyond their own members.
As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, large organizations, such as the United African
Traders Association and the African Worker’s Federation, were not strong enough on
their own to resist government repression, co-optation, and divisive mechanisms in or-
der to produce long-standing change for informal workers. Evidence suggests that the
national-level umbrella organization KENASVIT is faring better.
The unification of small associations under the auspices of a registered national-level
organization provides a robust challenge to existing structures of inequality in no small
part because municipal and state bodies function according to organizational forms that
privilege registered organizations (Mitlin 2001; Mitullah 2004; Lyon 2003; Setsabi and
Leduka 2008; Cross 2000:43). KENASVIT has been providing this umbrella organi-
zational form and function for traders but it remains to be seen whether the dynamic
leadership exists to mobilize informals to negotiate for their own rights. We turn to this
question in the following section.
6.2.4 Characteristics of a Social Movement: Leadership
The Women’s Movement
Leadership in the first women’s organization, MYW, was composed of the wives of
colonial officials including the governor, the Anglican bishop, provincial commissioner,
and the provincial agricultural officer. These upper-class women projected their conser-
vative and traditional Northern notions of being a proper wife, managing the household,
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and supporting the husband in his leadership positions onto the organization (Wipper
1975:99). Initially, the elite leadership hand-picked their African successors from loy-
alists trained at the Jeanes School who would then be sent to the reserves to spread the
colonial propaganda (Maathai 2007:156; Aubrey 1997:50). Yet, as the independence
movement grew, MYW separated from elite colonial interests and voiced its support for
an imprisoned Kenyatta, who assured MYW leadership that women’s issues would be
an important component of the post-colonial administration. However, once in power
Kenyatta ignored women’s issues, relegating them to the private domain of the home,
and included no female voices in his cabinet or advisory circle. For the next decade, a
style of leadership developed that focused on establishing local connections with rural
women and the secondary goal of lobbying the government to address the traditional
subordination of women (Wipper 1975:106; Aubrey 1997:56).
In 1971, a new chairperson was chosen in a fiercely contested election between
Nyiva Mwenda, a former MP and wife of an ex-chief justice, and Jane Kiano, wife
of the Minister of Commerce, cabinet member, GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru As-
sociation) officer, and chairman of the Kenya Broadcasting System. Kiano won and
began the longest and arguably most influential term of any MYW chairperson. Kiano
was well-connected politically and socially and paired this with a strong and aggressive
leadership style that courted contributions and support from a wide-range of patrons.
Kiano became the face of Kenya’s women’s movement in the international women’s
rights conferences, particularly those in Mexico in 1975 and Copenhagen in 1980, using
these audiences to generate financial support through bilateral ties with USAID, GTZ,
Pathfinder, and NORAD. She also made use of her husband’s KANU connections and
combined speeches on behalf of MYW with campaigning trips on behalf of her husband
(Aubrey 1997).
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MYW came under the auspices of the NCWK in 1974 but successfully lobbied for
a significant amount of power in the organization due to their unique representation of
large numbers of rural women. MYW was awarded ten votes in the organizations elec-
tions, compared to three allotted to all other groups, and the chairwoman of NCWK was
always a senior member in MYW. Thus, the NCWK closely mirrored the ideological
bent of MYW.
This changed in 1979 when Wangari Maathai ran for the chairwoman position in
NCWK. Although Maathai came from a poor family in rural Kenya by luck she was
enrolled in missionary schools and then chosen as part of the 1960 “Kennedy Airlift”
of Kenyans to U.S. universities. She earned a PhD and upon her return, moved the
middle-class suburb of Lang’ata in Nairobi and worked as a professor at the University
of Nairobi while supporting her husband’s campaign to be a Member of Parliament.
Later she worked for an arm of UNEP and traveled internationally on its behalf (Maathai
2006:15).
Maathai lost the 1979 NCWK election, becoming the vice-chairwoman instead, but
was not deterred. She ran again in 1980 and won. Shortly thereafter MYW withdrew
from NCWK signaling a shift in the caretaker of the women’s movement. Through the
NCWK, Maathai provided strong and decisive leadership that moved forward a pro-
gressive agenda for women’s rights. After her term ended as chairwoman of NCWK,
she used the GBM as a platform for confronting the government over a myriad of poli-
cies including the politicization of ethnicity, human rights violations, repression, unmet
promises about the political representation of women, and environmental policies.
Voicing her concerns about the loss of public green space and government repres-
sion under single-party rule, Maathai directly confronted the Moi’s administration in
a violent confrontation in 1992 (Maathai 2007:184–205). However, not all women’s
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groups were supportive of Maathai’s direct attack on the government and involvement
in political battles and some even left the movement. However, as Udvardy suggests,
“When Maathai began to realize the negative impact of her political activities upon the
movement, she fought to separate her political activities from her role in the movement”
(1998:1757). As a strong and truly visionary leader, Maathai recognized her faults and,
putting her own personal grievances aside, focused on the grievances of GBM’s mem-
bers.
Maathai proved to many that change could come and that the authoritarian regime
could be challenged. Later, when no other women’s organizations dared to speak out,
Maathai organized a petition through GBM and the NCWK to support Wambui Otieno’s
legal battle against patrimonial legal structures (Udvardy 1998; Gordon 1995). Ulti-
mately, she used the platform of GBM to make visible the capacity of women instead of
just preaching it. She writes,
In a nation where women’s roles are commonly perceived as subordinate,
the [Green Belt] Movement found it important to raise awareness — both in
rural and urban areas — of the willingness, ability and capacity of women
to play leading roles in communal, regional, and national development
(Maathai 2006:39).
Kiano and Maathai were both charismatic and determined leaders. Without them
and other women like them, it is not certain that a women’s movement would have
developed. Thus, the leadership of the women’s movement came in the form of well-
educated, middle-class, charismatic, and strong-willed women.
The Informal Workers’ Movement
Historically, leadership and membership in informal workers organizations have been
male even when women represented a significant portion of informal labor (Brown and
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Lyons 2010; Bonner ND; McCormick et al. 2003). Thus, this work expected to find pre-
dominantly male leadership in KENASVIT. Indeed, the urban alliances are all chaired
by men, except for one — the currently defunct Eldoret alliance. However, the initial
executive board of KENASVIT in 2006 had an even representation of men and women.
The distinct difference in gender representation between the urban alliances and the na-
tional executive board hints at the influence of the more progressive public intellectuals
who started the organization.
The IDS-Nairobi researchers who acted upon the intellectual history of the depart-
ment and created KENASVIT are also active members of Women in Informal Employ-
ment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). This progressive trans-local organization
issued a manual for organizing informal workers that provided specific strategies to en-
courage women’s leadership (Bonner ND). As a result, the founders from IDS-Nairobi
were highly attuned to these concerns, and their influence in the national-level executive
leadership representation is evident. Indeed, Mitullah (2007:3) reports that the urban
authorities who attended the 2003 workshop to discuss the technicalities of forming the
alliance were required to elect one male and one female representative to compose the
National Interim Steering Committee that wrote the constitution for KENASVIT.
The gender equality in leadership that was initiated by the IDS researchers has
changed in the most recent election where more males (6) than females (3) were elected
to the executive committee and all women were in a secondary or “vice-” role. Although
the gender composition of KENASVIT membership was not known, this research found
that a significant percentage of hawkers and traders were women making it increasingly
important to have female representation on the executive committee that can bring up
concerns specific to women.
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As of 2007, IDS researcher Evalyne Wanyama still served as the project coordina-
tor and was located at the head office in Nakuru. She and Winnie Mitullah, the other
IDS professor and the director of the initial project, edit the organization’s newsletter,
The Street Trader, thereby maintaining significant control over the “voice” of traders.
Moreover, the IDS logo is prominent on the most recent brochure, suggesting that it
continues to play a significant role in the organization. Mitullah and Wanyama are the
main international spokespersons for the organization (although recent trips by National
Secretary Peter Okello indicate a potential shift) and also appear in a number of urban
alliance pictures in the newsletters, suggesting they still play a central role at least in
the marketing of the organization (Okello 2007a; The Street Trader 2007a). Mitullah
in particular is a prolific writer and has documented the growth of the organization in
several articles and policy briefs (Mitullah 2007).
A workers movement would likely face resource challenges such as forming “bridg-
ing” ties to elites outside their social network and accumulating large amounts of capital
to fund advertising campaigns.14 The organizational structure of KENASVIT may be
beneficial in this regard, since the advisory members from IDS are well-respected indi-
viduals or institutions with ties outside of the informal social network. These advisors
have also facilitated corporate relationships, such as with Coca Cola and national cell
phone companies to gain access to vending space around the ferry docks in Mombasa
and providing recognition for the rights of traders and street venders (Kreilick 2009). In
this case, a well-respected and well-known leadership was useful in opening doors to
benefit informal workers, and these strengths must be weighed against the challenge of
developing legitimacy and the trust of members with non-trader leadership.
14See Granovetter (1973, 1983) for a discussion of strong and weak (bridging) ties.
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Conclusion
Dynamic leadership is an essential part of an effective social movement. Such leaders
help to inspire staff, recruit new members, bring national and international awareness to
the movement, generate and reassure donors, and protect the autonomy of the organiza-
tion.
The evidence shows that the leadership of both the women’s movement and the
potentially nascent informal workers’ movement relied on well-educated, charismatic,
middle-class women, at least in the foundational stages. It is not expected that the lead-
ership of the informal movement will continue to be middle-class females, since many
traders are male, but it is concerning that in recent elections the most powerful positions
went to males with only a minority of female representation and only in subordinate
roles. It is important that KENASVIT continues to draw female traders into leader-
ship roles to represent the significant proportion of women in informal trade and street
vending and to advocate for the unique concerns of women.
The evidence presented in this section shows that the “bridging” capital of the wo-
men’s movement leadership generated wide-spread domestic support and international
rapport. Initially, Mitullah and Wanyama used their broad-based connections and legit-
imacy stemming from appointments at the University of Nairobi to generate beneficial
relationships for KENASVIT. However, since they have taken on advisor roles, it re-
mains to be seen if they will continue to exploit these connections or whether local
leadership will make an effort to build “bridging” capital.
Mitullah’s insistence on local leadership is indicative of a different approach to or-
ganizational leadership than has been historically seen in the case of large organiza-
tions in Kenya. With this strategy, the leadership has most likely avoided the problem
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MYW faced when reports of Kiano’s international travel and luxurious life-style sur-
faced and rural women questioned the legitimacy and representation of their leadership.
At the same time, the quickness with which local leadership replaced the founders of
KENASVIT also sidelines Maathai’s effective model of generating international recog-
nition through her personal dynamism.
Having shifted leadership styles away from the charismatic, politically connected
model, it remains to be seen whether KENASVIT’s strategy (adopted at least in part
from WIEGO) of identifying potential leaders from the pool of association members
and training them for leadership positions, can develop an indigenous leadership that
will build the legitimacy and strength of the movement. Are charismatic, politically-
connected, and internationally-respected leaders essential for the success of a social
movement in Kenya? If so, can the well-known IDS researchers affiliated with KE-
NASVIT function as effectively in the advisor role they have chosen in a way that cham-
pions the movement rather than leads it? Or, does the informal sector itself have its own
dynamic leaders that have yet to surface in the movement?
To this end, one of the most promising resources supporting a movement of informal
workers in Kenya is the relatively high level of education of traders at least in urban
areas. My survey found that a large proportion of retailers in Nairobi (45 percent) had
completed secondary education while ten percent had some college education. Only
ten percent had no education.15 If this educational resource can be further employed to
develop skilled but local leadership, the organization may not need a charismatic leader
that runs the risk of co-optation.
15Surveys conducted by NISCOF in 2005 similarly found that a majority of traders had both primary
and secondary level education (Odhiambo ND).
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6.2.5 Characteristics of a Social Movement: Resistance to Division,
Co-optation, and Repression
The Women’s Movement
Division, co-optation, and repression have played a significant role in the specific form
of women’s movement that developed in Kenya. Government meddling ultimately re-
duced the legitimacy of those women’s organizations calling for more moderate reforms
of gender inequality. In their place rose a more progressive agenda that was directly
confrontational to the Kenyan government.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, KANU sought to assert its control over NGOs
and other organizations in Kenya, appropriating their international funding to finance the
national debt, their voters to boost the ranks of their party, and their successful program
initiatives to improve the record of state-led development. Both Kenyatta and Moi ap-
proached Jane Kiano, then chairwoman of MYW, seeking to affiliate the women’s orga-
nization with KANU. Kiano held off the assault for over a decade, finally resigning the
chairmanship in 1985 in recognition of the inevitable. MYW was particularly vulner-
able because it was female-led, espoused the most conservative agenda of the national
women’s organizations, and had tried to work with the government instead of criticize it
(Aubrey 1997:67–68). Moreover, “the government believed that MYWO could be used,
as it was used, to silence other non-compliant “unruly” women’s organizations, partic-
ularly NCWK” (Aubrey 1997:68). Kiano had, perhaps, too closely aligned herself with
the political elite in an attempt to revitalize wide-spread support for MYW.
MYW was never a radical force for women’s empowerment, but small gains had
been made in the ten years after independence by presenting the government with re-
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quests for women’s rights. However, Kiano’s ascension to chairwoman in 1971 ushered
in an era of leadership less concerned about deep-rooted gender reforms and more inter-
ested in courting the favor of the government to enlarge and strengthen the organization.
It was hard to be progressive when the chairwoman felt that “Women in this country do
not need a liberation movement because all doors are open to us” and that “the simple
reason [we want men involved in MYW] is that we want men to acquaint themselves
with our activities so that when we ask permission from our husbands to attend meet-
ings far from our homes they should know what we are going to do” (Wipper 1975:106).
While attuned to “women’s issues,” the leadership of MYW did not advocate for radical
change, instead seeing men’s authority in the home and political sphere as unquestion-
able.
Some suggest the shift in organizational goals that occurred under Kiano’s watch
compromised the ability of MYW to truly be a voice for women’s empowerment. More-
over, the possibility for a more radical women’s movement under MYW was ultimately
eliminated, allowing for co-optation by the government apparatus (Aubrey 1997). Wip-
per describes Kiano’s shift toward a Western-style philanthropic organization that sought
well-connected “patrons” as leaders and directed activities towards “the sophisticated
middle and upper middle class urbanite with cosmopolitan tastes and with access to
a western-level salary and lifestyle” (1975:104). Cabarets, fashion shows, extravagant
dinners, art exhibitions, and barbecues were organized for diplomats, the international
community, and others running in elite circles looking to “contribute to East African de-
velopment.” Rural women at this time were feeling neglected by their urban leadership,
spurned by the pay cut they had taken while hearing about the lavish international trips
of the chairwoman (Udvardy 1998; Wipper 1975).
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Despite Kiano’s shift toward courting government support and international donors,
she did not have the intention of submitting MYW’s authority to the ruling party. Kiano
resisted attempts by both Kenyatta and Moi to incorporate MYW into the state appa-
ratus for 12 years of her tenure. Aubrey (1997:67) writes, “In April 1984, however, in
large part because KANU could no longer be prevented from affiliating MYWO, Kiano
resigned as chair of MYWO. She resigned three years before her active term was over,
to everyone’s surprise, on the eve of the UN Decade for Women meeting in Nairobi
in 1985.” The women’s movement was subsequently divided with MYW becoming the
face of the government-legitimated women’s movement (one that respected the patrimo-
nial desires of KANU and the nearly all male parliament) and the NCWK as the more
radical step-sister the government sought to eradicate by persecuting and slandering the
organization and its leader Maathai (Tripp 2001:46).
Maathai winning the NCWK chairperson election meant that MYW would no longer
be able to control the NCWK. Encouraged by elements of the government, MYW and its
affiliates such as the Girl Guides withdrew from the NCWK. Charging that the NCWK
was composed of elite urbanites who did not care about rural women, the MYW offi-
cers bankrupted the organization and resigned their membership. NCWK had to rebuild
from scratch under the leadership of Maathai, who was also the leader of the GBM.
Of this period, Maathai writes, “For much of the 1980s, the NCWK and the Green Belt
Movement struggled to survive, while from that time on, the regime labeled me “disobe-
dient,” and sought to curtail my activities and my voice” (2007:159). This persecution
and harassment by the government was to remain a theme in Maathai’s life through the
1990s.
Faced with the example of the co-optation of MYW and the division of the women’s
movement, Maathai sought to keep both GBM and NCWK politically autonomous and
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in control of decisions regarding personnel, funding, and agendas (Tripp 2001:45).
Maathai was somewhat aided in this process by the personal vendetta Moi seemed to
have for her (Aubrey 1997:68). That KANU evicted GBM from its government-owned
office building, arrested Maathai on charges of fear-mongering, and encouraged gov-
ernment officials from working with the movement gave GBM additional independence
and freedom from co-optation (Maathai 2006:75–76). NCWK also remained politically
neutral — condemning the tactics of both KANU and the opposition group, FORD,
especially in consolidation of power by the executive and inciting ethnic tensions.
In effect, co-optation, division, and repression hindered the development of a strong
and progressive women’s movement. Despite gains made for women, particularly by
NCWK and GBM, the movement would have been much stronger and more wide-spread
had MYW had not defected in 1980. The political co-optation of MYW divided the
movement and reduced its efficacy.
Political co-optation and repression are so wide-spread in Kenya that their appear-
ance in the history of the organization of informal workers is expected. They are espe-
cially likely to arise in this case because informal workers compose a large sector of the
population in urban and rural areas, have the potential for affecting votes, have a history
of aligning with the opposition and demonstrating for their cause, and are politically
unrepresented and marginal. What remains to be seen is how the use of co-optation,
repression, and mechanisms of division by the government have affected the form or
potential for an informal workers movement. The following section will discuss evi-
dence of co-optation, division and repression of traders and how this has affected the
organization and mobilization of informals.
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The Informal Workers’ Movement
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, co-optation and repression have a long history of use
in controlling traders’ and hawkers’ organizations. Under the colonial regime, informals
were treated as dirty and diseased vagrants, the lazy unemployed, and criminals. Their
movement was controlled through pass laws and their property was arbitrarily destroyed,
while leadership from early hawkers’ and traders’ associations was given civil service
jobs for abandoning their constituents and complaints. These policies affected traders
and hawkers to a greater degree than small manufacturers, the latter of whom were
generally viewed as being less dangerous and more likely to contribute to the nascent
capitalist system (Hay and Harris 2007; Robertson 1997b).
After independence, working class Kenyans experienced a short period of celebra-
tion before becoming disillusioned by the continuation of many colonial policies that
privileged the elites and constrained the poor. The post-colonial government continued
to harass informals and conduct arbitrary raids and marketplace destructions (Obudho
and Aduwo 1989). Informals from all sub-sectors of work felt that independence did
not produce as many benefits for them as for the elites. The Kenyatta administration
reduced the potential for conflict by distributing licenses preferentially to placate the
leadership of the Nairobi Hawkers and Traders Association and other leaders in populist
movements (Robertson 1997b:143).
Repressive measures continued after independence but were greatly expanded by
President Moi following the attempted coup in 1982. To prevent the change to a multi-
party system, President Moi ordered his police force to “use whatever force was neces-
sary” to restrict the freedom of the press, the ability of the NCWK to meet, the selling of
“subversive” music by traders, the organization of poor people in Nairobi, and to arrest
protestors and destroy shantytowns and kiosks (Schanche 1990; Reuters 1990; Henry
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1989; Maathai 2007). As the tide of dissent increased, KANU chairman Wilson Leitich
employed incendiary language to urge youth-wingers and loyalists to chop off the fin-
gers of the opposition (Associated Press 1990). Traders who took part in the rallies
for multi-party democracy were brutally repressed before the government conceded by
building them a new marketplace.
Recently, President Kibaki, who was first elected in 2002, lifted some of repressive
state controls instituted by President Moi. The new administration claimed to have eased
restrictions on opposition political parties, the ability to express political opinions in the
press, and the assembly of large organizations (Republic of Kenya 2008). In many ways,
Kenyans enjoy more freedoms today than under the colonial regime or Moi dictatorship.
Populist movements have more space in which to operate now than in the past; however,
the displays of state control during the attempt to restrict opposition party mobilization
after the 2007 Presidential elections and the continued crackdowns on trader and hawker
organizations call into question the legitimacy of the government’s official policy (Horn
and Lembethe 2007; BBC News 2008).16 Ultimately, the State has maintained Moi’s
diversified portfolio of mechanisms of consent and coercion to deal with dissent, such
that in periods of crises, the government tends to reinstate some of the more stringent
controls in order to maintain control. Cycles of repression and concession have had the
effect of placating hawkers’ and traders’ movements and creating internal divisions that
have distracted members from the larger structural constraints.
Divisive mechanisms have also been employed that have reduced the potential for
solidarity among informal workers. In the 1980s, President Moi implemented the ILO
Kenya Report’s suggestions in such a way that privileged small manufacturers (jua kali)
16For example, state police appeared in Uhuru Park to prevent the ‘Street Vendor’s Rally’ planned for
the 2007 World Social Forum. Ironically, this rally was to occur at Freedom Corner in Uhuru Park, the
location of the 1992 violent repression of the women’s movement that served as a catalyst for nation-wide
support (StreetNet International 2007).
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while targeting hawkers and traders with more repressive measures. While structural
adjustment and liberalization policies hit all informal workers particularly hard, MT-
TAT and the World Bank’s Voucher Program (MSETTP) were tasked with protecting
small manufacturing enterprises from damages (Republic of Kenya 1992; Riley and
Steel 2000; King 1996). Jua kali workers thus had more institutional support for their
material and social needs; unlike traders, they did not have to constantly prove their
worth and define their identity in the face of an antagonistic government while simul-
taneously defending their space from demolition. Similarly, police harassment has not
been as significant of a concern for jua kali workers, due to their special treatment be-
ginning with President Moi and subsequent relative ease in obtaining licenses. The City
Council tolerated the “illegal occupations” of certain public spaces in Nairobi by jua kali
metal artisans while conducting evictions of traders from other public lots (Macharia
1993:3). Recent research from UN-HABITAT supports these findings, suggesting that,
[Jua kali] sheds operate in a self-regulated environment and most have ac-
quired city council licenses. . . . their craft is fully recognized . . . [they] fully
comply with city council by-laws and there is very little conflict between
them and the city authorities . . . In stark contrast with jua kali entrepreneurs,
mistrust is well shared between authorities and street vendors in Nairobi”
(2006:112).
In part, this mistrust stems from NCC’s long-standing attempts to relocate street
traders to marketplaces that were perceived to be far removed from customers in the
CBD. Traders often viewed these attempts by NCC as a “way of running them out of
business” instead of as a beneficent service (UN-HABITAT 2006:112).
Since independence the City Council has enacted particularly repressive measures
on hawkers and traders that have served to separate them from jua kali. Arbitrary demo-
litions, bribery, police harassment, arrests, and forced relocations have been employed to
control the hawker population at their expense. Most recently, the government forcibly
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removed all hawkers from the central business district and destroyed their premises.
This caused significant disruption and financial loss to thousands of hawkers.
Retailers also protested the 2008 increase in taxation without any attendant improve-
ment in services in the marketplaces or increased access to annual licenses. NCC refuses
to license hawkers partly for having dirty premises that do not meet health regulations,
but the Council has reduced cleaning and maintenance services in the marketplace while
increasing the collection of fees, according to traders. As a result retailers organized and
paid for services that they believed should have been covered by the NCC taxes, includ-
ing hiring security guards, street-sweepers, and sanitation services in the marketplace,
on top of the increased tax rates.
NCC here is very bad and the government doesn’t help us at all. They ac-
tually charge gate charges for items and follow you to your stall and charge
again and again. NCC charges Ksh 25 everyday whether or not traders sell.
Above all there is no water, security lights, and no public toilets. They don’t
clean the market (Interview 35b).
NCC doesn’t give us the required services like cleaning and we have to pay
daily for ”nothing services” (Interview 43b).
City Council taxes have increased tremendously to Ksh 50 per day. We are
now paying maintenance fees, unlike before, but cleanliness has worsened
because City Council doesn’t maintain the market; we are now paying se-
curity guards out of our pocket (Interview 130).
When we started . . . it was a clean environment because City Council used
to clean and burn rubbish. Today, though we pay, they don’t clean. We have
to hire people to clean (Interview 22).
Business has gone down since the NARC government took power; prices
[of basic commodities] have increased; . . . we started maintaining cleanli-
ness here to the better (Interview 10).
Prices have soared high from the time we had Rift Valley fever last year.
. . . We are now paying Ksh 50 taxes per day that we did not have to pay be-
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fore. On top of this, the City Council is charging special taxes for chicken
and meat, unlike before (Interview 123).
The City Council is charging Ksh 25 twice per week but they don’t clean
well. . . . Police harassment has also been increasing (Interview 158).
Furthermore, respondents were frustrated at government policies that limited the
extent of the second-hand clothing trade while allowing cheap imports from Dubai to
flood the market. One retailer stated, “Sometimes the government wants to ban mitumba.
This has affected the way clothes are being imported here” (Interview 25). The arbitrary
nature of bans and tax hikes implies to traders that the government does not value this
segment of the population — this is in stark contrast to the verbal and physical support
jua kali receive. According to traders and wholesalers, import taxes for used-clothing
have steadily increased over the past decade, while Chinese goods were being imported
cheaply through the Dubai free trade zone (Gikomba 7.20.07). A trader in Gikomba
lamented that if the imbalance between Chinese and mitumba imports continued, she
would consider shifting businesses; however, she felt pained to have to sell “those things
of inferior quality” (Gikomba 7.01.08).
Jua kali manufacturers also suffered when the government increased taxes on basic
commodities and import duties. In the 2007 budget, the finance minister slapped a 20
percent excise duty on imported used spare car parts, which deeply affected the ability of
jua kali mechanics to find parts and compete with other industries (Daily Nation 2007d).
Small manufacturers complained to the government that the increased excise duties in
the 2007 budget opened the door for “cheap imports from countries with large produc-
tion capacities like India, China, and Dubai [that] could also flood the local market”
(Daily Nation 2007b:29).
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Despite some shared grievances and a common history of repression, albeit at differ-
ing levels of intensity, there is no evidence that informal workers are looking to form an
alliance that can collectively lobby the government. Hawkers and traders generally have
a much more volatile and contemptuous relationship with municipal authorities than do
jua kali, who seem reticent to bite the hand that feeds (UN-HABITAT 2006:112). KE-
NASVIT has not addressed this concern of uniting the larger front of all sub-sectors of
informal work since it continues to advocate on the behalf of traders and hawkers alone,
in part because of the special treatment the jua kali have benefited from since the 1980s
(KENASVIT 2009; Mitullah 2007). In particular, KENASVIT submitted a proposal to
the Attorney General requesting the title of the proposed Micro and Small Enterprises
bill be changed to “Micro Street Vendors, Hawkers and Market Traders and Small En-
terprise Bill.” This move confronts the myth of homogeneity that clouds discussions
of informal work and seeks to guarantee representation in the bill for sub-sectors of in-
formal work that have historically been marginalized in government policy (The Street
Trader 2007a:5).
Ethnic divisions have also been encouraged by the government, especially during
election periods. Maathai faced such tactics when she tried to use tree-planting to bring
peace to a region where ethnic conflict had been incited for political purposes (Maathai
2007:237). In response, KANU’s propaganda tool, the Kenya Times newspaper, claimed
Maathai was “crusading for the supremacy of the Kikuyu.” Instead of letting such fear-
mongering and incitement of ethnic tensions divide the GBM, Maathai used the opportu-
nity to inform the international press about the ethnic cleansing occurring in Kenya and
to encourage members of the international community to condemn Moi’s involvement
in ethnic incitement (Maathai 2007:246). Maathai argued that,
Political and economic insecurity . . . had led to an electoral outcome in
which people voted along ethnic lines, as they believed that only leaders
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in their own communities could protect their interests. Maathai . . . viewed
ethnicity as a tool used by politicians and bitterly disagreed with those
politicians who claim that Kenyans are polarized along ”tribal” lines (Tripp
1996:301–302).
Officials promised favors to their own ethnic group as an incentive for future votes,
striking fear that if a new ethnic group gained power their constituents would lose their
preferential treatment. In some cases, these divisive tactics have proved detrimental to
the actualization of social movements (Warah 2007).
After the 2007 election ethno-political tension soared in some parts of Nairobi, par-
ticularly in Kibera and Mathare, where rioters burned shops and homes that they be-
lieved to be owned by the ethnic groups favoring the opposite political party (Gettleman
2007, Gettleman 2008). These clashes led to the razing of Toi Market and the tempo-
rary closing of most other markets in Nairobi. Traders in the reconstructed Toi Market
reported that many Kikuyu had not returned to the marketplace six months after the vi-
olence since they still feared for their lives (Toi 6.20.08). Even in marketplaces where
there was no violence, traders were affected by its threat, as evidenced by traders I in-
terviewed in June and July of 2008.
Gikomba was not closed by clashes as such. But violence in the city used
to spew here causing stampedes and fear here. This meant that customers
were not coming to town hence no business. . . . All of my neighboring
traders closed their stalls and we lost revenue for all those days. No one
was an exception in the whole of the market (Interview 1b).
Around here property was not looted, our merchandise was left intact but
we lost money as we closed for several days (Interview 28b).
People closed down stalls, tension was very high and because we deal with
perishables, loses were inevitable. People went home and those people re-
maining were very fearful. Business was very low. Those who come here
stopped and went to buy at supermarkets (Interview 37b).
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When we ran away our kiosk was looted in this area. We lost all our property
but they didn’t burn our stalls. Other people were not so lucky (Interview
68b).
Six months after the clashes, retailers still reported a significant reduction in earn-
ings, in part due to reduced customer levels. Despite the lack of marketplace violence in
Gikomba, retailers noted that customers were reticent to return. One man who had been
selling in Gikomba for ten years responded that, “Business has come back only by 40
percent because we used to rely not only on Nairobi customers but people from across
the country. These customers are not coming to buy as they are treating it as a tribal war,
even in business” (Interview 22b). Respondents in City Park saw a drastic reduction in
Asian and Korean customers while retailers in Gikomba noticed a decline in Tanzanian
clients. Likewise, a 38 year old Kikuyu retailer who had been selling for ten years in
Kawangware noted the decrease in familiar faces as “Many old customers left this area
and went back up-country, especially mothers took children home, and now were are
relying on purchases from passerbys (Interview 70b). A male Akamba retailer at Toi
who lost his stall in the fire commented, “I used to communicate to [my customers] by
phone but now only a few are available and many fear to come back here while oth-
ers occasionally come and are surprised to find we have come back” (Interview 94b).
Despite the lower levels of tension, customers were only trickling back to Nairobi, but
many retailers expected their full customer base to ultimately return with the formation
of the coalition government.
Some retailers also speculated that while tensions were decreasing now in the mar-
ketplace, they would likely arise again during the next election. One lamented, “Tribal
animosity is waning as days go by but it will not be healed at all. After five years we
may see the whole scenario replicated again” (Interview 52b). In general, retailers were
reticent to speak about tribalism and downplayed its relevance in business. However,
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when pressed, many admitted that the present political situation had brought ethnic af-
filiation to the fore, even in the marketplace, and that there were still elevated levels of
ethnic tensions six months after the poll violence.
In and out here life has been changed by tribal hypersensitivity and mistrust
— the sensitivity is now automatic between Kikuyus and Luos. Even when
they have rented houses from each other (Interview 24b).
Tribal tensions are still ripe though not very open around here — though we
are still working together (Interview 32b).
Tribal animosity though suppressed but still it is there. People are kind of
pretending but they are still not happy with one another (Interview 45b).
I have reduced my interactions with Western/Nyanza provinces business
friends here. Mistrust is still very high on the agenda here (Interview 17b).
Tribal sensitivity is high, especially between Kikuyus and Luos at the mar-
ket. . . . We can’t sell late at night like we used to before. Today we are in
by 9pm due to insecurity (Interview 19b).
There is mistrust from Kikuyus, who believe they are more superior than
others, that will remain there but our movement and intermingling is still
there. Security here has deteriorated. Many boys have no work. I have been
mugged three times since January here causing a lot of fear (Interview 22b).
My customers still are not coming. Especially many of my customers from
the Rift Valley are still fearing that Kikuyu people may want to revenge the
election killings hence they are not coming for items (Interview 41b).
Currently, the very real feeling of grievance and suffering caused by opposing ethnic
groups has created divisiveness among informal workers. For example, a male Akamba
trader in Toi reported that, “People are now buying only from their tribesmen. Even
stalls are occupied along tribal lines” (Interview 96b). Creating a unified agenda based
on occupational rights that mitigates the recent wounds of ethno-political animosity is a
serious challenge for KENASVIT.
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KENASVIT has employed strategies similar to those used by the women’s move-
ment to reduce ethnic tensions among members. It has drawn its membership from over
nineteen ethnic groups and vowed to remain apolitical to mitigate political attempts to
fragment the base. Yet, the 2007 Presidential elections show how tenuous these strate-
gies are when the government rallies supporters through ethnic favoritism. Identification
with an ethno-political group is currently much stronger than the affiliation with the non-
political occupation-based alliance. Evidence of this was also found in a conversation
with the chair of Kibaki’s reelection campaign. He discussed how everyone from MPs to
Provisional Commissioners, District Commissioners, and Divisional Officers were sup-
ported by the government in their candidacy based on ethnicity and then were expected,
if not mandated, to produce a certain number of votes in their constituencies in return
during presidential election years (Upper Hill 06.16.07).
The effect of ethno-political affiliation on KENASVIT was evident during the
months following the contested Presidential elections. Especially in towns where ethnic
violence was most prevalent, the urban alliances disbanded or were seriously crippled by
interethnic tensions. Alliance feedback was collected in January of 2008 with members
reporting, “The contested appointment of a vice president from the Akamba commu-
nity has provoked hostility towards members of the Akamba community in Mombasa”
and “Ethnic hostility has flared among the land officials who oversee matters related to
members’ vending space, the impact of which will likely take time to resolve” (Unitar-
ian Universalist Service Committee 2008). KENASVIT chairman Simon Sangale, who
failed in his recent bid for a government position, lamented, “I was not able to penetrate
the hawkers because of the politics of Kenya today where ethnic and social background,
wealth and prestige are the major attributes that voters are interested in” (The Street
Trader 2007b). Recent evidence suggests that despite its call for political neutrality
and its attempt to construct an identity based on being a trader or street-vendor under
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an urban alliance, KENASVIT was not able to supersede the ethno-political identities
fomented by the political parties seeking power (Unitarian Universalist Service Com-
mittee 2008). KENASVIT’s short and long-term policies for addressing such events
(which are likely to reoccur in the future) may be the best indicator for measuring the
organization’s confidence that it can resist the attempts at divisiveness co-optation, and
repression.
Conclusion
Unfortunately organizations fighting for women’s and informal workers’ rights have
faced division, co-optation, and repression in their quest for representation. In the case
of the women’s movement, evidence shows that the government attempted to bankrupt
the NWCK and destroy elements of the women’s movement they disapproved up by
bringing MYW under the auspices of KANU. The NCWK had to rebuild the women’s
movement from scratch but resolved to remain politically independent in the future. This
political independence limited the amount of co-optation possible by the government
and helped the women’s movement grow.
In the case of informal worker mobilization, the evidence shows that the government
has made a number of attempts to co-opt the leadership and quell riotous members. Pre-
vious chapters gave several examples of this, including the building of new marketplaces
and the distribution of licenses after periods of hawker rioting. It remains to be seen if
KENASVIT will have the resolve to resist future attempts to stymie the movement as it
grows stronger and more likely to draw the attention of the government.
One positive indicator of the presence of this resolve is that the question of the ap-
propriateness of KENASVIT officers aspiring to political office while maintaining their
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positions at the alliance is being discussed in light of Chairman Sangale’s recent polit-
ical quest. Some suggest that “officials aspiring to contest political office are inviting
politicians to meddle in the affairs of the association, opening up the associations to
be viewed as political establishments. . . . These ambitions should not be allowed to
threaten the stability of the informal traders associations” (The Street Trader 2007b:10).
However, Sangale argues that a position in government could facilitate trader demands
in the Micro and Small Enterprise Bill and bring attention to the plight of hawkers and
traders everywhere. Given this history of government co-optation and division of or-
ganizations disliked by the government, it is crucial for KENASVIT to institute a firm
policy protecting its autonomy.
6.2.6 Characteristics of a Social Movement: Scope and Support
The Women’s Movement
Affirmation of the uniqueness of “womanhood” increased in relation to International
Women’s Year (1975), which spawned the United Nations Decade for Women (1976–
1986). These events culminated in a World Conference held in Nairobi that introduced
institutional recognition and support for women’s rights (Beneria 1992; Tinker and Ja-
quette 1987). The conference also helped some Kenyans develop awareness for is-
sues women faced for simply being a woman. Yet, with the break between MYW and
NCWK, the women’s movement had to shift to developing legitimacy and attracting
supporters with a focus on more universal frustrations with human rights abuses by the
government. These more general concerns were not strictly “women’s empowerment”
concerns, but they gave women a base for mobilizing against tangible grievances felt by
a large segment of the population. This in turn generated legitimacy and visibility for
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the struggles of women (Tripp 1996; Maathai 2006:39, 72). Only later was the NCWK
able to turn this tide of mobilized women towards a movement for a greater inclusion
of women in leadership roles and other gender-specific issues (Maathai 2007). The
women’s movement had to sacrifice some of its more specific goals to attract member-
ship but ultimately formed a broad-based movement fighting for a number of populist
grievances.
NCWK’s shift to broader issues helped them generate a number of international
donors. Mobil Oil sponsored the initial funding of the GBM and with later funding
coming from Denmark, Sweden and Canada. Large international organizations such
as UNIFEM and UNEP donated to GBM through the NCWK while funding rolled in
from Austria, Norway, the U.S., Japan, Finland, Germany, the U.K., and the Nether-
lands. Maathai also developed international support through her international appear-
ances. Beginning in 1976 when she attended the first United Nations Conference on
Human Settlements (HABITAT I) held in Vancouver, Canada, Maathai developed inter-
national contacts that she nurtured over the years. Over time, they yielded support for
GBM both under and separated from the auspices of the NCWK.
In part due to NCWK’s lobbying, President Kibaki, in collaboration with the UN,
ILO, International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), and Equity Bank, has
recently launched a new program, “Promoting Women in Business and Investment,”
aimed at training women and increasing their access to financial resources (Wafula and
Kazungu 2007:25). Equity Bank is planning to open three new branches in Nairobi
catering only to women (Daily Nation 2007e:34).The government has also introduced a
Women’s Fund with a budget of Ksh 5 billion to provide loans to female-owned busi-
nesses (Barasa 2007:24). Multilateral and state policies have helped to demarcate a
distinct social category, around which a collective identity has begun to develop.
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International funding and support has been crucial in helping the women’s move-
ment become an effective social movement. International donors contributed substan-
tially to the strength of the women’s movement by providing much needed funds for ini-
tiatives, leadership development, awareness-raising activities, and organizational over-
head. In particular, bilateral relationships were forged between the aid arms of Northern
governments and NGOs in Kenya. Without such funds, many of the organizations lead-
ing the fight for women’s rights would have become defunct, composed of only wealthy
elite women, or even more vulnerable to government meddling as a result of promised
financial support.
International women’s conferences held in Nairobi from the 1970s onward have also
helped to develop a sense of identity, and solidarity among Kenyan women. Meeting
women seeking to improve the status of women in other countries has expanded the
vision of women in Kenya and helped them see how, as the 2007 World Social Forum in
Nairobi emphasized so appropriately, “another world is possible.” But has the informal
workers’ movement had similar success attracting international support?
The Informal Workers’ Movement
The KENASVIT leadership started the process of defining the alliance’s goals through
several conferences in 2005 that established a mission statement and constitution. While
emphasizing advocacy and training, KENASVIT delineated two main goals: to create
alliances among small associations of street vendors and informal traders across the tra-
ditional boundaries of gender, ethnicity, and geography; and to create alliances between
vendors, traders, and powerful local authorities (Mitullah 2006). The first goal reflects
the desire to help hawkers and traders transform their own identity frames through the
sense of power that comes from translocal organization around similar objectives. The
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latter goal seeks political reform to improve the material conditions of informal work.
In particular, by building relationships with local political institutions the organization
seeks to strengthen hawkers and traders business rights, including the right to vend and
the right to a work-space with infrastructure such as shelter, water, electricity, and sani-
tation (Kreilick 2009).
Similar to the women’s movement, there is evidence that KENASVIT has been able
to achieve some modest success by locating its goals under broader campaigns for so-
cial justice. One example of this strategy was its link to the 2007 World Social Forum
under its theme of “Another World Is Possible” (StreetNet International 2007). KE-
NASVIT organized a street vendors rally on the theme of “No! To Poverty and In-
equality” (The Street Trader 2007a:2). Kisumu and Nakuru Urban Alliances have also
partnered to draw attention to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among street traders and
hawkers as part of a larger campaign to make VCT testing more accessible (The Street
Trader 2007a:13). To build broad-based support KENASVIT has also successfully part-
nered with other organizations outside the scope of informal work (Okello 2007a). For
example, KENASVIT has worked closely with the Kenya Land Alliance to design urban
land policies that designate space for informal work (Kreilick 2009).
Yet, KENASVIT has also focused on more narrow concerns unique to street vendors
and informal traders. In particular, it participated in the drafting of the Micro- and Small-
Enterprises Bill, prepared a motion on street-vending and presented it to Parliament, and
is planning a national conference to discuss the bill (Mitullah 2007:3). Urban alliances
in particular are often more focused on local concerns than broad human rights issues.
For example, NASTHA, the Nakuru Urban Alliance, made a banner for the WSF that
read “Land Space in the CBD is our Right: Let the Hawkers Trade” (The Street Trader
2007a).
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The decentralized structure of KENASVIT gives relative autonomy to each urban al-
liance when determining localized goals and objectives. While two of the seven alliances
had not composed distinct mission statements and goals as of 2007, the remainder of al-
liances wrote mission statements that closely mirrored that of the umbrella organization.
However, a few included additional goals such as “creating space for holistic socializa-
tion;” “to supplement the governments [sic] effort in reaching the urban and rural poor,
and the unemployed in the fight against poverty, HIV/AIDS, drug abuse, environmental
degradation and insecurity;” and “to ensure equal representation of women and men in
leadership at all levels” (The Street Trader 2006:5, 6).
The benefit of this organizational model is that it allows for grassroots develop-
ment where the community is deciding its priorities based on its own grievances and
values. However, this organizational structure can also make it difficult to create uni-
fying goals and have members identify with these overarching ideas. For example, the
Mombasa Urban Street Traders Alliance (MUSTA), one of the seven KENASVIT urban
alliances, reported that it ”faces challenges of splinter groups” as the values and inter-
ests of individuals diverge from the group’s mission (The Street Trader 2006:3). The
issue of negotiating complex identities and often-divergent values when building a so-
cial movement is a significant challenge that threatens the viability of transforming from
an organization to a social movement.
While developing grassroots mobilization, KENASVIT has also sought to build
an international presence. It has partnered with international organizations such as
WIEGO, StreetNet International, and Unitarian Universalist Service Committee that
help to increase its visibility; its leadership has been invited to participate in conferences
in South Africa, Senegal, Brazil, Ghana, and South Korea and it has hosted delegations
from Denmark and Nepal (Okello 2007b; The Street Trader 2007b). All of these net-
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working activities have provided the opportunity for KENASVIT members, particularly
the leadership, to build connections with international organizations and solidarity with
other informal worker organizations. As we saw with Maathai and the women’s move-
ment, these international connections that started before she had even joined NCWK
were foundational in the future success of GBM.
Conclusion
Evidence from the women’s movement suggests that developing a broad agenda is nec-
essary in the early stages of a social movement to generate wide-spread support and
identification with the movement, but goals and actions must narrow over time to pre-
vent fragmentation and the disintegration of the movement. KENASVIT has negotiated
this challenge by pairing over-arching national level goals with local level goals particu-
lar to each urban alliance. However, the national agenda of KENASVIT is still narrowly
focused on hawkers’ and traders’ rights. While this work acknowledges the distinc-
tion between sub-sectors of the informal labor forces and the favoritism showed to the
jua kali over other sub-sectors, it also sees the potential for solidarity among informal
workers that could lead to a very strong base for a social movement.
In July 2007, KENASVIT organized a workshop to discuss the Micro and Small
Enterprises bill, inviting delegates from the seven urban alliances, the Community Or-
ganization Practitioners, Kenya Private Sector Alliance, IDS-Nairobi, and the Ministry
of Labor. Conspicuously absent were other informal stakeholders, including represen-
tatives from the Jua Kali Federation. Their absence was noted as a limitation and a
following forum was organized that included the Federation, Maasai Market Traders,
Disabled Small Scale Traders Association, and Fisher folk. Other informal groups not
present would be sent a copy of the revised draft of the Bill (Okello 2007b). This ev-
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idence suggests that KENASVIT is aware of potential partners in their cause but are
wary of aligning too closely with them until their organization grows stronger.
International support has both strengths and dangers. As seen through the women’s
movement, foreign donors can provide funds and resources that are not available within
the country, generating growth for an organization that otherwise would not have had the
opportunity. International funding can also strengthen an organization’s autonomy from
threats of political patronage by relieving its reliance on the government for support.
However, international support can also have the effect of shifting the values of the
organization so they more closely parallel those of the donor. To win bids for funding,
organizations may design new initiatives that are not in line with their current goals and
that may end up fragmenting its overarching agenda. So far, KENASVIT has limited
international donors but evidence has already shown that this support has influenced
the organizational structure and leadership representation. It will be important for the
organization to monitor such interventions as they occur and determine if they strengthen
or weaken the overall agenda.
6.2.7 Characteristics of a Social Movement: Group Identification
While the majority of social movements are not interested in purely political/material or
identity/cultural reform, the debate over the exact role collective identity formation plays
in social movements has been long-standing in social science (Kurtz 2002). Is a sense of
collective identity necessary to ascribe to the goals of the movement and to view them
as compatible with deeply-held personal values and beliefs? From personal experience,
Gooding (1999) argues this is true, ”To build long-term commitment to the union and
the labor movement, people have to see themselves reflected in the institution’s priorities
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and practices. It is not only ideological, but pragmatic . . . Integrating identity strategies
can be a critical part of a ’winning strategy’” (Kurtz 2002:xxx).
Or, is group identity an outcome instead of a foundational component of social
movements? Giddens et al. (2005:400) argues that “new social movements are a form
of ‘expressive logic’ whereby participants make a statement about who they are: Protest
is an end in itself, a way of affirming one’s identity, as well as a means to achieving
concrete objectives.” Identity in this case is created, transformed, or affirmed through
the process of participation in the social movement.
Evidence from Kenya’s women’s movement suggests that at least in this instance,
collective identity is both antecedent to and a product of mobilization. Since a full-
fledged workers’ movement has yet to materialize in Kenya, it is hard to know whether
identity formation/affirmation will be an outcome of any potential future mobilization.
However, for the present, we can examine the evidence for group identification prior to
the actual mobilization.
Within the sub-sector of informal work, jua kali social identity has been constructed
as unique from the social identity of traders and hawkers. Colonial and post-colonial
policy favored the small-manufacturing sub-sector of formal and informal work, frag-
menting the likelihood of unified working-class goals. At the same time, the boundaries
among sub-sectors of informal work or divisions between informal and formal work are
continually shifting. Workers can participate in multiple informal sub-sectors or infor-
mal and formal activities within the same working day, making it difficult to distinguish
between values among informal subsectors and between informal and formal workers.
Collective identity formation can benefit from the shifting nature of informal work since
many workers have experienced the needs and demands of other subsectors of work.
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Yet even within the same sub-sector collective identification can be difficult to de-
velop. One urban alliance under KENASVIT reported that, ”Since there are hundreds of
street vendors and small traders’ welfare groups in Migori Municipality with different
objectives, formally it was difficult for these groups to speak with one voice to influence
the policy decisions of the local authority” (The Street Trader 2006:5). Given the lack
of clear and consistent identification with any one sub-sector of the working class, other
social categories, most notably ethno-political affiliation, have been used for primary
collective identity formation.
As Klandermans (2008) argues, collective identity can be formed through identify-
ing as a subordinate group with a strong desire for more respect from a more power-
ful group. In some cases, groups coalesce over persecution and channel this common
ground into a social movement that contests the power of the oppressor. Informal work-
ers in Kenya have certainly faced persecution but have not recently coalesced using the
collective identity of the informal worker to channel their anger. Instead, Kenyans re-
cently visibly expressed their deep-rooted anger through ethnic clashes after the 2007
Presidential elections.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter explored the private and public contestation of discourses of power by
hawkers and traders. In private, retailers used small associations to affirm their sense
of self-worth, productivity, organization, rationality, and morality. When faced with
wide-scale harassment traders formed associations and engaged in broad-based riots
against police and government harassment. Despite these violent confrontations none
have resulted in the mobilization of informal workers beyond the immediate period.
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Surprisingly, the two instances of the mass mobilization of informal workers oc-
curred during periods of strong state oppression.17 During the State of Emergency,
the colonial administration sought complete control over Nairobi by removing traders,
burning marketplaces, instituting curfews, and preventing meetings. However, informal
workers who launched an urban battle through Anake wa 40, in collusion with the rural
elements of the LFA (Mau Mau), were a significant factor in the drive for Independence.
The second example occurred in the late 1980s when informals joined the movement for
multiparty politics after the Saba Saba demonstration. This era of extreme repression
and state-sponsored violence under Moi rivaled the brutality seen under the colonial
administration (King 1996:33). Ultimately, the Moi administration realized that the
violent measures were instigating a nascent class mobilization and began to employ var-
ious mechanisms including repression, coercion, co-optation, and the creation of social
boundaries to prevent working class mobilization.
Although on the surface, these movements appear to have formed during the periods
of heaviest state oppression, in reality, the infrastructure to support these movements was
constructed during the periods prior to heavy state repression. Similar to the women’s
organizations that took almost forty years to collectively mobilize, these groups had
been preparing for years — sharing grievances, developing goals, collecting members,
initiating leadership — but only became visible when their mobilization was triggered by
a series of violent events. However, in both cases, this long period of mobilization had
been geared toward larger nationalist causes, and when these goals had been achieved,
the informal workers, as a participant sub-group, could not maintain the momentum of
the movement to fight for their own rights.
17However, both of these mobilizations were couched in a larger nationalist movement organized
around grievances that affected the majority of non-elite Kenyans, and neither of these mobilizations
spurred a social movement to fight for the rights of informal workers alone.
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It remains to be seen whether the recent development of a national-level umbrella
organization to unite hawker and trader interests during a period of reduced repression
can build a strong enough alliance to mobilize effectively once provoked. A review of
the evidence presented in this section reveals several key weaknesses that KENASVIT
may need to address in order to generate a social movement with lasting effects.
First, KENASVIT and its urban alliances are still young and their macro-organiza-
tional structure is relatively unformed and weak. Poor communication between mem-
bers and leaders has led to suspicion, mistrust, and the near collapse of at least one urban
alliance Communication within and between alliances needs to be improved to address
problems before they result in disbanding an alliance.
Far from having to derive new communication strategies to unify isolated individu-
als, leaders of a social movement of informal workers have a variety of existing path-
ways to help mobilize members. Retailers have adapted methods for cost-sharing of
information by “subletting” the daily newspaper. A large number of retailers read at
least part of a daily newspaper everyday, creating the potential for newspaper ad-based
mobilization. In some areas of the marketplace, the common use of radios could be
turned into a mechanism for disseminating messages concerning mobilization. Also,
the high percentage of cell-phone users in the marketplace surveys (in my survey, nearly
60 percent had a cell-phone for business purposes) also indicates the possibility of mass
communication via cell-phone texting. Currently however, cell phones are currently
used within the marketplace primarily for business and social purposes and not for po-
litical organization, according to my survey.
Second, precautions must be taken to find dynamic and effective leaders that will
respect the members, honor the constitution and submit individual interest to the inter-
ests of the group (The Street Trader 2006:7). A strong leadership will have a better
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chance at creating unifying goals that are inclusive but also concrete and actionable. To
this end, KENASVIT has been implementing Urban Alliance Induction seminars that
focus on improving leadership skills, conflict management, transparent record-keeping,
organization, communication, and resource mobilization (The Street Trader 2007a:5).
Organizational processes also need to be delineated to clarify the relationship and re-
sponsibilities between members and the leadership. The leadership must be beyond
reproach to avoid political patronage or co-optation and must create legitimacy and trust
through transparent and ethical practices.
Third, political co-option and patrimonial favoritism have not only stunted local
leadership development but also affected the continuity of informal workers’ organi-
zations. Traders have been exposed to a variety of institutional programs designed to
benefit them; however, the majority of these have been decapitated, disbanded, or co-
opted, leaving traders reticent to invest heavily in another transient institution. Consis-
tent leadership and broad-based, actionable goals need to be developed that can expand
the membership and produce real results through a social movement.
Fourth, mobilization of a large-scale informal workers’ social movement has been
hindered in part by the government’s successful policies to divide informal identity
based on occupation and encourage ethnic allegiances. Evidence also suggests that
while informal workers share grievances due to their social position, they may not be
aware of their compatibility or collective power if united in one movement. For the time
being, alliances based on ethno-political affiliation, gender, and age are more central to
informal workers’ sense of identity than occupation or social class.
Fifth, traders and hawkers were heavily influenced by policies encouraging training
and micro-finance advocated by multilateral agencies. Four of the five urban alliances
of KENASVIT that stated organizational goals included measures to increase access to
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credit facilities and training of retailers. The use of foreign frames to define local issues
needs more exploration and the organization must be careful not to mirror MYW’s early
example of mobilization around externally-perceived needs or deficiencies.
The women’s movement in Kenya drew its power from being able to unite the inter-
ests of its membership, composed primarily of small self-help groups, across a diversity
of social categories often used by politicians to divide. Strong leaders, such as Wangari
Maathai, were able to create a collective identity based on a shared recognition of the
daily struggles of women and then use this identity to build momentum for political
lobbying and social change. There remains hope that private resistances and the small
associational forms observed in the marketplaces are a starting place for building larger
collective mobilization among informal workers that can lead to a social movement.
Strong leadership, large organizational forms, international supports, and broad agendas
are beginning to take form in order to counter the powerful elements of co-optation,
division, and repression.
The following chapter will return to the hypotheses delineated in the first chapter and
evaluate what progress we have made in answering our research questions. The chapter
will conclude with a discussion of potential directions for future work.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Foucault urges an analysis of power based on an understanding of the intersection of
power, knowledge, and right. In particular, he is interested in how the three spheres
work together to both legitimate and mediate power and how this is experienced in
the margins of society. This dissertation has applied Foucault’s method of analysis to
another marginalized social group — informal workers — by exploring outcomes of
the interactions of powerful forces at the international and state level. In keeping with
Foucault’s understanding of power as a web, this work has also explored ways infor-
mal workers contest macro-level expressions and techniques of power and exert their
own forms of power. This chapter will synthesize the findings by reviewing the three
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1 and summarizing the evidence for and against each
hypothesis as presented in this study. The chapter will conclude with recommendations
for future work that may expand the ideas presented in this thesis.
7.1 Hypothesis One: Power Relations in the Field of Informal Work
Academic institutions, international organizations, state and local govern-
ment, and local social movements influence the construction of informal
identity, albeit with differing levels of influence.
The influence of multilaterals and the Kenyan State was evident as this dissertation
traced the history of the conceptualization of informality from the early 1900s. This
section will discuss international influences and their effects on a broad, global under-
standing of informal work.
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7.1.1 International Power Relations
The world system is composed of powerful actors, only some of which are nation-states.
Since the rise of the Bretton-Woods system, large multilateral agencies have emerged
and played an important role regulating and monitoring the world system. The widely-
held view that these regulatory bodies are independent, beneficent third-parties that seek
technical solutions to the worlds problems has been recently challenged. The Bretton-
Woods institutions were designed to help rebuild Europe and scholars have provided
evidence that shows that they have continued to represent the interests of the most pow-
erful Northern States (Boas and McNeill 2003; Hoover 2003; Cammack 2004; Mitchell
2002, 2006; Elyachar 2005).
Foucault argued that, “we cannot exercise power except through the production of
truth” (1977:93). Evidence presented in Chapter 3 reveals the ongoing “production of
truth” by the multilateral apparatuses. These institutions rely on research conducted
by consultants, very often actors associated with elite Northern academic institutions.
While a range of research stems from the academies, only certain theories and models
are adopted by the multilaterals. What explains this narrowing? This work found that
that multilaterals produce “truth” or knowledge that is relevant to their goals and desired
outputs. This production ultimately privileges certain types of knowledge and forms of
solutions, such that research using these mechanisms are more likely to influence policy.
We found that the most powerful multilaterals, in this case the World Bank and IMF, tend
to privilege knowledge that adheres closely to the dominant development paradigms of
Northern states.
These paradigms changed over time as influenced by political shifts and empirical
analyses that revealed flaws or inconsistencies in the theories that made up the paradigm.
In the field of informal work, the fundamental theories and models used by multilaterals
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to explain the rise of an “informal sector” and justify ensuing policy recommendations
emerged from modernization theory. This perspective was closely related to the U.S.
State Department and its foreign policy at the time that focused on the ideological bat-
tle against communism (Tipps 1973:200). Under this paradigm, focus was placed on
developing rural labor and the modern sector, ignoring the plight of informals based on
the assumption they would eventually be incorporated into the expanding modern sec-
tor (Rostow 1960; Kuznets 1955; Fields 2004b, 2007b). A dualistic perception of the
labor market generated the understanding of informal labor as unproductive, transitory,
and a holding pond for rural migrants, a view that has been hard to shake (Sethuraman
1981:63; Mazumdar 1976:55; Fields 2001:36). Moreover, modernist perspectives influ-
enced generations of urban planners and municipal officials who focused on processes
of efficiency and productivity when organizing African cities. As part of the “unpro-
ductive” sector, traders were not given space in the city and were treated as trespassers
without legal rights to their livelihoods (Setsabi and Leduka 2008).
During the 1970s, modernization theory was challenged by dependency theory and
while the latter was never well-incorporated into the multilateral apparatus, a less radical
form of it briefly appeared in the Redistribution with Growth (RWG) paradigm recom-
mended by the ILO’s World Employment Programmes. RWG impacted the global con-
ceptualization of informal work by arguing that informal labor had tremendous potential
as an engine of national development if it was supported through programs providing
training, access to capital, and organizational development to informal workers (Singer
et al. 1998). Although the RWG paradigm was not long lasting, it did point to enough
problems with the former paradigm that it advanced the beginning stages of a paradigm
shift to neo-classical/neo-liberal economic theory.
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In the 1980s, informals became a centerpiece of the justification for neo-liberal poli-
cies. Informal workers were portrayed as an untapped resource for domestic economic
growth that could help themselves if only the government could just get out of the way
(de Soto 1989). This view paired well with programs that limited the State’s role in de-
velopment to “providing an enabling environment” (WB0 2000). Informals were front
and center of World Bank campaigns such as the World Bank Voucher Programme that
sought to improve micro-economic conditions through private sector development (Ri-
ley and Steel 2000). However, many of these programs never took off after the initial
investment by the World Bank and informals (and other marginalized groups) were left
neglected by the state and abandoned by the private sector (Goldmark 2000). Jeremy
Seabrook (1996:176) summarizes the effect of this discourse of self-help, ”By demon-
strating the ability, the courage, and the capacity for self-help of the slum people, the
way [was] prepared for a withdrawal of state and local government intervention and
support.” The same can be said for the plight of informal workers.
Finally, while the issue of “right” at the international level is outside the scope of
this dissertation, it is important to at least identify the third leg of Foucault’s triangle
of power relations. At the international level, Foucault’s understanding of “right” is
best exemplified by other multinationals such as the United Nations system that regu-
lates the global system through conventions and treaties. Conventions on topics such as
human rights, the rights of the child, torture, terrorism, and the rights of persons with
disabilities have influenced the discourses established by multilaterals and have helped
to both legitimize the power of multilaterals and circumscribe their reach. In the case
of informal work, the ILO played a role in formalizing norms and regulations through
the Employment Policy Convention of 1964. Through this vehicle, the ILO committed
governments to adopt “active full employment policies” that were later monitored by
the ILO’s World Employment Programme (McNeill 2004:43).
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Yet, while international bodies have played a significant role in the generation of
economic theories and policies that have contributed to a global understanding of infor-
mal work, national powers have had a more direct effect on the daily lives of informal
workers. The following section will discuss national power relations in the context of
the Kenyan State.
7.1.2 National Power Relations
The last century of rule in Kenya provides a backdrop for studying the interaction of
power, truth and right. In particular, the colonial regime, the independence government
under Kenyatta, and the autocratic era of Moi were explored.1 Power in all regimes was
extremely autocratic, with the role of the judiciary limited to legitimating and propping
up the colonial/executive apparatus (Mutua 2001; Ikiara et al. 2004).
The colonial government, and more broadly the British crown, propagated a num-
ber of discourses concerning the economic, physical, moral, and intellectual superior-
ity of the European. These discourses ultimately were used to justify the subjugation
of Africans on many fronts. This thesis provided evidence that the understanding of
Africans as a “backward people” who needed to be cared for by the self-reliant, hard-
working, friendly, and generous English race was a widespread norm among Kenyan
settlers (Wipper 1975:100). Moreover, Kenyans were widely seen as laggards who
needed an incentive to work, one that colonists were only too happy to provide. An
early manual for the colonial officers states,
The pastoral races are by temperament disinclined to undertake manual
labour, while the agriculturalists lost the last stimulus to strenuous effort
1The most recent regime under Kibaki was given less consideration because it is so young (2002–
present).
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when the menace of the slave raider and the Masai was removed on the
establishment of British rule. In order, therefore, to incorporate the native
in the rapidly extending industrial system of the European community in
British East Africa, some new motive to effort has to be supplied. Such
incentives as exist at present are the desire to accumulate stock and wives,
the necessity of obtaining the wherewithal to pay taxes and . . . the desire to
purchase European commodities (Geographical Section 1920:466).
The British colonial government attempted to derive legitimacy for its intervention
for material gain in part by normalizing discourses of superiority. While many Kenyans
accepted European superiority as a norm, fewer translated this into a legitimization of
European rule. Throughout British colonial rule there were always elements that de-
manded self-determination (see Koinange 1955; Pankhurst 1954).
Thus, a judicial apparatus was necessary to enforce laws and regulations that sup-
ported discourses of superiority propagated by the colonial regime. The British legal
and parliamentary system was adapted to Kenya, heavily favoring Europeans (Mutua
2001). Social reproduction was controlled through legal instruments such as the Regis-
tration of Natives Ordinance and the Masters and Servants Ordinance. These enforced a
strict segregated social hierarchy through housing, movement, and employment controls
that forced Africans into the most squalid areas of town thereby creating conditions that
supported the discourse that Africans indeed must enjoy filth because they lived in filthy
areas (see Furedi 1973:321; Robertson 1997b:12–13).
Sexual reproduction was also controlled through the Employment Act by discourag-
ing the wives of urban laborers to live with them in the city and by conducting regular
evictions of prostitutes (White 1986; Bujra 1975). This dissertation highlighted how
the entrance of women into retailing was facilitated because women could not provide
industrial labor and prostitutes had to have “legitimate” employment to remain in the
city, thus forever changing the face of urban informal labor.
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The myth of the superior “productive capacity” of the colonists was also supported
by regulations such as the Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance, the Agricultural Ordinance, and
the Market of Natives Produce Ordinance, which indentured Kenyan men and women to
the cash crop system and limited trade and indigenous enterprises. The Credit to Natives
Ordinance of 1926 was imposed to restrict the credit available to Kenyans seeking loans
to start large enterprises. When legal tactics were not enough to keep workers from
retaliating, the administration made concessions, such as slightly increasing available
licenses to appease unhappy traders (Robertson 1997b; Furedi 1973).
The colonial administration also used coercion, most notably through “pacification
schemes” and forced evictions, to further its economic and political interests (Bryce-
son and Potts 2005:185–186). The use of force increased significantly as the colonial
government felt its power slipping and declared a state of emergency in 1952. The
criminalization of trading and brutal eviction of traders from Nairobi to rural intern-
ment camps increased substantially during this time. During the Emergency, traders
were labeled as subversive and were treated as dangerous criminals and health hazards.
Hawkers and traders could be removed at will through the laws such as the Vagrancy
Act and the Public Order Ordinance (Robertson 1997b). Although the popular percep-
tion of informal workers has improved over the years, in part because so many Kenyans
now generate at least some of their income from this type of labor, this negative percep-
tion was foundational in creating their identity as marginal and unwanted members of
society.
The first president of independent Kenya used the discourses of Africanization and
Harambee to explain his economic and political policies. Africanization was imple-
mented through the Trade Licensing Act of 1967, which tightened regulations for re-
newing a license to the point that it restricted the involvement of non-Kenyans in trade.
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The Act also restricted non-Kenyan enterprises to major urban areas and uncommon
commercial goods (Swainson 1978). While this policy may sound like it would be
beneficial to the increasing numbers of Kenyans without formal jobs, Africanization es-
sentially came to represent the process by which Kenyatta privileged family members,
Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA) elites, and other loyalists by installing
them in high-ranking political or industrial positions and/or giving them economic con-
trol over modern-sector industries (Bryceson and Potts 2005:186). Despite the pan-
African origin of Africanization, Kenya remained a highly unequal capitalist state and
African Socialism was merely an intellectual construct.
Africanization proved to be of little benefit to hawkers and traders, the plight of
which Kenyatta either ignored or exacerbated through iterative policies of marginaliza-
tion and repression. This treatment was not much different from that which charac-
terized informal work in the colonial period. Moreover, the discourse of “productivity”
under the paradigm of modernization theory was used to define labor sectors to the detri-
ment of informal workers. Since trading activities were considered unproductive and
traditional, to be eliminated with modernization, this theory was ultimately used jus-
tify the poor treatment of informals. Operation Clean Up expelled thousands of traders
justified by this new discourse of “productivity” and the perpetuation of colonial era dis-
course that portrayed informals as filthy vagrants that endangered the moral and physical
fabric of public space (Robertson 1993). The answer to this problem of “vagrancy” was
modernist city planning that emphasized order, control, and efficiency, necessitating an
eviction of those not viewed as fitting this understanding of “proper” urban activities
(Brown and Lyons 2010). The discourse of vagrancy was used to perpetuate the notion
that informals had no place in or right to conduct their work in the city.
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The counterpart of Africanization was Kenyatta’s notion of Harambee (self-help).
This policy associated positive moral norms with self-help initiatives, encouraging Ken-
yans to pull together and assist the new nation in its development. This had the effect
of distracting attention away from State-led development and forcing poor Kenyans to
finance their own “development.”
A coup attempt shortly after President Moi took office in 1978 was the catalyst for
an increasingly autocratic government. Moi consolidated power in the executive such
that discourses his office perpetuated were accepted de facto. One such example is the
discourse of Nyayo (footsteps) that the President used to build legitimacy for his regime
when he was not particularly popular (Throup 1993:383). The term Nyayo branded
everything from the President himself to a new stadium to new sheds built for small-
manufacturers, and was used to generate legitimacy by creating an emotional connec-
tion to the dearly loved former President Kenyatta. Moi followed in the footsteps of
the Kenyatta, in part by encouraging the spirit of Harambee by elevating the status of
small-manufacturers (jua kali) as a prime example of the positive spirit of self-help. The
move was intended to build the legitimacy of the executive but also served to divide the
interests of informal workers. As a result jua kali gained privileges such as access to
capital, rights to working space, reduced police harassment, more respect from the pop-
ulace, and government ministries dedicated to helping them become more successful
(Macharia 1993). Education reform measures were quickly passed by the single-party
Parliament, that once implemented, had the effect of changing how jua kali were per-
ceived (King 1996).
While Moi did not introduce much new legislation that directly affected informal
workers, he also did not seek to redress colonial era policies that were harming them
(Gichira 1991). He sometimes used these discriminatory acts to justify his repressive
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measures and other times exercised coercive force. Increasingly after 1982, he relied
on State police to implement extra-legal means to control informal workers, particularly
hawkers and traders who were still viewed by the government as “subversive” (Mutua
2001; Reuters 1990) The use of mechanisms outside the law was made possible because
Moi curtailed and co-opted the judicial system such that,
political murder, detention without trial, arbitrary arrests and detentions,
false and politically motivated charges of opponents, both real and imag-
ined, became the business of the state. State and KANU officials committed
crimes with impunity. Laws and constitutional amendments that abrogated
due process protections and the independence of the judiciary were passed
without parliamentary debate or resistance (Mutua 2001:98).
Moreover, President Moi removed the security of tenure for judges, made Kenya a de
jure one party state, increased the amount of time suspects could be held without charge,
and gave himself the power to dismiss the Attorney General and the Auditor General
(two checks on his power) at his discretion (Mutua 2001:101–102). Thus, when leaders
of hawkers and traders associations were arrested or otherwise removed from leadership,
thereby preventing the mass mobilization and organization of this sector, there was little
anyone could do. Traders rioted in protest but the repressive measures of the State
ensued with a vengeance. Demolitions of small enterprises and marketplaces increased
in the 1990s, leading some to say that informals were treated worse in independent
Kenya then they were treated under the repressive colonial regime (Ikiara 1991:316 in
King 1996).
Thus, under the autocratic regimes of the colonial government, Kenyatta, and Moi,
Foucault’s triangular relations of power became circumscribed by the State/colonial ap-
paratus to the point where all relations were simply mutually reinforcing. Discourses
propagated by the executive became normative whether or not they were made into laws
by parliament or enforced by the judicial branch. Laws were often forced through the
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one-party parliament and were enforced to a degree often outside of the law but extra-
legal measures were not prosecuted because of the consolidated power of the executive
(Ikiara et al. 2004). Right was not functioning effectively to mediate power, creating
a feedback loop that privileged power and its creation of discourse. In the case of the
discourse of Nyayo and the jua kali, these state-created identities had enormous reper-
cussions for how informals in Kenya would be viewed from the 1980s onward.
7.1.3 Conclusion
Evidence presented in this work highlighted how the intersection of power, truth, and
right both at the international and national level affected informal workers. At the macro
level, these forces had the effect of creating and disseminating macro-economic theories
to explain how the labor market functioned.
This work provided evidence of several key ways that workers in Kenya felt the im-
pact of this discourse through policy recommendations that privileged modern sector de-
velopment and self-help policies. First, informal workers were ignored as a component
of national development and the State did not enact policies that benefitted informals.
Second, the assumed unproductive nature of the informal sector became a justification
for the state to enact laws and regulations to remove or curtail informal work in Nairobi.
Third, these theories relieved the State of their obligation to assist their citizens, forcing
informals to negotiate the difficult economic climate on their own. Finally, these macro-
theories provided an externally-defined but widely-applied identity for informals, which
would influence not only how others viewed them but also how they viewed themselves
and the worth of their work. This last aspect will be discussed in more detail in relation
to hypothesis three.
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7.2 Hypothesis Two: Privileging of Elite Interests
Groups in power privilege elite interests and their control of knowledge and
material production. As a result, policies meant to benefit informal workers
also minimize class-consciousness and social mobility. As long as informal
workers lack the solidarity needed to form a social movement, they can be
controlled and manipulated to maintain the status quo.
This dissertation explored policy prescriptions of multilaterals and the nation-state in
Kenya with an eye towards whom these policies benefitted. In most cases, elites stood
to gain the most from dominant discourses perpetuated by the State and regulations
enacted on its behalf. This section reviews the detailed evidence presented earlier in the
dissertation.
7.2.1 National Policies
British policies in Kenya, like in most colonized countries, privileged European social
and economic interests (Mutua 2001). Colonial concern over African competition in
trade and business led to movement, enterprise, and price controls. These were instituted
to protect European productive forms and to keep Africans from entering these activities,
except at as laborers for the colonial apparatus.
In the 1930s the middle-class African settlement Pangani was destroyed on the
premise that it was a hideout for rebels, criminals, and spivs. However, evidence sug-
gests that Europeans had outgrown their neighborhoods and needed more “suitable”
places to expand within the city (Hirst and Lamba 1994). In the 1940s, hundreds of peo-
ple a month, especially prostitutes and the “unemployed,” were deported from Nairobi
and returned to their Native Reserve (Robertson 1996; Bujra 1975). Premised on the
association of traders with crime, disease, vagrancy, and prostitution, this constructed
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identity justified the eviction of traders and prostitutes as in “the best interest of the
public,” even though it ultimately privileged European material interests (Setsabi and
Leduka 2008).
Later, during the LFA insurgency, the fear of subversive elements in the populace
was employed to justify the use of physical violence and policies of containment in
internment camps. A colonial officer reported that “the city was permeated by gang-
sters and other undesirables supposedly in unemployment. . . . it was clear that even
more drastic measures were imperative” (Furedi 1973:285). Subsequently, market-
places were destroyed or fenced to separate traders from the populace and constrain
African economic activity (Robertson 1997b). These measures were introduced not
only to maintain political control by curtailing potential opposition uprisings but also to
maintain economic control by eliminating independent business opportunities and forc-
ing African males back to European industries that were badly in need of workers due
to increasingly stringent pass laws.
As discussed in Chapter 5, even the privileging of small entrepreneurs at the very
end of the colonial period was conducted in the interest of colonial elites. The devel-
opment of an entrepreneurial middle-class loyal to the administration was seen having
the potential to help them regain their ebbing control (Himbara 1989). British colonists
also owned the majority of factories and plantations, which depended on cheap labor
and inputs. Small, stable enterprises could supply the basic needs of laborers at a low
cost and provide locally produced inputs for factories.
This dissertation revealed that post-colonial regimes also implemented policies that
favored African elite. In particular, President Kenyatta installed family members and
elites into the country’s most important industries and formed parastatals that benefited
the political elite. Import substitution policies ultimately favored factory owners, many
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of whom were related to MPs in Kenya, who benefited from reducing their reliance on
expensive imports and from the low-cost of urban living for its workforce (Swainson
1978). When corporations faced competition from more flexible forms of work, such
as street traders, they complained to the government who called in the police. Policies
of repressing or over-regulating traders were instituted alongside urban planning agen-
das based on modernist ideals of control, order, and efficiency that effectively designed
traders right out of urban public space (Cross 2000:41).
When Moi came to power in 1978, he continued Kenyatta’s system of political fa-
voritism by installing family members and members of his ethnic group in positions of
power. He also continued to privilege policies of modern-sector development, creating
more parastatals and giving control of other industries to his supporters as a form of
political patronage. Moi bankrupted the State with these measures and his domestically
unregulated use of international loans for personal expenditures (Mutua 2001). While
wealthy KANU members who could prove their loyalty to the executive benefitted un-
der Moi, ordinary Kenyans suffered. Moi’s move in 1980 to accept an IMF Structural
Adjustment Programme cut social service spending that hit the poor especially hard
(Manundu 1997; Bryceson and Potts 2005:56–57).
Moreover, Moi became increasingly paranoid and obsessive about maintaining pow-
er after a 1982 coup attempt. He entered into a complex negotiation common to dom-
inant groups, as theorized by Gramsci (1971), between maintaining a base of support
for legitimacy while also fracturing it to prevent mobilization. As discussed in detail
in Chapter 5, Moi employed divisive mechanisms toward a potentially powerful “new”
group, the informal sector. Choosing to privilege those who were theoretically most
likely to benefit the material interests of the elite and generate legitimacy for his regime,
Moi supported the jua kali while increasing the harassment of hawkers and traders. The
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poor also suffered directly from the extra-legal measures Moi enacted to privilege elite
interests. In May 1990, Moi sent bulldozers to destroy some kiosks on the edge of a
large slum called Muroto. In the end, the bulldozers had cleared not only the kiosks
but also the slum itself. Later this prime real-estate was given to loyalists to bribe their
continued support of Moi and KANU. This happened again later in the year to Kibagare,
making 30,000 people homeless (Widner 1992:194).
Most recently, the Kibaki administration has sought to eliminate hawkers from urban
areas (Daily Nation 2009a). This policy privileges the formal and elite enterprises that
occupy the Central Business District (CBD), suggesting that informal enterprises do not
have the same rights to urban space. To fully separate this illegitimate form of work
from the legitimate, a new hawkers’ market was built outside of the CBD and fenced off
from pedestrian walkways and vehicular traffic. With only two entrances, access was
limited and controlled. This structural barrier was perceived as a deliberate mechanism
to seclude and segregate traders from urban public space and ultimately part of the
government’s larger project to control the city by eliminating their livelihood altogether
(Setsabi and Leduka 2008).
7.2.2 International Policies
In the late 1960s and 1970s, multilaterals including the World Bank, encouraged polices
based on the economic theory of modernization and advised the Kenyan government
to focus on developing a modern sector and reducing import substitution policies. In-
ternational firms of the wealthiest members states of the World Bank, benefitted from
these policies that encouraged the elimination of import tariffs, the increased market for
foreign imports, and the lower prices of raw materials (Leys 1975; Swainson 1978).
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Modernization theory also promoted state intervention, protectionism, and a level of
market distortion in order to develop exports to the North and keep communism at bay
(Tipps 1973). Such policies demanded large inputs of capital in the form of loans, aid,
and investment from the World Bank and private commercial lenders, thereby benefit-
ting both the World Bank and powerful Northern banking institutions.
So-called “alternative” policy, specifically RWG, could barely step outside the dom-
inant paradigm in that it still saw development as occurring at least in part through
modern-sector growth. Colin Leys (1975:264) criticized the ILO for not seeing the
problem in Kenya as a “struggle of oppressing and oppressed classes, but only a se-
ries of particular ‘conflicts of interests’ which the ‘leadership’ would resolve, if only
from enlightened self-interest, in favour of the common good.” Thus, even “reformist”
paradigms failed to see the intimate connection between political elites and the capital-
ist mode of production that so heavily restricted the potential power and capacity for
transformation among ordinary Kenyans.
Structural adjustment policies implemented in the 1990s signaled an escalation of
favoring the material interests of powerful international forces such as the World Bank,
IMF and their most important members, the U.S. and U.K. (Boas and McNeill 2004).
Such policies removed tariffs and liberalized markets to the benefit of international com-
mercial and financial interests.
7.2.3 Conclusion
This section traced the effects of power and discourse and revealed a clear privileging of
elite interests in the realms of political power and economic production. These policies
supported the ruling system and encouraged the reproduction of elite interests through
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the maintenance of power and control of discourse, right, and economic production.
Does this power circumscribe all elements of life or are there opportunities for resis-
tance? The following section addresses this question using evidence presented in this
dissertation.
7.3 Hypothesis Three: Contestation of Power
Informal workers can exert influence over their own identity, spatial dis-
tribution, and understanding of valuable social processes and forms of or-
ganization through contestation and resistance. However, this influence is
limited by powerful forces. The power structure in Kenya has encouraged
divisions based on the occupation, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic sta-
tus, and gender of workers, affecting the ability of informals to develop
a broad-based social movement to fight for livelihood rights, legality, and
democratic processes.
Informal workers have not been passive recipients of macro-techniques of power.
They have contested external constructions of identity as well as specific policies that
seek to marginalize them in Kenyan society. Evidence presented in this work highlights
how hawkers and traders have used various methods to contest policies with which they
have disagreed.
In the 1920s traders formed small associations based on commodities such as cob-
blers’ and banana sellers’ guilds. Later these associations were incorporated into the
4,000 member United African Traders Association that advocated for the interests of
traders by petitioning and lobbying the colonial administration. When the State of
Emergency was declared in 1952 and traders and marketplaces were targeted for their
subversive activities, a general strike was called to protest the increasingly repressive
policies. Violent tactics were employed in 1960 during the First Hawker War when
hawkers retaliated against the destruction of their enterprises and attempts to control
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their movement by throwing stones at police officers and resisting arrest (Robertson
1996). During this time, the Nairobi Hawkers and Traders Association wrote petitions,
held protest marches, engaged in physical altercations with authorities, and boycotted
designated markets in order to make their demands heard (Robertson 1997b).
Under the post-colonial government, traders threatened to stage a sit-in at the Police
Commissioners office in 1964 if more licensees were not provided (Robertson 1997b).
Over the next fifteen years of Kenyatta’s rule, informal workers rioted, demonstrated,
and otherwise contested the implementation of colonial era policies to control hawkers
and traders. However, in the late 1970s and 1980s, violent demonstrations reduced and
informals turned inward to small associational forms.
As the authoritarian nature of rule increased, especially under Moi, these contesta-
tions became more and more forceful, ultimately leading to the violent confrontations
of 1988–1992. Widner (1992:163) writes “Only in the last half of 1990 did segments
of Kenya’s large informal sector, long considered part of Moi’s “populist” base, begin
to participate in opposition activities and use the sector’s economic position to advan-
tage.” In 1988, 300 women marched to the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner’s Office
in protest of the harassment and destruction of property they faced at the hands of NCC
police. During Saba Saba (July 7, 1990), hawkers and traders from nearby Gikomba
marketplace joined forces with other marginalized groups to demonstrate for multiparty
rule. Rioters burned vehicles, built roadblocks out of burning tires outside Gikomba,
and engaged police with a violent barrage of stones.
Hawker and trader militancy, especially around issue of right to work and urban land
rights, has continued until the present. When the government tried to clear the Central
Business District of hawkers in 2007 they were met with rioting and stone throwing. In
March 2008, hawkers marched in protest of their forced relocation and in June 2009,
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they again demonstrated over land rights, throwing stones at police and burning tires in
downtown Nairobi. This dissertation has provided numerous historical examples of how
hawkers and traders have contested discriminatory policies, demonstrating that despite
its political marginalization, this group has not accepted this marginalization passively.
Hawkers and traders have also contested externally created notions of informality
independent of formal organization, instead creating small pockets of resistance among
peers with alternative notions of informality. Chapter 6 discussed these informal con-
testations of power where retailers spoke about their understanding of informal work as
legitimate, moral, productive, stable, and organized.
For the entire history of informal trade in Kenya, the administration in power has
been encouraging discourses that delegitimize informal workers and their rights to pub-
lic urban space. Paired with notions of productivity and immorality, this discourse of
illegitimacy has been used to justify the confinement of hawkers to marketplaces and
their imprisonment, deportation, beatings, and even murder in attempts to evict them
from urban areas. Traders rejected the notion that they have an illegitimate claim to
urban space, instead seeing themselves as legitimate businesspeople who are trying to
make a decent life for their families. Most were not engaged in illegal or immoral
activities that have been said to occur at marketplaces such as drug running and gun
smuggling (Daily Nation 2008). Moreover, many traders are surprisingly productive.
Although most informal workers were not wealthy, evidence provided in this disserta-
tion revealed that many were making more than minimum wage. Another recent report
found that traders in the CBD hold a combined daily capital stock worth almost USD 1
million (UN-HABITAT 2006).
A number of respondents also viewed their enterprises as productive in the sense that
they were able to use the profits from their enterprise to buy land, cattle, houses and cars,
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improve their diets, and send their children or even themselves to school. Some even
saw their business as lucrative enough to pass along to their children, although rarely
did retailers express a desire to force them into a career. Retailers also used their en-
terprises to exert control over the poor working conditions offered in formal industries,
including long hours of standing, no breaks, cruel managers, low pay, and potential for
retrenchment, by choosing to reject this form of work. Retailers resented the dominant
discourse that had created a perception of their work as worthless, with many expressing
how informal work provided opportunities for independence, entrepreneurship, flexibil-
ity, adaptability, and creativity.
In many ways, informal labor is the epitome of unstable work because workers re-
ceive no guaranteed minimum wage, no benefits such as health care or pensions, and
have no title deed to land or premises. However, traders also claimed that this “insta-
bility” allowed them to be flexible enough to adapt to the changing global and local
economy and thus offered them a measure of stability. Retailers contested the notion
that there is anything “inherent” about the instability of their enterprises, instead arguing
that this characteristic is a result of a long history of discriminatory policies by various
administrations. Thus, traders condemned the arbitrary police raids and the reluctance
on the part of City Council to rework colonial era by-laws that have been used to jus-
tify the eviction of informals. With a more fair, transparent, and consistent regulatory
environment, informal workers could operate much more successful businesses.
Finally, traders described their work as highly organized with complex commodity
chains for both goods and services. Associations exist within the marketplace to pro-
vide more formal organization. Most marketplaces have an elected leadership structure
consisting at minimum of a chairperson, vice-chairperson, treasurer, and secretary. The
executive committee represents marketplace interests to the NCC or area chiefs, noti-
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fies vendors of any policy changes, arbitrates disputes over property, and allocates new
stalls. Also, many small business and welfare associations exist within the marketplace.
While contesting externally created identities in several key aspects, retailers also
accepted external categories of knowledge. Retailers considered themselves, mufanya
biashara, or businesspeople as an acceptance of the revisionary social categories applied
by the IMF and World Bank. Moreover, traders and hawkers were heavily influenced
by policies encouraging training and micro-finance advocated by multilateral agencies.
Four of the five urban alliances of KENASVIT that stated goals included access to credit
facilities and training of retailers. The use of foreign frames to define local needs high-
lights how retailers play a part in their own identity formation through contestation of
and concession to the discourses of power.
7.3.1 Organizational Forms
Without the support of the government, informal workers relied on a variety of orga-
nizational forms including small associations, occupational groups, large organizations,
and umbrella organizations. As discussed in Chapter 6, small self-help associations met
both the economic and social needs of traders — helping them pool resources as a form
of insurance, gain access to credit for large purchases, share knowledge and resources,
and pay for large cultural expenses such as weddings and funerals.
Small associations have played an important role in both the realm of business and
personal needs; however, they have also been unable to improve the political, busi-
ness, or legal climate in Kenya or to transform norms regarding informal work. Only
sometimes have these associations been able to help hawkers and traders build shared
identities that resisted notions of external constructions of informality generated by
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multinationals and the State. Larger organizations have had marginally more success
negotiating for change.
In the 1940s, the African Workers Federation and the United African Traders Associ-
ations developed in response to trader persecution. These large organizations advocated
for the interests of traders by petitioning and lobbying the colonial administration, but
government coercion and co-optation ultimately reduced their potential power. Favor-
able policies toward the jua kali in the 1980s and 1990s led to the creation of a number
of market-place based organizations, including Gikomba Jua Kali Society and the Ka-
mukunji Jua Kali Association, and national organizations such as the Kenya National
Federation of Jua Kali Associations (KNFJKA), Kenya National Jua Kali Organiza-
tion, and the Jua Kali and Kazi Cooperative Union (Kenya) Limited. Although the
KNFJKA has been the primary mechanism for the government’s disbursal of small en-
terprise funds, it largely focuses on small-manufacturing enterprises and never had more
than 400 members. In addition, internal political battles rendered it marginal by the late
1990s. Likewise, none of the other national organizations mentioned above have large
membership bases and few are well known to hawkers and traders. Thus, the history
of mobilization for workers’ rights through large organizational forms seems about as
dismal as through small associational forms.
However, a new umbrella organization for hawkers and traders was recently formed
that seems to be gaining a broad membership base and traction in advocating for infor-
mal workers’ rights. In light of recent research concluding that a major barrier to self-
help was the a lack of consistent uncorrupted leadership and large-scale organizational
structure to train members in local and national-level advocacy, the Kenya National
Alliance of Street Vendors and Informal Traders (KENASVIT) was formed (Mitullah
2007).
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KENASVIT has seen moderate successes in both its urban alliances and national
agenda since its registration in 2005. Among some urban alliances, KENASVIT has
mediated conflicts among the leadership of various organizations and encouraged them
to work together under the umbrella of KENASVIT. This has strengthened hawker and
trader representation and provided a neutral third party moderator. In Nakuru, the mayor
has agreed to meet with the local KENASVIT urban alliance members regularly and has
begun the process of constructing of a new hawkers’ marketplace. In Eastern Kenya,
the Kisumu urban alliance has increased dialogue between associations and the munic-
ipal authority and even taken the Municipal Council to court (The Street Trader 2006;
Mitullah 2007).
At the national level, KENASVIT has negotiated an active role in providing feed-
back on the proposed Micro and Small Enterprises Bill. They have taken leadership of
the initiative and even created a forum for other informal sub-sectors to voice their con-
cerns and suggestions regarding the bill. This cross-sectoral spirit is a new phenomenon
and if cultured, may facilitate a strong, powerful, and united informal sector that can
advocate on their own behalf. The National Executive Council has also promoted rais-
ing awareness by creating a blog, a newsletter, a website, and by encouraging urban
alliance members to represent KENASVIT at the 2007 World Social Forum in Nairobi.
Alliance leadership also organized panels and a hawkers’ rally during the WSF to draw
more awareness of the plight of informal workers. KENASVIT has also been proac-
tive in networking, connecting with numerous local NGOs and attending international
conferences to develop solidarity with other street trader organizations (Okello 2007a;
The Street Trader 2007a:4, 12). Thus, while this dissertation did not find evidence of a
widespread social movement of informal workers, it did find evidence of the beginning
stages of social mobilization among hawkers and traders.
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7.3.2 Conclusion
This section reviewed the evidence presented in this work and concludes that informal
workers can contest relations of power; however, their contestations have not, as of yet,
generated enough momentum to develop a broad-based social movement. There are
many limiting factors to collective mobilization including internal divisions, political
patronage, failure to generate solidarity on collective interests, and the difficulty of en-
gaging poor people in advocacy work with a long time-horizon until potential benefits.
But historically, the most destructive factors preventing informal worker mobilization in
Kenya have been policies privileging elite interests, government mechanisms of repres-
sion and co-optation, and the generation of ethno-political tensions.
Evidence in this work highlighted how national and international discourses and
policies surrounding labor markets privilege elite interests. As a result, policies con-
cerning informal workers primarily focus on improving their skill capital, productivity,
and financialization without improving their collective-consciousness or mobility. This
discourse of materiality has been internalized by traders who fight not for systemic re-
forms but for concessions from the political elite. For example, the vision, aims, and
objectives of NISCOF focus on creating a conducive business environment, providing
training and capacity building, and improving credit facilities without mentioning re-
distribution of assets or upward mobility (The Street Trader 2006). Historically, these
discourses have been extremely effective in preventing informal workers from realizing
their larger interests of reducing discriminatory government policy or instituting a more
just social and economic system.
Second, mechanisms of consent and coercion were broadly applied to control the
strength of hawkers’ and traders’ organizations. When possible, the government used
lucrative civil service positions to co-opt leadership away from representing the con-
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cerns of informal workers. When this tactic failed, strong leaders were often removed
by force. Moreover, riots to protest unfair government policies were met with violence
and repression. The government’s arbitrary destruction of retailer property and kiosks
was used to retaliate for the demonstrations. Although these repressive measures did not
end rioting by hawkers, they raised the stakes of participating. Thus, fewer people were
willing to advocate for the rights of informal workers.
Third, the State apparatus has encouraged ethno-political divisions, which has served
to focus attention away from the collective grievances of informal workers. Ethno-
political tension has affected social organization by influencing trading relationships,
marketplace structures, and membership in small associations. As the 2007 presidential
elections showed, ethno-political affiliation can be a destructive force, not only for in-
formal workers’ organizations, such as KENASVIT, but for the solidarity of the nation.
However, Kenya has recently entered a less repressive era where potentially some
gains can be made in organizational strength. Likely, hawkers’ and traders’ organiza-
tions, like KENASVIT, will still have to deal with attempts to co-opt the leadership and
foment ethno-political tensions, and certainly fight an uphill battle against the normative
understandings of informal workers and their right to public urban space. But, with the
precursor of the women’s movement, the reduction in overt repression, and more open
opportunities for opposition parties, it seems that there has been no better time in the
past century for traders to advocate for wide-scale political changes on their own behalf.
7.4 Future Work
Future research can build on this work by exploring the direct and indirect influences
of religious and scientific institutions and corporations on the construction of informal
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work. Early British missionaries played a role in the colony’s “civilizing mission” to
Kenya. Although missionaries depended on traders for sundries, missionaries were also
ambassadors of colonial policy and a foreign moral code. The influence of Islam may
have been significantly different as this religion arrived in Africa via Arab sea traders.
The influence of religious institutions on the acceptance of trade has yet to be explored
and may offer additional clues to understanding the construction of informal work in
Kenya.
Colin Leys (1994, 1996) called for the examination of Kenyan capitalists at indepen-
dence to understand how much they saw themselves as having class-based (versus ethnic
or gender) interests. Uniquely, in Kenya indigenous capitalists experienced a significant
amount of political power from their overlap with the ruling elite class. Leys suggests
that the lack of a significant capitalist class provided the space for multinational cor-
porations to enter Kenya to initiate capitalist development. Indirectly or directly these
institutions and corporations may have contributed to discourses and the implementation
of agendas that helped to frame informal work. Such institutions and corporations also
likely had close connections with informal workers and may have played a more direct
role in constructing their social identity.
Further exploration of KENASVIT and its Nairobi urban alliance NISCOF is also
warranted. These groups offer the most promising opportunity to advocate for and obtain
improved political, social, and economic rights for informal workers. It remains to be
seen whether they can also advocate for more lasting and systemic change that will
create a more equal and just governing and economic structure. This study could also
include an exploration of the mobilization potential of other sub-sectors of informal
work, including transport, home-based work, casual labor, and services. Understanding
the needs, demands, and existing organizational structure of these sub-sectors would
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give a much more holistic picture of the likelihood for and value of informal worker
mobilization.
This study revealed that mobilization by occupation or class does not seem likely at
the present time in Kenya. Instead, social categories of ethnicity, gender, and age are
more consistent with the ways informals see their place in social structure. Given the
recent political violence and its very real affect on informal workers, ethnicity demands
further attention in the context of informal workers. In particular, a comparative study
of Kenyan and Tanzanian informal workers could explore how the two populations con-
ceptualize ethnic and national identity.
Tanzania offers an exciting microcosm for comparison because of its similarities to
Kenya in language, colonial empire, and rich tradition of local and long-distance trad-
ing networks and differences in its post-colonial policies. After a relatively peaceful
transition to independence in 1961, Julius Nyerere instituted pan-African Socialism to
encourage national solidarity and self-reliance and deemphasize ethnic ties and depen-
dency. The implications of national identity as opposed to ethnic identity could have a
profound impact on the organizational structure of Tanzania informal worker associa-
tions.
Furthermore, the mobilization potential of not just ethno-political groups but also
of groups based on age, religion, family/marital status, occupation and class could be
explored comparatively. Studies of informal work and workers movements in Tanzania
have recently been conducted by Brown and Lyons (2010). Preliminary research sug-
gests that multilaterals (intentionally and unintentionally) heavily influenced the con-
struction of informal worker identity and organization. Traders in Dar es Salaam were
also significantly affected by the World Bank’s policies of liberalization and decentral-
ization. The State required all people to work essentially forcing itself to recognize
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informal work. In 1992, a project instituted by the UNDP and UN-HABITAT included
the formation of a working group on petty trading tasked with strengthening the ability
of formal traders associations to negotiate with municipal authorities.
By 1997, about 240 self-help groups represented 16,000 traders (DCC,
1999) and two umbrella groups were established — VIBINDO (Associa-
tion of Small Businesses) and KIWAKU (an association of clothes sellers).
VIBINDO achieved considerable status, representing about 300 associa-
tions with a combined membership of 40,000 people (Msoka, 2007) and its
three broad objectives included advocacy, acquisition of plots and providing
business information. Guidelines for Petty Traders were published in 1997
(Nnkya, 2006) (Brown and Lyons 2010:674–675).
In 2005, Hernando de Soto visited Tanzania and promoted the legalization of infor-
mal work, the reduction of licensing barriers, and the granting of land titles to traders
(Kovacevic 2005). However, in March 2006 the Prime Minister pronounced street trade
illegal and ordered informal workers off the streets. Now representing illegal activities,
VIBINDO and KIWAKU were helpless in preventing evictions and hundreds of thou-
sands of traders were pushed away from their work in 2007. Over 200,000 of these
traders also faced prosecution (Brown and Lyons 2010:675). On the surface, there seem
to be remarkable similarities between the plight of informal workers in Kenya and Tan-
zania. Further comparative research can explore how similarities and differences in
organizational structure, leadership, and identity formation may contribute to the suc-
cessful mobilization of informal workers.
Research on this project began in 2006 with the goal of ascertaining the effects of
power on informal workers in Kenya. Through both primary and secondary data col-
lection, this project uncovered mechanisms of power operating in the field of informal
work, including normalization, consent and coercion, and economic control. Through
the lens of these mechanisms, it then began to explore the effect of power on the global
understanding and lived experience of informal workers. This work found that a number
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of powerful forces have influenced the construction of global and local informal iden-
tity including multilateral organizations (particularly the ILO, World Bank, and IMF),
Northern academic institutions, powerful Northern States (particularly the U.S. and the
U.K.) and the Kenyan State.
In this web of power relations, informal workers have also exerted power through
dissent, demonstrations, contestation of external identities, and the exertion of power
over other segments of society. These instances highlight that informal workers are not
passive recipients of external identities but instead find diverse tactics to make them-
selves heard in an autocratic society. However, informal workers have yet to exert power
as a collective through the mechanisms of voting and their collective voice in lobbying
is still quite weak.
Informal workers face a number of barriers to collective mobilization that could lead
to a social movement. The history of informal work in Kenya is full of instances of gov-
ernment repression, co-optation of leadership, political patronage, fomenting of ethnic
divisions, and policies that privilege elites. Informals have attempted to form both large
and small organizations to combat these elements with limited success. Most recently,
an umbrella organization of hawkers and traders has been formed, uniting over 5000
workers to lobby for representation on current draft of the Micro and Small Enterprise
Bill. A forum was held by hawkers and traders to discuss the Bill with other sub-sectors
of informal work including the jua kali. These are positive signs that informal work-
ers are beginning to mobilize for lasting political and social change that will help them
support their livelihoods and improve their lives.
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APPENDIX A
KISWAHILI/SHENG/KIKUYU TERMS
Anake wa 40 40 Group political party
Askari Policeman, guard
Camera/wanga Newly opened bale of used clothes
Githeri A traditional Kikuyu bean dish
Harambee Working together for the common good; self-help
Jua Kali Literal translation is “hot sun;” refers to small manu-
facturers and artisans; some times used to refer to all
Kenyan informal workers
Kipande Colonial era pass system
Mabati Corrugated tin/iron sheets
Maendeleo ya Wanawake Progress for Women Organization
Mitumba Used clothes
Mufanya biashara A business-person
Nyayo Footsteps; nickname for President Moi to symbolize that
he followed in the footsteps of Kenyatta
Saba Saba July 7th; the day of a violent pro-democracy rally in Ka-
mukunji
Shamba Farm plot
Sheng A slang language mixing Kiswahili and English
Spivs Suspected Persons and Itinerant Vagrants
Thingira A house built by the parents of a young male to be given
to him upon his circumcision; Kikuyu
Uji Porridge/gruel
Wananchi Populace; populist term for the lumpen-proletariat; citi-
zens
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APPENDIX B
TIMELINE
International History of Informal Work Kenyan History of Informal Work
1890 Kenya becomes a British Protectorate
1899 Mombasa-Kampala railway reaches Nairobi
1901 Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance
1915 The Registration of Natives Ordinance created pass laws regulating movement
1922 Henry Thuku of the EAA arrested sparking violent protests; Vagrancy Act imposed justifying forced evictions from Nairobi
1926 Credit the Natives Ordinance – prevented Africans from obtaining large loans
1928 Food Control Ordinance imposed price controls and distributed licenses
1930s Kawangware Marketplace founded as a trading site for Kikuyu women
1935 Pangani Destroyed to make way for European housing
1939 Native Advisory Council was set up to improve tax collection
1940s Kikuyu drafted into World War II
1940 UATA formed to represent trader interests
Bretton Woods Agreements created World Bank and the IMF
(IBRD) 1944
1949 Voluntary Unemployed Persons Ordinance labeled hawkers as vagrants
Singer-Prebisch theory 1950
1952 State of Emergency declared in Kenya
1953 Kariokor Marketplace partially destroyed
Arthur Lewis – dual sector labor market model 1954 1954 Operation Anvil – 30,000 suspected LFA sympathizers removedfrom Nairobi; Shauri Moyo Marketplace partially destroyed
Kuznets’s curve 1955
1959 State of Emergency lifted in Kenya
Rostow‘s Stages of Growth Model developed 1960 1960 First Hawker War
1963 Kenya obtains independent from Britain; Jomo Kenyatta (KANU) becomes first president of Kenya
1964
Operation Clean-Up – thousands of traders removed from 
Nairobi; Kenya becomes a de facto one-party state when the 
opposition party is dissolved
1965 Trade Disputes Act prohibiting strikes in key industries,
1967 Trade Licensing Act allowed the government to remove non-Kenyans from their businesses
ILO instituted World Employment Programme to develop
police that would encourage economic growth and reduce the
effects of inequality on the poor
1969 1969 Kenyatta outlaws the opposition party Kenya Peoples’ Union formed by Odinga Odinga.
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
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1971
“Urban Unemployment in Africa” conference hosted by IDS-
Sussex -Keith Hart introduces term “informal sector” while 
presenting research on small-scale entrepreneurs in Ghana
ILO releases their Kenya Report officially defining the term
“informal sector;” WEP heads to Kenya under leadership of
Hans Singer
1972
World Bank adopts “Basic Needs” approach; Chenery et al
publish "Redistribution with Growth." 1973
"The Task Ahead for the Cities of the Developing Countries"
criticized dualist approach for being too simplistic 1975
1978 Kenyatta dies; Daniel T. Arap Moi (KANU) succeeds him as president without an election.
1980 Kenya takes its first SAP
Atlas Foundation for Economic Research established to fund
neo-liberal organizations world-wide 1981
1982 Coup attempt; Kenya becomes a de jure  one-party state
1986
Moi visits jua kali  at Kamukunji, dedicates Nyayo  sheds; 
Sessional Paper No. 1 on Economic Management for Renewed 
Growth emphasizes informals as the hope for economic 
development; Educational reform
1987 Small-Scale Enterprises Unit established within the Ministry of National Planning and Development
1988
Ministry of Technical Training and Applied Technology 
(MTTAT) in formed to supervised the Jua Kali Development 
Programme
“Washington Consensus” becomes guideline for neo-liberal
policies 1989
“The Other Path,” by Hernando De Soto – influences many in
the U.S. State Department and World Bank 1989
1990
Saba Saba  – pro-democracy held in Kamukunji that was 
violently shut down by the government; later in the year all 
CBD marketplaces destroyed; Muroto and Kibagare bulldozed
1992
City Park Hawkers Market is Built; Sessional Paper Number 2 
of 1992 on Small Enterprise and Jua Kali Development in 
Kenya promises to provide an “enabling environment” for 
SMEs; Kenya National Federation of Jua Kali Associations 
(KNFJKA) established by MTTAT
International Conference of Labour Statistician – ILO releases
new definition of informal sector 1993 1993 Kenya takes second SAP
1994 MSETTP and the Jua Kali Voucher Program, established in Kenya funded by World Bank
2002 Mwai Kibaki (NARC) elected
2005 KENASVIT registered
Tried to remove all hawkers from CBD amid protests; Mwai
Kibaki (NARC) elected president in contested election; World
Social Forum is held in Nairobi
2007
2008
All hawkers forced into newly built Muthurwa Marketplace; 
Coalition government formed with opposition and Raila Odinga 
(ODM) becomes Prime-Minister
2009 Hawkers return to CBD and police repression sparks violent riots
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
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APPENDIX C
MAP OF AFRICAN HOUSING IN NAIROBI DURING THE COLONIAL ERA
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APPENDIX D
SINGLE BUSINESS PERMIT FEE SCHEDULE
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